THE MUSLIM WORLD

VOL. XLVIII APRIL, 1958 NO. 2

لَا مَلْجَأَ مِنَ اللهِ إِلَّا إِلَيْهِ

"THE HIJRAH OF THE SOUL"

The centrality of the Hijrah in the development of primitive Islam is never in doubt. The Calendar merely recognises a fact. "The year of the Hijrah" becomes the pattern for the Muslim of the numbering of all subsequent time. It not only divides the career of the Prophet into two clear, biographical elements and the Surahs of the Qur'ān into two groups, it also inaugurates the extension of the Meccan mission into the Medinan polity and the translation of Meccan impulses into Medinan fact. It is, furthermore, the occasion of the most familiar distinction of roles, and so of parties, in the common cause of early Islam—the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār, those who made the migration and those who made the migration a success, the recipients and exponents of Muslim hospitality. In these senses "the year of the Hijrah" provides a formative memory for the sequence of years it heads.

But seen in the immediate context of its occurrence, the Hijrah must have been an event of considerable personal jeopardy and upheaval which, until its successful issue was accomplished, called for qualities of tenacity and courage. There were elements of danger both in the departure and arrival, uncertainties of the future intensifying risks of the present. It may not be inappropriate, then, to think also of the Hijrah as a parable of equally crucial experiences within man's soul in its search for salvation. For here was a gesture of aspiration in a setting of hopes hitherto deferred and of fears still dubious in their outcome. Implicitly the whole future of Islam turned upon it. It was the crossing of the Rubicon and, like another Exodus, had generations yet unborn in its unfolding. In that sense the Muslim is always in "the

years of the Hijrah" since he is what he is by virtue of that history. He needs no excuse then for going back in reflection into its historic meaning and its feasible parable.

In doing so, he may perhaps borrow a notable verse of the Qur'ān which, though it probably has to do with another and much less significant occasion of going forth, can well afford a clue by which to understand the Hijrah as an experience. The surrounding verses refer to the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn, though not, as seems likely, in respect of the Hijrah itself. Then the verse in question, Surah ix.118, expresses a memorable truth and explains it as a confession of those who passed through despair and shrinking fear into courage and obedience. "They realised" it says "that there is no refuge from God save in Him." Applying these words, as we do here, to the far more exacting and intimidating event of the Hijrah, do we not find them illuminating the inner conflict of that experience? For there was no shelter from the risks of their journey — risks which it *might* be the Divine Will to have eventuate — save in the mercy of God Himself. The only recourse from feared events of the providential order is the fear of that order's Lord. Is this a possible exegesis? So at least the three reluctant men of Surah ix.116 discovered. Their brethren of the Muhājirūn, going out earlier from under the Divine protection of the sacred city to the still undisclosed fortunes of Medina, had only the Divine goodness upon which to cast themselves. "From . . unto . ." — but all under God than Whom there is none other.

How much Hijrah, Exodus, movement of soul and circumstance, there is in life, how much going out and coming in. Out of the world of childhood into the perplexities of youth; out of the assurance of youth, angry or idyllic, into the struggle with a non-conforming world; out of what we do not wish to be into what we fail to become; out of one into another of the differing sets of circumstances with which social changes, personal vicissitudes or the march of science, may confront us. In all the issues of experience there is this

dimension of Hijrah, of transit from and to these inevitable yearnings of unsettledness wherein "we have no continuing city." From the memory of past provision, with an Ebenezer of the spirit, we must journey from Him Who "hitherto hath helped us" unto Him Who yet well be our sufficiency.

Yet there is another significance to these words, deeper than what arises merely from time and change. There is a Hijrah deeper than these. Perhaps Francis Thompson has, of all English poets, most tellingly expressed it in his "Hound of Heaven," with his sense of a fear that "wist not to evade where love wist to pursue." For God pursues us only to save us. The awareness that we need refuge from God is the first condition of our refuge in Him. The realisation of judgement upon us is the only context of mercy for us. How much there is, when we know ourselves, from which our souls would flee and wherein we know that we flee before the displeasure of God. Our mean ambition, our easy complacency, our low imagination, the whole self-centredness of our being — these are the inward sources of that wrongness of the world of which the external scene is so evident a mirror. Such honest vision of ourselves is an intimation of a Divine judgement, a judgement upon our civilised conceits, our prides of race and culture. It impels us to seek a refuge from God, in a migration of the soul, a movement of spirit, crying:

> "O that a man might arise in me
> That the man I am might cease to be."

Thus to flee judgement is to find mercy. Isaiah the Prophet, contemplating the enormities of his day and nation (Chapter 1) and crying out "Woe is me, for I am undone" discovered the refuge that God Himself provided. (Chapter vi.) Likewise the pilgrim in the progress. The book, the burden and the rags — these were the prelude to the liberation and the Cross. Out of judgement comes mercy: repentance acknowledges the one and awaits the other. Selfward it is the recognition of undoneness: Godward it is the acceptance of forgiveness.

There is, of course, no implication in our use of the passage in Surah ix that the escape from Mecca is an escape from self. On the contrary, the obduracy of the city and all the aspects of its recalcitrance towards the nascent community of Muḥammad are understood as wholly from within the former. But there is altogether no reason, under the guidance of these inclusive words, for limiting the soul's need of Hijrah to realms that are only external. Rather, in the last analysis, refuge from God can never be fully interpreted in commentary, still less discovered in experience, except in terms of those things that most arouse His judgement. And these, clearly, are inward. They are not His indictment of our foes and persecutors, though these may originate the dangers from which a Hijrah has to happen. They are His indictment of ourselves. And then we are impelled to a Hijrah that is more desperate, because the intimations of disquiet have arisen, not from circumstances we suffer, but from the character of the people we have been. It is then we know even more decisively that His judgement being what it is there is truly no refuge from Him save unto Him. It is "the valley of Achor" — the place of utmost menace of ourselves from ourselves — that then becomes "a door of hope." (Hosea ii.15.)

Was not this in fact the experience of the Prodigal Son? It was from "the far country" of a bankrupt selfishness that he came to his Father. But only because he first came to himself. His slow and painful Hijrah, his weary, despondent, reproachful way home, was at the same time sure, eager and wistful, because it was a journey out of self and into love. God's was the judgement upon the follies from which he sought repair: God's was the mercy unto which repair was found. "As is His judgement, so is His mercy." They are the twin aspects of the same sovereignty: our accountability recognised is our salvation begun.

There is one place where, for the Christian, this judgement and this mercy most surely converge. It is the Cross of Christ our Lord. Good Friday most deeply measures the judgement

in which the Divine righteousness holds us and by the same token the mercy which rejoices against it. Here "righteousness and peace have kissed each other." Here we may take the measure of our human sinfulness. For the will to crucify is its plainest index and the deed of the Cross its darkest depth. There is no exonerating, either ourselves from humanity, or humanity from judgement, once we have understood the significance of Christ crucified. This event finds us all citizens of the Qaryah Ẓālimah of this world, in which it happened. At the Cross men come to know themselves and to flee in a Hijrah of penitence for refuge from God. But the refuge-seeker is led by the same Cross to a city of peace, to a refuge of pardon, to a commonwealth of redemption, in which he finds that the God from Whose face He fled is the God Whose face receives him in a welcome of mercy. That "there is no refuge from Him save in Him"' is most wondrously "realised" at the place where the Cross stands.

There many a spiritual migrant has found an inward Hijrah, out of a yearning to be rid of the self it condemned into the promise of its new order.

Al-Fārābī discusses the subject matter as well as the function of political science in Chapter 5 of his *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm,* or "Classification of the Sciences".[1] In the same chapter he treats the Islamic religious sciences of *fiqh* (Jurisprudence) and *kalām* (Theology). That *fiqh* and *kalām* should be treated in a chapter devoted to political science is not accidental, and the significance of this arrangement may be grasped in the light Al-Fārābī's conception of political science and its place among the other sciences.

Philosophy or science, he says, consists of two parts: theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy.[2] Theoretical philosophy supplies knowledge of the things that we cannot make or change. They are objects of knowledge only. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, supplies knowledge of the things which we can know and do. Practical philosophy is also called political philosophy or political science.

Theoretical philosophy consists of three parts: mathematics, physics and metaphysics or theology. Each one of these sciences confines itself to one class of beings as a theme of knowledge. Practical philosophy consists of two parts: ethics, or what Al-Fārābī calls the "ethical art" which supplies knowledge of the noble actions and the moral dispositions from which the noble actions proceed and the philosophy of government or politics proper. While ethics occupies itself with the noble things as far as individual men are concerned, politics "supplies knowledge of the things by which the noble things and the manner of acquiring and preserving them for the inhabitants of the city are realized."[3] Ethics and politics treat of the same subject matter—the noble things—but each from a different angle. They are not two different disciplines but two different approaches. Ethics is limited to the consideration of actions and virtues of individual men, while politics is limited to the consideration of actions and virtues of associations of men in social groups.

This, says Al-Fārābī, is the sum of the parts of the art of philosophy. One immediately notices that he has ignored the threefold division of practical wisdom into economics, ethics and politics which goes back to Aristotle. His silence must be understood in the light of the fact that in the *Iḥṣāʾ*—his most important statement about the classification of the sciences—he is silent not only about economics but about ethics as well. In his enumeration of the opinions common to the "inhabitants of the virtuous city," he passes immediately from the opinions concerning God and the Universe, happiness and the principles of beings, without a single word about the virtues.[4]

Political science thus assumes a predominant position. It is equated

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[1] Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm,* ed. Othmān Amīn (Cairo, 1948), pp. 102-107.
[2] Al-Fārābī, *Kītāb al-Tanbīh ʿalā Sabīl al-Saʿādah.* (Hyderabad, 1927), pp. 20-21.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Al-Fārābī, *k. Arāʾ Ahl al-Madīnat-al-Fāḍilah* (Cairo, 1948), p. 103.

with practical wisdom. As defined by Al-Fārābī, political science

> examines the different classes of voluntary actions and ways of life, and the habits, moral characters, inclinations and natural dispositions out of which these actions and ways of life are derived, and the ends for which they are performed. It also examines how they ought to exist in man, the manner of their ordering... and their preservation. It (political science) distinguishes between the ends for which actions are performed and ways of life followed. It demonstrates that some of these ends constitute true happiness, others imaginary happiness; and that that which is true happiness cannot possibly be attained in this life but in the life to come. It also demonstrates that the actions and ways of life that would lead to true happiness are the noble things and the virtues, and the condition of their existence in man is that they should be properly and commonly practiced in cities and nations. [5]

Al-Fārābī's political science or political philosophy, like classical political philosophy, starts with ends; it takes its bearings by how men ought to live, or better, by what they ought to be, and not by how they live or by what they are. If political science takes its bearings by man's natural end, and if happiness is the highest of human ends, political science must be the highest of all sciences, the most "architectonic" as Aristotle put it. Happiness is the good desired for its own sake, it is the ultimate end of man, his perfection. If happiness can be attained only in a political community, [6] and if the distinction between true and imaginary happiness precedes the distinction between virtue and vice, perfect and imperfect, ethics ceases to be an autonomous study of the moral virtues and becomes subordinate to political science. The distinction between good and bad, virtue and vice, perfect and imperfect, is made not by a science of ethics separate from politics, but a science of politics which, in its broad sense, includes both ethics and politics. This being the case, it would no longer be necessary or possible to divorce ethics from politics. In other words, there is no ethics that precedes politics or is separable from it. [7]

Political science or political philosophy assumes this priority because it treats of ends, not for individual men, but for political communities. Ethics treats of the régime of the individual man himself, while political science treats of regulations and prescriptions by which men govern or guide other men. Politics is concerned with the realization of happiness for man through the agency of the political association, the city or the state. It is rather difficult to make a distinction between politics and ethics in view of the fact that actions, habits and institutions are not separate classes of things each characteristic of a certain science, as in the case of the theoretical sciences. Politics and ethics are not separate sciences treating of independent subject matters, but different approaches to common problems. The practical sciences are not independent of one another. What one science makes another uses. The end of one becomes in turn the means of realizing that of another.

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103; the author attempted to render the original Arabic without any change in style.

[6] *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 78.

[7] *Iḥṣā'* 103; cf. Leo Strauss, "Quelques rémarques sur la science politique de Maimonide et de Farabi", *Revue des Études Juives*, C (1936), p. 11.

Politics or the royal art alone uses the products of all the other practical arts in order to produce happiness which is the highest of all practical goods. The moral virtues—products of the ethical art—are means for political ends. If the study of man's natural end belongs to politics and not to ethics, the moral virtues can only be understood with a view to their political function. Virtue is the concern of politics insofar as it contributes to man's perfection. Al-Fārābī's subordination of ethics to politics means that the moral life is not the highest type of life, that the moral virtues and their exercise are not man's ultimate end. The highest perfection peculiar to man is intellectual perfection or what Al-Fārābī calls *kamāl naẓarī*. [8]

This 'architectonic' position of politics is assigned to it not only in relation to the practical sciences, but to the theoretical sciences as well—a conclusion confirmed in a statement in the treatise on the attainment of happiness—*Taḥṣīl al-Saᶜādah*. We shall render as literal a translation as possible of this important statement. After stating that man's ultimate perfection is realizable by certain rational principles, and that material objects are necessary for its realization, Al-Fārābī continues as follows:

> ...and that by nature each [man] has to be bound with other men in everything he seeks. He, therefore, needs to associate with his kind, and for this reason he is called the social or political animal. Hence, arises another science and another type of speculation which searches for these rational principles, and for the actions and habits by which man seeks his perfection. This is human or political science. It [this science] begins by speculating about the beings that are beyond the natural beings, following the same methods used in the study of the natural beings... Until it [political science] reaches a certain being which is the first principle of all beings. Once it gets to know this being, it will then examine what the order of all beings ought to be if that being were the principle and the cause of their existence... It will know things by their first causes. [9]

This, says Al-Fārābī, is the "divine speculation about beings." If political science determines what true happiness is, and if true happiness consists of the knowledge of 'separate beings', God and the angels, [10] political science must occupy itself with things 'divine.' Consequently, it is no more possible to separate 'political' and 'divine' things. This may partially explain why Al-Fārābī discusses the religious sciences of *fiqh* and *kalām* as corollaries to political science.

There is the danger that political science, thus defined or understood, would usurp the function of metaphysics or theology, and the distinction, made at the outset, between theoretical and practical sciences seems to have been blurred. Political science appears to invade the domain of the theoretical sciences of physics and metaphysics. [11] Yet Al-Fārābī cannot leave us with such contradictory conclusions; and a little further, he gives us a clue to the connection that exists between metaphysics and politics.

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[8] Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Saᶜādah* (Hyderabad, 926), p. 16.
[9] *Taḥṣīl* 14-15.
[10] *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 66.
[11] *Taḥṣīl* 14. It is important to remember in this connection that his most important political books are at the same time metaphysical treatises.

Political science prescribes the opinions about all beings, natural and divine, that the inhabitants of the *madīnah fāḍilah* ought to have in common. In Al-Fārābī's system, as in Plato's, metaphysics and politics are intimately connected. This close connection is intimated in his identification of the Imām—head of the Muslim politico-religious community—with the philosopher. [12] But to identify the Imām or *ra'īs awwal* with the philosopher is not to identify politics and metaphysics (philosophy). What then is the connection between politics and metaphysics? In what sense does political science concern itself with the theoretical sciences? Political science concerns itself with the theoretical sciences insofar as they are related to the organization and life of the political community. It seeks to discover the rational principles by which people living in political associations attain happiness, everyone according to his natural disposition. [13]

Political science concerns itself with the theoretical sciences for more than formal reasons. Since the end of political science is man's happiness as a member of the political community, and since happiness or perfection depends not only on actions but also on opinions, it prescribes the kind of opinions the 'inhabitants of the city' should possess in common. These 'opinions' include knowledge of the First Cause, the separate intelligences, the celestial substances, man and the universe, happiness and life after death. [14] Political science, as 'architectonic' science and art of arts, exercises supervision and control over all the other sciences and arts, insofar as they are relevant to the life of the city. It is in this sense that political science occupies such a predominant position in Al-Fārābī's political and philosophical system. In view of the basic distinction between 'theoretical' and 'practical,' one should not confuse the supervision exercised by politics with the treatment of scientific principles in metaphysics. [15] There is something in the other sciences which does not fall within the competence of political science. In Al-Fārābī's *Iḥṣā'*, metaphysics precedes political science, it follows directly on physics.

The importance of political science in the philosophic system of Al-Fārābī, as well as in the system of his Muslim disciples, can hardly be overemphasized once we realize that it is the only philosophic discipline to which they assigned the study of prophecy and the Sharī'ah—Muslim Canon Law. It is in their political doctrine that the *falāsifah* could dispute the very foundation of their thought, i.e., the belief in revelation. [16] The subject of revelation would at first impression be expected to be assigned to metaphysics or theology. In his statement on metaphysics, Al-Fārābī does not even mention revelation or prophecy, the

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[12] *Ibid.* p. 42.
[13] *Ibid.* p. 16.
[14] *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 102.
[15] *Iḥṣā'* 99.
[16] Strauss, "Quelques rémarques", pp. 1-2.

discussion of which is reserved to his purely 'political books'.[17] "Political science," he says "explains how revelation emanates from God to the first chief, and with it he manages the affairs of the city, nation or nations."[18] It supplies knowledge about the nature and possibility of prophecy, and explains the need of mankind for the Sharīᶜah. It makes the distinction between true and spurious prophecy.[19] By making revelation or prophecy a subject of political and not of speculative philosophy. Al-Fārābī, as a philosopher, could suspend judgment as to its truth while at the same time justifying its social necessity.

The subordination of prophecy to the science of politics is made possible by the nature of the Islamic religion. Islam, like Judaism, is not primarily a faith, but a law, a Sharīᶜah, which God reveals to mankind through a prophet. The prophet is not only a man of vision, he is also a law-giver—*wadīᶜ al-nawāmīs* whose proper function is to establish laws and justice among men, and show them the way towards a happy life in this world and the next.[20] This juridical and political understanding of religion is at the basis of Islam and Judaism.[21] To the *falāsifah,* therefore, prophecy presents itself as an essentially political fact. As such, and as a universally valid and binding law, it envisages a perfect political order. According to Maimonides, who knew his Al-Fārābī well, the founding of a perfect nation and thus the proclamation of a perfect law to serve as a constitution for the perfect nation, is the *raison d'être* of prophecy.[22]

The perfect state or nation envisaged by the Sharīᶜah reminds one of its philosophic equivalent in Plato's political philosophy. The Prophet or the Imām who is the first chief of the politico-religious community, occupies in the political philosophy of Al-Fārābī the same position that the philosopher-king occupies in Plato's political philosophy.[23] It is therefore in Plato's writings, especially the *Republic* and the *Laws,* that we find the philosophic system for which the notion of law, and especially divine law, is essential. It is no accident that Al-Fārābī wrote a commentary on Plato's *Laws* and a summary of his philosophy;[24] and it is in his prophetology that we for the first time find Platonic political philosophy stated in Islamic terms. This common ground that existed between Islam and Plato's political philosophy, enabled Al-Fārābī and his disciples to give a philosophical explanation of the

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[17] *Madīnah Fāḍilah*; *Siyāsah Madaniyyah*; *Millah Fāḍilah* only to mention his most important political treatises.

[18] *Madīnah Fāḍilah,* 102; *al-Millah al Fāḍilah,* Leiden, Cod. Or. Lugd. Bat., MSS, 1002, fol. 59-60.

[19] Cf. Avicenna, *Tisᶜu Rasā'il* (Cairo, 1908), p. 108.

[20] *Revue des Etudes Islamiques,* 1935, p. A221.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] Strauss, "Quelques", p. 20.

[23] *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 87-90; cf. *Republic* 485-487.

[24] Al-Fārābī, *Talkhīs Nawāmīs Aflatūn,* ed. and trans. Franciscus Gabrieli. Plato Arabus III. London: The Warburg Institute, 1952; *Falsafat Aflatūn,* ed. and trans. Richard Walzer and Franz Rosenthal. Plato Arabus II. London. The Warburg Institute, 1943.

Sharīᶜah. This explanation or philosophic justification is based on the equation, in Al-Fārābī's system, of the Prophet or the Imām with the philosopher-king of Plato.

Al-Fārābī teaches us that man is by nature a political animal who can satisfy his basic needs and realize his perfections only in political association. [25] The natural differences among men are so great that political life becomes impossible. [26] A law is therefore necessary to maintain order and establish justice and harmony. But why divine law? True happiness or perfection, according to Al-Fārābī, consists of the well-being of the soul, i.e., the knowledge of the principles of beings, God and the "spiritual bodies." But this kind of knowledge is accessible only to the philosophers—*Ahl al-burhān*. Most men need to be guided to truth. A law in general is necessary to establish justice among men, and a divine law in particular to direct them to some form of knowledge of the truth. Human law leads to the well-being of the body, divine law (revelation) to the well-being of the soul. It guarantees that the masses will achieve a certain degree of happiness. "The well-being of the body," says Ibn Sīnā, "is guaranteed by politics, while that of the soul by science." [27] Revelation justifies itself by combining both, for man is not only a political being but a spiritual being as well.

Divine law is an exoteric representation of certain esoteric truths that should remain hidden from the masses—*jamāhīr*. What philosophy renders intelligible by demonstration, divine law represents by means of 'corporeal' and 'political' things. Divine acts and principles, says Al-Fārābī, are represented in terms of "actions that derive from political principles. This is what Plato does in the *Timaeus*: he represents intelligibles by their equivalents amongst the objects of sense. Thus the naught is represented by darkness, or true happiness by what is thought to be happiness." [28] Such comparisons cannot be taken literally, they conceal an esoteric teaching while their exoteric sense is of great utility for political life. Political life is a life of action, a life of choice. Action needs belief, not all men are men of demonstration. Divine law is the condition of a uniformity of sentiment and thus of social stability.

The subordination of the Sharīᶜah to political philosophy or political science, led to its justification on grounds of political usefulness and not of theoretical validity. It exhorts people to a peaceful and moral life. The Sharīᶜah presents itself to the philosopher as a system of opinions [29] and actions laid down for a political community by its chief the Prophet. The opinions consist of opinions about God, the "spiritual

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[25] *Al-Siyāsāt al-Madaniyyah* (Hyderabad, 1927), p. 39; *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 77-78.

[26] In another place Al-Fārābī says that it is these natural differences that make political life possible. If people were of equal and similar natures, a political régime, or political life as such, would have been impossible and unnecessary, *Siyāsāt* 45-48.

[27] Avicenna, *op. cit.* p. 124.

[28] *Taḥṣīl* 42.

[29] *Arāʾ* and not *Ḥaqāʾiq* (truths).

bodies," the generation of the world, man, his soul and reason, and his rank as compared to God and the "spiritual bodies." They also supply knowledge of prophecy, revelation and life after death. These theoretical opinions ought to be represented to the inhabitants of the city in a manner that would convey to them the order in the universe. That order serves as a model for the proper organization of the city. The same order that prevails in the universe must also prevail in the city, nation or group of nations.

The actions consist of the actions and practices by which God and the angels are glorified, and those with which prophets and kings are praised. [30] Therefore, the Sharīᶜah, like philosophy, consists of two parts: theoretical and practical. The practical part derives its universals —*kulliyāt*—from the practical part of philosophy. Practical or political philosophy determines the usefulness of the Sharīᶜah and is superior to it. The Sharīᶜah can only be understood with a view to its political function.

This superiority of practical philosophy over the practical part of the Sharīᶜah leads Al-Fārābī to the assertion of the superiority of theoretical philosophy over its theoretical part. As practical philosophy provides justification for the practical part of the Sharīᶜah, so does theoretical philosophy provide justification for its theoretical part. "Therefore, both parts of the Sharīᶜah are below-*taḥt*-philosophy." [31] In what sense is a science or a teaching below another? A thing is said to be "below or part of a certain science in that it derives proofs (for what it teaches without proofs) from that science." This philosophic justification of the Sharīᶜah amounts to the assertion of the primacy of philosophy over religion. [32]

Al-Fārābī's discussion of the religious sciences of *fiqh* and *kalām* as corollaries to political science, has served as a clue to his whole philosophic system. [33] He wrote at a time when philosophy and philosophers were persecuted by the rulers of orthodox Islam. Using Plato's political philosophy, he could philosophize without inviting the wrath of his rulers. If Plato used the allegorical method to escape the fate of Socrates, Al-Fārābī attempted to restore philosophy to its classical supremacy without hostility to Islam. The role of politics, however, remains subordinate to Al-Fārābī's purely philosophic intention. This raises the question of the relationship between political science and theoretical philosophy.

The transition from politics to philosophy is closely connected with Al-Fārābī's understanding of man's natural end—his happiness or perfection. When we come to ask what this happiness is, we are confronted by the fact that man has a double nature. He is not only

[30] *Millah* fol. 52; note the use of 'kings' instead of 'Imāms' or 'Caliphs'.
[31] *Ibid.* fol. 53.
[32] The language of the manuscript is confusing, another reading of the word *taḥt* might change the whole meaning.
[33] In *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 97, Al-Fārābī mentions *fiqh* right after dancing in the hierarchy of arts.

political (human) being, but is also a spiritual or intellectual being with a mind or intellect capable of knowing higher things than things human. Practical or political life is at best a servant—*khādimah*—of the intellectual life, the life of speculation, what Aristotle calls "theoria." [34] Al-Fārābī leaves us in no doubt as to where he stands on this point. He says that all the faculties of the soul are made "to serve" the rational and are "lower than it in rank and dignity." [35] The rational faculty itself is divided into a theoretical and a practical part, and the practical is subservient to the theoretical. The function of the theoretical is to know and attain happiness. [36]

His views on man's theoretical perfection or true happiness are stated in his treatise on Plato's Philosophy. [37] His understanding of Plato's intention is a clue to his own. What does Al-Fārābī teach in Plato's name? According to Al-Fārābī, Plato was guided by the question of man's happiness or perfection. Man's happiness is realized by "a certain science and a certain way of life." The science is the science of the essence of each of all beings, and the way of life is the virtuous way of life. Plato discovers that philosophy is the theoretical art that supplies this science, and the royal art is the practical art that supplies the way of life. He also discovers, so Al-Fārābī tells us, that philosopher and king are one and the same. [38]

The identification of 'philosopher' and 'king' leads one to believe that philosophy and the political art are identical. Al-Fārābī substantiates this conclusion by saying somewhere else, [39] that philosophy is the art by which the 'noble things' become our possession and through which we attain happiness. If philosophy is concerned with happiness and if happiness is also the subject of political science, philosophy becomes essentially a political investigation. [40] This is irreconcilable with Al-Fārābī's sharp distinction between philosophy, the art that supplies the science of the essences of all beings, and politics, the art that provides the virtuous way of life.

The definition of philosophy as the theoretical art that supplies the science of the essence of each of all beings, a definition he maintains as final, leads us to assert that he is far from identifying philosophy with the royal art. Philosophy is the theoretical art which finds its end or its completion in the simple activity of knowing. True or ultimate happiness is knowledge—scientific knowledge—of all beings, natural and divine. The science supplied by the art of philosophy is the maximum of man's perfection and his ultimate end. Philosophy is also

[34] Aristotle, *N. Ethics,* vi.6.1141a.
[35] *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 67-68; cf. Galeni, *Compendium Timaei Platonis.* ("Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi Ser. II, V. I", Londonii, 1951), p. 33.
[36] *Siyasāt* 43.
[37] *Falsafat Aflatūn.* I owe the central theme of this interpretation to Professor Leo Strauss's comprehensive study of this important treatise, "Farabi's Plato", *American Academy for Jewish Research,* I (1945), 357-393.
[38] *Falsafat Aflatūn* 3-4.
[39] *Ibid.* pp. 12-13; cf. *Tisʿu Rasā'il,* 124.
[40] *Millah* fol. 55.

identified with the art of demonstration—*ṣināᶜat al-burhān*—which leads to the science of the beings. The science of the beings is also called philosophy. [41] Philosophy is then essentially theoretical philosophy and, as such, it excludes the study of political and moral subjects. The theoretical life is the highest type of life, it is the highest excellence of the human intellect—of man.

However, philosophy must justify itself by being concerned with moral and political questions. In other words, it has to translate itself into human, i.e., political and moral, terms since it is manifestly concerned with human happines. Al-Fārābī's identification of the Imām or king with the philosopher and his identification of philosophy with the royal art, is another way of recognizing the need for the philosophic reflection upon things human. If the philosopher cannot rule the city, he must act as an adviser to the ruler. Thus Al-Fārābī makes the distinction between the 'king of the city' and the 'manager—*mudabbir*—of the king of the city'. [42] The *mudabbir* is none but the philosopher himself. "Philosophy contains the royal art which is lower than it in rank and dignity." [43]

To say that the royal art is lower in rank and dignity than philosophy, is to say that philosophy is necessary for the royal art, and for the virtuous way of life. Yet Al-Fārābī makes the distinction between the "virtuous" royal art and the "non-virtuous" royal art. [44] The latter does not need the universals of the virtuous royal art, nor does it need philosophy. Non-virtuous kings attain their aims—wealth, pleasure, honour, and power—with the help of an "experimental faculty" acquired by experience in particular actions that lead to such imaginary goods, and the help of a "sensual aptitude" for the knowledge of such actions. "Their life has no fixed purpose, and it is useless to appeal to them to do what is truly good." [45] On the other hand, philosophy is necessary, rather indispensable, for the virtuous royal art; it supplies the knowledge of the universals of this art. The ruler of the city must have a perfect knowledge of theoretical philosophy, because it is only by theoretical philosophy (and not the Sharīᶜah or the royal art) that he would have a true knowledge of "God's ordering of the universe and be able to imitate Him." [46] The royal art is the virtuous royal art only if it is allied with theoretical philosophy. Philosophy and the royal art are not only two distinct sciences, but also the former is superior to the latter and to divine law. [47]

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[41] *Tanbīh* 71; cf. Strauss, "Farabi's Plato". 364-65.
[42] *Millah* fol. 60.
[43] *Ibid.* fol. 53.
[44] *Ibid.* fol. 58; *Iḥṣāʾ* 106.
[45] *Millah* fol. 58; *Iḥṣāʾ* 107; cf. Aristotle, *N. Ethics,* i. 3. 1095a: "Theory is as unprofitable to persons of this character (juvenile) as it is to the morally weak. On the other hand, those whose appetites and acts are guided by a consistent rule (rational principle) will find a knowledge of the theory to be of the highest value."
[46] *Millah* fol. 60.
[47] *Ibid.* fol. 58; cf. *N. Ethics,* vi.3.1141a: "It is evident also that philosophic

Al-Fārābī seems also to intimate that the royal art is necessary to philosophy. Philosophy alone is insufficient to guarantee happiness for the political community, it must be supplemented by the royal art. This follows from his initial statement that happiness is realizable by a science and a way of life, and that the royal art supplies the way of life while philosophy supplies the science. How could philosophy be at the same time sufficient and insufficient for the attainment of happiness? The answer may be found in Al-Fārābī's assertion that philosophy is sufficient to produce happiness or perfection to philosophers only. [48] What about the rest of mankind? Philosophy will guarantee happiness for all men if it were allied with the royal art. It must assume its "royal position" before it can guarantee happiness for the city. This presupposes the realization of the perfect régime which amounts to saying that mankind is doomed. What about the philosophers living in a bad city? They may live happily in "these cities." [49] They are forced to live in "these cities" without being parts of them. As "strangers" they are always seeking an "other city," a city in which philosophy is the royal art. [50]

How can one be truly happy in a place where he does not feel at home? A philosopher living in a bad city is like an animal "with the legs of a dog and the body of a horse." [51] This unnatural combination leads to the paradoxical conclusion that philosophers cannot be happy in a bad city. The clue to this seeming contradiction lies in Al-Fārābī's distinction between happiness and perfection. Happiness is not the possession of the "noble things" but a state "coextensive" with their possession. The noble things are human (political) things and, as such, they do not exist in a bad city; but so far as man can live the intellectual life, he rises above the merely practical and political, and in so doing he lives a life which is in a higher and in a truer sense his own. For intellect is more truly man's own self than any other part of him. It is the real man. Therefore, man's perfection is the perfection of the best that is in him, his intellect.

It is in this sense that philosophers can achieve true happiness—perfection—in a bad city. They transcend political life and in so doing become "strangers." However, political life remains essential because man's intellectual life at its best can only be understood in contradistinction to his political life at its best.

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wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same; for if the state of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be called philosophic wisdom, there will be many philosophic wisdoms..."

[48] *Falsafat Aflatūn* 4; *Madīnah Fāḍilah* 78-79.

[49] *Siyāsāt* 50.

[50] *Falsafat Aflatūn* 20.

[51] *Millah* fol. 56.

THE KARAOUINE AT FEZ

Due to the seclusion in which it had chosen to live through most of the 18th and 19th centuries and to its occupation by France, from 1912 to 1956, Morocco remained practically unknown to the rest of the world. Even the professional Arabist knew far less about it than he did about the Near East. Thus it is seldom realized that Morocco was the first western country to produce a university that has functioned uninterruptedly to the present day.

The Karaouine mosque at Fez was founded by Fāṭimah bint Muḥammad al Fihri, the daughter of a wealthy citizen from Kairouan in Tunisia, in 859 A.D. (a hundred years before the foundation of the Al-Azhar mosque in Cairo). The original building was of modest dimensions, but it was greatly enlarged in the following century. Both its physical dimensions and its educational scope kept increasing from year to year. Having already in 918 become the official mosque in which the sultan attended the Friday prayers, the Karaouine was taken over by the State. From the Idrīsī in the 9th century to the Alaouites in the present, the Karaouine was being enlarged and embellished by successive dynasties. But it attained its present size already under the Almoravid Sulṭān ʿAlī ibn Yūsuf (1106-1145). The largest mosque in Africa—it accommodated 22,000 worshippers—the Karaouine soon also became the chief centre of Muslim scholasticism in Africa, and one of the leading ones in Islam in general. While architecturally less distinguished than some of the other mosques at Fez, it impresses by size and dignity, and in its two arched pavilions it possesses specimens of Moorish architecture whose grace and beauty are unsurpassed by anything in the Alhambra at Granada.

Though the library of the Karaouine is today but a pale shadow of what it must have been at the time when the Merinid Sulṭān Abū Inan stocked it with thousands of manuscripts that formed part of the booty won from the Christian King of Seville, some of its possessions still give the visitor a genuine thrill: for example, a volume of Ibn Khaldūn's *History* in which the author had annotated in his own hand that this was a genuine copy, a working copy of Ibn Rushd and an Ms. written entirely by Ibn Khāṭimah, not to speak of some magnificent copies of Al-Bukhārī's Ḥadīth. (That these treasures are in a pitiful state and that the Moroccan Government is too poor to house them in conditions that would more effectively assure their future, is a matter for regret.)

The golden era of the Karaouine was in the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th centuries, that is, under the Almohades and throughout the reign of the Merinids, those eager patrons of learning and builders of some of the city's most exquisite architectural monuments. In those days the university attracted students not only from Africa and the Muslim world beyond, but even from Europe.

Among its teachers or students we find Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn Khaṭīb, Al Bitrūjī, Ibn Harazim, Ibn Bajjā, possibly Ibn ᶜArabī. It is claimed that it was at the Karaouine that Gerbert of Auvergne (930-1003), the future Pope Sylvester II, first encountered the Arabic numerals and the use of the zero, both of which he is somtimes held responsible for having introduced into Europe. Ibn Maymūn (Maimonides), too, is supposed to have studied at the Karaouine, namely under ᶜAbd al ᶜArab ibn Muwāshah. The great traveller and chronicler of Africa, Ḥasan ibn al Waẓẓān, known as Leo Africanus (1494-1552), was yet another Karaouine scholar.

When, at the end of the 15th century, western Christendom, personified by Ferdinand and Isabella, gained its decisive victory over western Arabism, and the Moors had to desert the beautiful civilization that they had created on Spanish soil, the Moroccans came to regard Europe as *the* enemy. They withdrew into their African shell. The once profitable interchanges with Christian and Jewish scholars came to an end, and the Karaouine began to decline. This process continued more or less uninterrupted until Morocco's attainment of independence in March 1956.

Though the Karaouine continued to attract students from all over North Africa, its curriculum solidified more and more into a medieval scholasticism that remained untouched by the intellectual advances in the rest of the world. The decline was accelerated in the second half of the 19th century, when European colonialism spread its tentacles over North Africa, and then again under the French between 1912 and 1956. The difference in the Karaouine's scholastic standards between the first half of the 19th century and the corresponding period in the present century is best illustrated by the subjects taught during those two periods. At the earlier date, when Morocco still enjoyed independence, the Karaouine taught not only theology, grammar, logic, rhetoric and poetry but also such 'advanced' subjects as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and medicine. By mid 19th century and in the days of the French Protectorate, only the following subjects were taught: *Fiqh* or law, *Farāᵓiḍ* or law of succession, *Tauḥīd* or theology, *Ḥadīth, Taṣawwuf* or mysticism, *Amdāḥ* or panegyric of the Prophet, *Balāghah* or rhetoric, *ᶜArūḍ* and *Qawāf* or prose and verse writing, the philosophy of grammar and *Manṭiq* or logic. Not a single 'scientific' subject was included. The teaching was done in the least imaginative way possible, one or two books being read and re-read *ad nauseam*, the students learning them parrot-fashion by heart. Questions addressed by students to their professor were as unheard of as was a student's examination by the professor. Though a student might be attending classes for five or ten years, at the end of his studies he would receive no diploma corresponding to anything familiar at modern universities. Instead he would be given a certificate stating that he had

attended such and such classes, read such and such books and that he was capable of passing on his knowledge to others.

The teaching staff was divided into four classes, ranging from actual ʿulamāʾ (who would correspond to full professors) to mere lecturers, that is, young men who had just finished being students themselves. Members of the faculty were appointed by the makhzen (government). The pay the ʿulamāʾ and lecturers received was miserable. While the former supplemented it by acting also as qāḍis, *habūs* officials, or muftīs, teachers of lower rank had to seek additional employment as preachers and muʾadhdhins in mosques, teachers in Quranic schools, notaries or simple scribes. Yet the prestige of the Karaouine ʿulamāʾ was enormous. They have always enjoyed the privilege of electing a new sultan and of signing the traditional *baiʿah* of the new sovereign's investiture. In Fez, they were regarded almost as beings from a different planet. When they appeared in the streets, clad in their white robes, grave of mien, walking at a dignified pace and without looking to either right or left, passers-by, whether illiterate country folk and shopkeepers or rich merchants and government officials, would rush up to them in an attempt to kiss their hand or at least a hem of their garment. Etiquette demanded that they should never be seen in a sūq or in the act of a shopping transaction, at a public bath or in a café. They lived in the rarified atmosphere of social seclusion, as an exalted class left to themselves. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, they could hardly be regarded as intellectual leaders. Their learning was confined to a rigid medieval scholasticism; they wilfully withdrew into a conservatism that abhorred all innovation; they led a life hardly related to that of the world at large.

In spite of the Karaouine's spiritual sterility. Fez remained until modern times the country's intellectual center. Not only Moroccans but also Algerians and Tunisians with intellectual ambitions would be drawn to this ancient city of Moulay Idrīs. Genuine intellectual intercourse, however, took place not at the Karaouine but in the houses of merchants, in political meetings, in cafés and shops. The students' own intellectual life manifested itself at its best not within the precincts of their great university-mosque but during private discussions held in the tiny rooms they inhabited in the beautiful, antiquated and highly unhygienic medersas of the city. It is significant that the foundations of the Istiqlāl party—Morocco's chief political and reform movement—were laid, some thirty years ago, in one of those rooms.

In spite of its stultifying influence, the Karaouine has somehow managed to produce several of Morocco's most progressive and adventurous modern leaders. The most famous among them is Allal el Fassi, head of the Istiqlāl party and, in the past, one of the guiding spirits in his country's fight for independence. However, the qualities of social awareness and liberalism that distinguish these leaders can hardly be credited to the education they received at the Karaouine. They

must be sought elsewhere, namely, in the innate intelligence of the Moroccan people at large and in the reforming zest of the younger generation of Arabs throughout the world. In Morocco, this reforming zest must be attributed to the political and social education that, over a number of years, the present generation was wont to receive through the Istiqlāl party. Because so many members of Morocco's present ruling class are Karaouine alumni, they are fully aware of the shortcomings of their alma mater, and are eager to modernize it.

The present problems of the Karaouine cannot be viewed in isolation. For they represent but one facet of the complex of issues that came in the wake of independence. Among them the following must be mentioned: the requisite integration of a still very potent past with the present; a reconciliation between the commands of Islam and the exigencies of a predominantly secular political and economic system that the country is forced to adopt; and the preservation of Islam among the young, so many of whom are tempted, at each step, by newer ideologies. These problems are neither new nor peculiar to Morocco. But in Morocco, with its specific historical background and its but recent attainment of independence, they have assumed a particular urgency, and their solution seems harder to achieve than in some other Arab countries.

The Morocco of today lives at a particularly acute stage of transition. Few aspects of its new life have found their proper mould, and most of them suffer from an unresolved ambivalence. Though most Moroccans are eager to point out that their country belongs geographically to the West and that its history forms a part of western history, they also stress their close religious, linguistic and cultural links with the lands of the Near East, lands that emphasize their opposition to the West. The Moroccans themselves are by no means certain what the ideological and practical conclusions resulting from their involvement in both West and East should be.

Externally Morocco has changed more since 1956 than it has during the preceding three decades. Officials at the royal palace and in government offices, professional and business men, teachers and shop keepers, have given up wearing their beautiful native dress and are wearing—often self-consciously—the far less becoming western garb. They explain—not quite truthfully—that the latter is cheaper and—more accurately—that the former is not practical for the modern type of work on which they have now embarked. The farther away you move from the centers of power the greater the prevailing sartorial chaos and, often, the bewilderment of people wearing unaccustomed western clothes. Though in purely rural districts native dress still prevails, even there it has begun to be worn in unbecoming combinations with western bits of apparel.

For the first time in a long experience of Morocco, most of the writer's hosts, whether private or official, treated him in 1957, to

western food, consumed with the help of knives and forks. Needless to say the quality of the fare was inferior to that of the native cuisine they used to serve in the past. There were occasions when the order of the courses was wrong by western culinary etiquette, and it was evident that the hosts themselves only half enjoyed what was for them uncustomary fare. At the house of one wealthy merchant who only a year earlier had treated me to a superlative Moorish meal, the last course of the 'French' dinner consisted of a bowl of chewing gum, evidently assumed to be obligatory at a western repast. Instead of the excellent mint tea traditionally served before a meal, bottles of Coca Cola would make their appearance, and they would replace the once obligatory water during the meal itself.

A similar ambivalence characterizes the new manners which are an undigested amalgam of traditional native courtesy, tact and refinement and a somewhat selfconscious briskness and lack of formality. Two short years were obviously not enough to resolve the underlying dichotomy between conflicting epochs and conflicting attitudes. Yet Morocco is enjoying greater inner unity than can be found in the majority of Arab countries.

The prevailing unity—social, racial and political—is due mainly to the leadership of King Muḥammad V and, to a lesser extent, to that of the Istiqlāl party. The King enjoys an enormous prestige, and there is no section of the population that does not acknowledge him as the one man who can bring about a solution of the many spiritual and material problems. Yet it would appear that the rush of events since the attainment of independence has taken even him by surprise. He has to meet many of the unexpected problems in a spirit of day-to-day improvisation rather than after the prolonged contemplation that, in the past, used to precede all his actions. What applies to the King applies likewise to the Istiqlāl leaders, especially the 'thinkers' and 'planners' among them, such as Allal el Fassi and Mahdī Ben Barka. For many years, they had been in the forefront of the fight for independence. When independence actually came, many of the problems it raised proved quite different from what the leaders had anticipated. As must be evident by now, the central problem facing them is: how to adjust a bi-racial community of Arabs and Berbers—both rooted deeply in Islam, adhering mostly to anachronistic concepts, and kept for the preceding forty five years in a deliberate condition of backwardness and racial disunity—how to adjust that community to the demands of a united, modern, western-orientated and democratic State.

The central problem of the nation at large is also the central problem of the Karaouine. But it is doubtful whether those in charge of the old university keep equally close to the demands of the times as do the King and the Istiqlāl leaders. This does not mean that the ʿulamāʾ are not conscious of the exacting tasks confronting the Karaouine. During a stay in Fez, in the summer and fall of 1957, I had

several meetings with them. Some of these ʿulamāʾ were aged traditionalists who spoke not a word of French and who, in their traditional costume and their manners, still proclaimed the ancient standards expected from a Fassi ʿalīm. Several, however, were younger men who could converse in French, wore western clothes and were eager to be regarded as progressive. Both groups agreed that something must be done if the Karaouine is to play a useful part in modern Morocco. But with pathetic frankness they admitted that they did not know how to proceed.

All discussion could be reduced to the following problem: how can the Karaouine make the study of Islam sufficiently real and compelling to prevent young Moroccans from drifting into a secularism that, in a Muslim country, so easily leads to a dangerous neglect of ethical and moral precepts? Humanitarianism, as developed in Europe ever since the days of the late Renaissance, remained practically unknown in the Muslim world whose ethics and morality were shaped almost exclusively by Islam. Thus divorce from Islam also means separation from the fountain-head of ethics and morals. The ʿulamāʾ eagerly admitted the urgency of the problem but they had no answers to offer. Yet, as the chief moulders of religious instruction, it is obviously they who must find a solution. They agreed that some of the fundamental tenets on which the Karaouine education is based called for radical rethinking, and indeed that the entire system must be changed. Yet doubts must remain as to whether even the younger ʿulamāʾ—themselves alumni of the Karaouine—are sufficiently aware of modern educational disciplines to instigate the necessary reforms. It appeared that the reformers would have to come from elsewhere.

The Moroccan government itself is determined to act as the Karaouine's chief modernizer. This modernization is to be achieved within the wider framework of Moroccan education in general. After the attainment of independence, one of the first tasks of the government was to Arabize native education. Under the Protectorate, education was dispensed in French, and Arabic was treated as a foreign language. In fact the authorities made strenuous efforts to replace Arabic by Berber —a language that possesses neither a uniform vocabulary nor an alphabet. In the otherwise excellent schools run by the French, Moroccan history or literature and the achievements of Arab civilization were completely ignored. Now attempts are being made to change all this. But it will obviously take time to train sufficient numbers of native teachers with the requisite knowledge.

Among the more spectacular measures taken in the educational field is that of the creation of the first modern university. By the time these lines appear in print, this university will probably have become a reality. It will consist of the various schools of higher studies that had already been established at Rabat by the French, but that operated independently of one another. In fact the French regarded

them merely as a preparation for a degree at a university in France. There is a school of law, a school of science, and the *Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines* which did some valuable work in the fields of linguistics, history and archaeology, some of whose leaders, however, used the Institute for the dissemination of a subtle colonialist propaganda. The three existing schools are to provide the nucleus of the new national university. Its faculty will consist of Moroccan, French and other foreign professors. The Karaouine, continuing, of course, at Fez, is to become the Faculty of Islamic Law and Letters. Its physical conditions are to be modernized; its curriculum is to be coordinated with that of the University at Rabat; and its staff is to be strengthened and rejuvenated by the introduction of professors from other Arab countries, mainly Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Minister of Education, Muḥammad el Fassi, himself a former President of the Karaouine, has expressed complete faith in the success of the planned modernization.

In spite of the government's excellent intentions, the modernization of the Karaouine will not be easy, for it obviously implies more than improved hygienic conditions for the students and a more up-to-date academic routine. At present, the medersas in which the majority of the students live—though among the country's finest architectural monuments—are, from a sanitary and hygienic point of view, anything but ideal, and they call for very drastic improvements. So does the academic routine. There are no individual class rooms, the various professors, surrounded by their circle of students, squatting in different parts of the mosque's vast court yards. The various lectures proceed simultaneously, and students are free to wander from one professor to another. In spite of this informality, there are no discussions between students and teachers, in fact next to no personal contact between the two groups. All this is to be replaced by methods more in keeping with modern academic procedure.

What, naturally, counts for far more than the external aspects of the Karaouine and its methods is the spirit guiding and permeating it. Yet the spirit of an institution as old and as venerated as the Karaouine cannot be transformed overnight. It will take a number of years before a new generation of professors versed in modern academic disciplines has been trained. At present, even most of the students still show what is called the 'Karaouine spirit.' Most of them come from country districts, and have been comparatively little affected by recent western trends. The secular outlook that is becoming conspicuous among the young people of the cities has, as yet, not revealed itself in the rural population. In the *bled,* religion is still the most pervasive force. Many of the young men from the *bled* do not seek the type of education offered by modern schools run along western lines. They are drawn not by mathematics or physics but by religion and the law. Their ideal

is not the engineer or even the doctor but the religious judge, a *ḥabūs* official or a Quranic teacher.

I have visited Karaouine students in their monastic cells over a number of years, both in the days of the French protectorate and in the more recent days of independence and have always found them modest and humble as individuals, as warm-hearted and generous as are most of their fellow-countrymen, and more industrious than the average Moroccan. Yet in regard to the Karaouine they showed a pride, almost a haughtiness, that contrasted strangely with their personal modesty. True, they clamoured for better living conditions, for classes that were better organized, for a more efficient system in general. Nevertheless, they were convinced that the education they received was superior to that dispensed in the modern schools. On my last visit several of them tried to persuade me that in matters of religion and of the law the Minister of Justice (a most distinguished, modern-trained jurist) and most of his fellow-ministers knew far less than they did themselves. Their attitude was that of the traditional *adīb* or *mutakallim* who would find it difficult to assess life in terms of efficency, technology and material progress.

The transformation that Morocco has been undergoing since 1956 is of so comprehensive and profound a nature that it might well be called a revolution of political, social and economic concepts as well as of modes of living. But in a country as firmly rooted in religion as Morocco, every reform must needs imply a reform of Islam itself. So far there has not been sufficient time for rethinking the many urgent reforms in Islamic terms, and many of the new measures must be regarded as a temporary compromise rather than as a final formulation. While in matters of personal status the provisions of the Sharīᶜah have retained their validity, the civil and criminal laws are still mostly French; and though the majority of the judges administering those laws are now Moroccan, many French and Spanish judges are still in office. While marriage with girls below a certain age is to be stopped, and women are to be given the right of choosing their future husbands themselves and of not necessarily accepting those chosen by their parents, no measures have, as yet, been taken to proscribe polygamy. Yet efforts are being made to go back to the potentially restrictive implications of the original Quranic licence of polygamy. Many of the younger women, especially in the cities, have discarded the veil and mix socially with men. However, in the rural districts, the veil is still *'de rigeur'*, and social mixing of sexes is abhorred.

In all these innovations or lack thereof it is obviously the ᶜulamāᵓ of the Karaouine, by tradition guardians of Islamic precepts and interpreters of the Sharᶜīah, who should act as the chief advisers. In actual fact they participate little in the reforming work, and their counsels are not often sought. All the reforms are being initiated by the King, the government and the Istiqlāl party in collaboration with the Trade

Unions. The ʿulamāʾ do not seem to resent this state of affairs, for they realize how unprepared they are for the exacting tasks facing their country. It is rather they who are seeking guidance. Moreover, the ʿulamāʾ have recognized that, within the framework of the country's overall social revolution, the reform of the Karaouine has assumed a comparatively minor significance. In the days of French rule, when the Moroccans themselves had no power to initiate any reforms, the oft attempted modernization of the Karaouine stood out as something unique in the nation's life. For, in theory, the Karaouine was supposed to have remained a purely native concern. In actual fact the university enjoyed no greater freedom than did any other native institution, from the *ḥabūs* to the Boy Scout movement, and all talk of Karaouine reforms had the air of utter unreality about it. While, today, the modernization of the Karaouine has entered the realm of fact, it represents but one of innumerable reforms. Its success or failure will be but a reflection of the government's ability to reform the country at large.

Are there any reasons for hope that Morocco will be able to solve the innumerable problems facing it? However deficient the Moroccans may still be in certain matters of western-style administration and efficiency, within the two brief years of independence they have achieved far more than even their most optimistic friends had expected. Events of the last few years suggest that they usually manage to reach the goal they set themselves. Instead of adhering faithfully to carefully conceived plans, they improvise, and, on the British model, they always seem to 'muddle through' somehow. Whenever their own know-how or constancy prove insufficient, they manage to find foreigners to help them. Sporadic bursts of enthusiasm often have to take the place of sustained industry. It is probably by methods such as these that the Karaouine will eventually exchange its threadbare garment of an antiquated pattern by better-fitting clothes of modern design. What the ultimate cut of those clothes will be, it is impossible to foretell. But there is no compelling reason for doubt that, in its new garb and with a new spirit behind it, the Karaouine might recapture some of the significance that it enjoyed in the past.

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The Libyan census of 1954 lists the total population as 1,091,830. Of this, about 961,830 are Arabs. Other important groups are: Berbers (40,000), Negroes (35,000), Qulaughli (35,000), Tuaregs (7,000), Tebou (1,200). An Arab (in Libya) is defined as a physically pure (relatively speaking) descendant of the original Arab invaders; he shows little or no evidence of the recessive blondism caused by admixture with the Berbers. Only al-badū (badawīn) groups meet this criterion. The definition must be extended to include those Libyans who follow Mālikī Muslim beliefs, speak Arabic, and adhere to Arab cultural patterns. The nearer kin an Arab claims to the Banū Sulaim or Banū Hilāl, the purer he is in the eyes of his fellows Arabs. The author's familiarity with the history of these two great tribes quite evidently surprised and pleased many Arabs, especially those away from the Tripoli area.

Physically the Arabs are tall (166-67 cm.), have thin bodies, long heads, black hair, dark eyes, straight or convex noses, and relatively heavy beards. In the desert they wear the flowing *jallabah* or *barracan, kafiyyah, ᶜaghāl,* and camel-hide sandals. Women are kept in seclusion and veiled when in public. This custom is more loosely followed among nomads. Arab women are generally tattooed on face, arms, and at times other parts of the body. Some Berber tribes also follow this custom. The tattoo marks are tribal identification and magical symbols to ward off the evil eye, ever real to the Arab and Berber. The Badawī carries a rifle and dagger constantly. In cold weather a light wool or cotton shawl is draped over the shoulders and head. Joseph's coats of many colors are highly prized. Tribal leaders and neighbouring townsmen usually wear a round red skullcap under their *barracan* hood. In the towns and urban centers, especially along the Mediterranean Coast, the well-to-do Arab generally wears a red fez as symbol of nationalist feeling, and, if attending a party where many foreigners will be present, a *barracan* or *jallabah.* His women wear a tent-like *barracan* similar to the *burqaᶜ* of Afghanistan and Iran which covers from head to toe. A thin latticed slit permits limited vision.

Tripolitanian and Fezzan Arabs speak dialects of Magribī or Western Arabic, the language of North Africa from Morocco to the Gulf of Sidra. Eastern Arabic dialects are spoken in Cyrenaica, Egypt, the Near East, and the Arabian Peninsula. Many Berbers speak Arabic as a second tongue, but few Tuareg or Tebou speak the language. Regional dialects vary. The Cyrenaicans speak dialects similar to those spoken by the 11th century Banū Hilāl invaders. The dialect of Tripoli City, Ṭarābulsī, is understood by most Tripolitanian Arabs. In the Fezzan and southern Cyrenaica, Sūdānī linguistic influences have crept in. Italian and English are popular second languages among the educated and semieducated Arabs along the Mediterranean Coast.

THE SANŪSĪ

(This discussion deals primarily with pre-Italian Libya.) The rise, decline, and final political triumph of the Sanūsī Order (primarily Cyrenaica) is the story of the birth of Libya as an independent nation. The Order was founded by an Algerian, Al-Sayyid Muḥammad ibn ᶜAlī al-Sanūsī al-Khaṭṭābī al-Idrīsī al-Ḥasanī, in the 19th century. His first Libyan *zāwiyah* was built at Al-Zāwiyah al-Baiḍā in 1843. The Order drew its strength through its identity with the badawī (*bwadi* in Cyrenaican patois) of Cyrenaica, north Fezzan, and south Tripolitania. Technically and theologically a Ṣūfī or Darwish Order, the Sanūsiyyah preach right living and meditation, and do not condone the use of outside stimulants, such as dancing, music, and flagellations. Therefore the conservative badawī easily adapted to the Order, which also follows the Mālikī canonical rites of orthodox Sunnī Islam. In fact the Sanūsīs are so orthodox they are the only Sufi sect tolerated by the militant Wahhābis of Saudi Arabia.

Zāwiyahs are stable islands, religious retreats, fixed zones in a mobile sea of badawīn. They are a combination school, resthouse, caravanserai, market, bank, law court, cemetery, and sanctuary occupied by Ikhwān (Brothers of the Order) who take care of the spiritual needs of their sponsoring tribe and advise them in legal and political matters. [1] The *zāwiyah* property and buildings belong to the Order as a whole and are considered *waqf* (*ḥabūs* in Libya).

Many tribal subdivisions, as well as tribes, have their own *zāwiyahs.* When a group requests a *zāwiyah,* the Grand Sanūsī, head of the Order, sends a Shaikh to found one. Many *zāwiyahs* were built on ancient Graeco-Roman architectural foundations. The Shaikhs of the *zāwiyahs* all possess *barakah,* an inherited portion of Divine grace which permeates everything near the Shaikh. Thus each *zāwiyah* has a permanent quota of *barakah* as long as the Shaikh lives there. A Shaikh who proved unsatisfactory to the host tribe could be removed by the Grand Sanūsī. The Shaikh's office, however, tended to become hereditary, for *barakah* passed from father to son. Poor communications made the *zāwiyahs* autonomous in most matters, and often disputes failed to reach the seat of the Order at Kufra Oasis.

Most pre-1911 Shaikhs came from Tunisia, Algeria, or Morocco and were learned theologians; many had schooled at Jaghbūb University, second only to Al-Azhār (Cairo) in the Islamic world, but after the initial impact of the Italians, the level of the Shaikhs' education declined until they were almost as illiterate as their badawī flocks. The nomads accepted and respected the Shaikh as a carrier of *barakah* who was learned in the ways of Islam, but always considered the Shaikh as less a man than the tough badawīn. This distinction was

[1] The shift of the Sānūsī Order from a spiritual to a secular power is excellently described by Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica,* 1948.

reinforced because the Ikhwān and badawīn remained mainly endogamous groups. The Sanūsī Order, however, did much to temper the harsh code of badawī life, giving the nomads a better appreciation of Islam.

The puritanical orthodoxy of the Order appealed to the Libyan, who, more than any other Arab outside the Arabian Peninsula, is closer, physically and culturally, to the 7th century Arabs who founded and spread Islam.

The Five Pillars of Islam may as well be sand as far as most Libyan badawīn are concerned. All know and accept the Confession of Faith. Few say their daily prayers. They furnish land, labor, and foodstuffs to the *zāwiyahs,* but regard this as charity, not Zakāt. Few have been or will ever go to Mecca. Most, however, keep Ramaḍān. Many drink *leghbī,* a fermented palm wine, or smoke hasheesh. All love a jihād, and think this will balance out any omissions or additions to the requirements of orthodox Islam. Therefore, we can conclude that the badawī is religious, but not in the conventional, organized way. He believes a man can be religious without following the specific tenets of his organized sect to the letter, and the badawī may often be a more sincere Muslim (though illiterate) than his sophisticated, praying, mosque-going urban cousin.

During the last half of the 19th century, after the return of the Ottoman Turks (1835), the badawīn slowly began to evolve as a nation with the Sanūsī Order as its cohesive rallying point. The Ottoman government dealt with the Grand Sanūsī and the Shaikhs as political entities. Taxes were collected from the sedentary Shaikhs who in turn collected them from the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. The Sanūsī hierarchy protected the tribes from exorbitant taxes and the tribes were not molested by Turkish rule. Naturally many nomadic groups seldom, if ever, paid the required taxes but, on the whole, the arrangement suited all three parties involved.

The first jihād called by the Sanūsī Order was against French encroachments in the Sudan and Fezzan, and the tribes resisted (unsuccessfully) from 1902 to 1912. Compared with the First Italo-Sanūsī War (1912-1918) these Sudan skirmishes were child's play.

The dissection of Africa by European powers in the late 19th and early 20th century was almost complete when Italy entered the arena. After the successful 1908 Young Turk rebellion the Italians overestimated Libyan dissatisfaction with the new régime. Actually, Libyan resentment was a simple, conservative outburst of Arabic orthodoxy against the Liberal heresies of the Young Turks. The Italians landed in Libya, hypocritically invoking liberation. The outside interference welded all the badawīn into a close alliance. Even blood enemies forgot their feuds to draw Italian blood. Evans-Pritchard sums it up aptly: "What gave stability to this new relationship between the Bedawin tribes and the Sanūsiyyah Order, turning the sacred Head into a

secular and the religious organization into a government, and changed a loose confederation of tribes into a nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingredient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously by the Italians." [2]

In 1912 the Ottomans formally abandoned the war in Libya because of the Balkans troubles, but continued to supply the patriots with arms, advisers, and a limited number of troops. The Italian Imperial Legions of the 20th century were not those of Julius Caesar. The easy, few-weeks' war predicted by the strutting Italians lengthened and then slowed down because of Italy's disastrous entry into World War I. The Italians controlled many Libyan coastal towns, but little else.

During World War I the Italians hoped to get the British to conquer Libya for them, but Britain had too many commitments elsewhere. The Turks, fighting on the side of Germany, were not idle. While the Italians were losing more military prestige in Europe, the Turks and Germans brought in supplies, men, money, and encouragement by submarine to the Libyan patriots. A jihād against the British in the Western Desert proved disastrous. The Libyans found the British (including Anzacs and Indians) better soldiers than the Italians and the series of raids and counter raids from 1915-1917 did much to weaken the guerilla forces. The Italians welcomed this diversionary minor war and attempted to manoeuvre the British into doing what they failed to do—conquer Libya by defeating the tribes. Britain declined, for at this time she was courting the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant in the hope that they would rise against the Turks.

World War I ended with Italy in social and political chaos and Sayyid Idrīs, Head of the Sanūsī Order, became the political head of Cyrenaica. Tripolitania sank into tribal wars and anarchy.

From 1917-1923 an armed truce prevailed. The Italians and Libyans both maintained governments in Libya, both had standing armies, both waited and watched, neither strong enough to challenge the other. In 1923 the blow came. The Italians disarmed and arrested most of the Libyan army. They predicted another short, few-weeks' campaign. But the war did not end until 1932, after the Sanūsī Order had been entirely destroyed as a religious, political and economic power. Guerilla warfare raged around the Italian forts and along lines of communication. Severe fighting characterized the war, and the Libyans and Eritrean colonial troops of Italy conducted themselves with great valor. Even in the last year of the struggle, when resistance was relatively feeble, the official Italian military history records 53 engagements and 210 minor skirmishes. Only sporadic resistance occurred after the capture and public hanging of the greatest Libyan soldier-patriot: Sidi ᶜUmar al-Mukhtār. Although most of the Sanūsī family fled to Egypt at the onset of the fighting, they remained the symbol of resistance, and the

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[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 69-70.

Grand Sanūsī, Sayyid Muḥammad Idrīs al-Sanūsī, is now Idrīs I, King of Libya.

The Order lacks today the political power it enjoyed before the Second Italo-Sanūsī War and many destroyed *zāwiyahs* are still in ruins. However the Sanūsiyyah is slowly reviving as a religious order. Together the badawīn and the Order may rise to their former prominence. Today *zāwiyahs* exist in Egypt, French West Africa, French Sudan, the new Republic of the Sudan, eastern Algeria, and the Arabian Peninsula.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

Before the advent of the Sanūsī, before the Italians came and destroyed the Sanūsī and were defeated themselves, the tribal and family structure had developed. It remained essentially the same. The socio-political structure of the tribes extends at least back to the conquest of Libya by the Banū Sulaim (Mudarid) and Banū Hilāl tribes from Najd in the 11th century. Many Cyrenaican tribes claim to be descendants of the Banū Sulaim; the Banū Hilāl is more popular in Tripolitania. Evans-Pritchard (op. cit., p. 48) states that the exploits of the Banū Sulaim are "for the most part unknown"' in tribal Cyrenaica. In south Tripolitania and north Fezzan, however, members of both the Zintan and Al-Magarba tribes knew and elaborated for me the heroic deeds of the Banū Hilāl.

The Banū Sulaim tribes of Cyrenaica recognize four classes of Arab tribes: Saᶜādī, Murabṭīn al-Sadqan, Murabṭīn bil barakah, Murabṭīn al-Fatḥah. Saᶜādī refers to the traditional nine Banū Sulaim tribes who conquered Cyrenaica: ᶜAbaidāt, Hasā, ᶜAilāt Fāyid, Aulād Hamād, Darsaᵓ, ᶜAbid, ᶜArata, ᶜAwāqir, and Margarba. The Murabṭīn al-Sadqan theoretically pay ṣadaqah (fee for the use of earth and water) to the Saᶜādī tribe nearest them. Apparently few client groups are found in Tripolitania. Most Murabṭīn al-Sadqan tribes in Cyrenaica consider themselves independent and fought wars with the Saᶜādī to assert this independence. Some, such as the Fawākhir and Suwaya, are too powerful to be considered clients, although they, like the rest, accept the genealogical—if not genetic—superiority of the Saᶜādī tribes.

Tribes classed as Murabṭīn bil barakah and Murabṭīn al-Fatḥah descend from holy men and saints who, having received the blessing of God, pass it on to their descendants. These tribes live on equal—and yet not *quite* equal—terms with the Saᶜādī. They occupy the area around tombs, holy places and sanctuaries, meditating, officiating at rites, selling charms to ward off sickness, bad luck and the evil eye, and to insure fertility. Often when an argument over real estate threatens to cause bloodshed between two groups, both parties agree to give the disputed land to a Murabṭīn group.

The following terminology is used to describe the tribal and family

system: *qabīlah* (tribe, primary subtribes, and patrilineal clans), *ʿailah* (patrilineal lineages which make up clans) *bait* (extended family groups). Most authorities agree that *qabīlah* is used to delineate tribes, subtribes, and clans by affixing the name of the unit after *qabīlah*; for example, *Qabīlah Zintan* refers to a tribe, and *Qabīlat al-Muasa* to a subtribe of the Al-Hasā tribe. The Shaikh of the *qabīlah Zintan*, however, assured me that subtribes were called *mirtaqā* within his tribe.

Tribal members trace descent from a common ancestor, real or fictional, and live within a waṭan (tribal homeland) enclosed by recognized, fixed tribal boundaries (ḥudūd), which are respected by other tribes. Each waṭan has pasturages, wells, and a camel brand which is also engraved on the headstones of the dead. Land cannot be given or sold without the consent of the whole tribe. Each tribe and subtribe has a Shaikh, whose status is defined more in terms of kinship than political power. Shaikhs are respected but are not considered superior beings. The position of Shaikh is generally hereditary in the same family and goes to the most influential individual; he must be rich, for the Arab's code of hospitality demands great resources.

The tribal government is a system of balanced oppositions between tribes and segments within the tribe. No real central authority exists until an outside force intrudes. The Italians offered bribes to the Shaikhs and many minor Shaikhs accepted. This undermined, to some extent, the position of all Shaikhs. Strong tribal organization exists only in Cyrenaica and among the Siaan and Nawayil of north Tripolitania and the tribes of south Tripolitania and north Fezzan, such as the Zintan. Few vestiges of tribal organization remain among the completely sedentary Arabs.

Subtribes are breakaway genealogical units which form smaller territorial units within tribal territory. Each subtribe is a replica of the tribe. Each *ʿailah* (lineage) has a distinct marking which, like the tribal brand, is branded, drawn, or woven on or into community property. In any given tribal area all clans try to claim connection with the Shaikh's lineage. The *bait* (plural is *biyūt*) is the basic socio-economic unit. The tribe and the subtribe may own the land and the water, but the family is the immediate user. The *bait* usually consists of five to ten tents in winter, but in the dry season many *biyūt* gather near wells or cluster around the shrinking ponds in stream beds.

ECONOMY

Libyan Arabs are divided into three subgroups for purposes of this report: Sedentary, seminomadic, and nomadic. The relative percentages of each group by provinces is as follows (1948 estimate):

	Tripolitania	*Cyrenaica*	*Fezzan*
Sedentary	64	36	73
Seminomadic	30	48	23
Nomadic	6	16	4

Most tribes have groups in all three categories.

Actually long distance nomadism is rare but many Libyan Arabs practice transhumance (short seasonal moves, usually from high valley to lower valley, following the rainfall and grasses). The nomadic Arabs of Cyrenaica usually graze their livestock within fifty miles of the coastline. Goats and cattle are kept nearest the Mediterranean; sheep and camels in the steppe behind the mountains, which are covered with thick—but scattered—juniper forests.

Cyrenaican winter rains (October to April) permit spring grazing on the steppes south of the Jabal Akhḍar. Most groups move south in December after barley is sown. Beginning in May the Arabs move north into the mountains and pitch their camps (*najaᶜ*) near wells. Others drive livestock to Egyptian markets and remain there until the following December, hiring out as herdsmen to fellow tribesmen living in Egypt. Trade items carried to Egypt are hoofs, hides, wool, live animals, ghee (clarified butter), barley, honey and wax.

Few wells in the steppes last out the hot summers. No strict ownership of wells is recognized north of the Ṭarīq ᶜAzīziyyah but very strict tribal ownership is recognized south of this line. Water rights to all wells are concisely and traditionally defined. The livestock of the badawīn offer him most of his material needs: meat (they are great meat eaters), milk and milk products, wool, hides, transport, draft. The badawī makes his own winter tents, a good part of his equipment, carpets, storage sacks, and water bags. He trades for—or buys—tea, sugar, rice, cloth and Berber horses, which are important prestige items. He lives an efficient life in his harsh environment. He uses all nature offers him, and like the Eskimo is technically more efficient in the use of available natural resources than any industrialized Western or Communist country.

Semi-nomads are common among Libyan Arabs. In Cyrenaica they cultivate land on the plateau, graze their flocks on the steppes in winter, then return north in the summer. All agriculture in Cyrenaica is by plough; the hoe is used mainly along coastal Tripolitania. Much barley and a little wheat are grown in Cyrenaica. Usually a barley surplus occurs. Barley is considered more important than wheat because it is a staple for both horses and men. Grain is stored in tomb caves on the plateau. Elsewhere grain is stored in holes dug in the ground.

The Jabal Nefusa and the oases of Tripolitania support several tribes of semi-nomadic Arabs. They live in settled habitation sites from early fall to June, and then split up, part of the group going to summer upland pastures. Winter habitation sites are small villages of either stone houses, troglodyte caves, tents or *gurbī*, depending on emphasis on agriculture; the more permanent the house, the more sedentary farming. More wheat and olive trees are tended in the Jabal, date palms and fig trees in the oases. Migrations are short (1 to 2 days) and usually only a part of the group moves. Both Arabs and Berbers dwell in the world-famous caves at the eastern end of the Jabal Nefusa.

Actually the caves are deep pits, 50 feet deep by 50 feet wide, with a slanting tunnel leading from the surface to the pit. After the pit is dug, rooms are hollowed out of the solid earth at the bottom. Often a well is dug in one of the rooms. These troglodyte dwellings are clean, warm in winter, cool in summer, and many have rugs on the tamped earth floors. The dug dirt is piled around the edge of the pit to prevent flooding, and to make detection difficult at ground level.

Dates are a primary crop in north Fezzan and south Tripolitania. In August and September they ripen and are eaten fresh. In October the dates are harvested and sold fresh and dried. Both camels and men live on dried dates while on the march.

To supplement the income of the immediate family since World War II, many Tripolitanian nomads and semi-nomads seasonally move to the fertile coast in summer and hire out as farm or garden laborers. Their black goat's-hair tents and mat shelters dot the coastal plain from the Tunisian border to the Gulf of Sidra. They generally bring only a few goats with them. Some decide to stay, thus relieving pressure on the limited resources of the interior. Limestone quarries west of Tripoli drain off some of the labor force. The horizontal, undisturbed limestone (basic topographic feature of Libya) is cut and sawed into blocks 18 inches by 12 inches by 6 inches and used for all types of construction.

The completely sedentary farming Arabs who live primarily along coastal Libya are looked upon by their nomadic and semi-nomadic cousins as inferiors. They are called ḥaḍūr to differentiate them from the badawīn. The Cyrenaican badawī views Tripolitanian villagers and townsmen with particular distaste because of their alleged (and in many cases actual) co-operation with the Italians. The ancestors of many townsmen were immigrants from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or Egypt. Unlike many other Middle Eastern countries the townsmen have never economically dominated the lives of the badawīn. Moneylenders are simply not necessary to the Spartan nomads and semi-nomads of the interior. A Zintan Shaikh told me: "They (the townsmen) need more from us than we from them." Traveling merchants, traders, and periodic markets take the place of the extensive town bazaar. These elements breed one of the important features of the social life of Cyrenaica, south Tripolitania, and north Fezzan: an absence of a peasant society tied to the land, dependent on landlords (usually absentee), moneylenders, and inequitable, inconsistent taxes.

The ḥaḍūr farmer primarily grows barley, some wheat (in Cyrenaica), olives (alternate rows of almond trees planted with olive trees), vegetable (potatoes, tomatoes), groundnuts, tobacco, dates (inferior to those in the interior oases), grapes (in decline since mass departure of Italian farmers), citrus fruits (output of oranges, tangerines, grapefruit, lemons annually increasing), and strawberries. One important export crop which grows wild and is collected in the Jabal and Gefara

is esparto grass used to manufacture quality paper, especially banknotes.

Many problems face the farming Arabs and hinder further development without outside aid. Among them are lack of sufficient water or means of adequately trapping available water, the merciless *ghiblis* (south winds which blow for days and deposit sand over many acres of cultivated land), encroaching sand dunes, and primitive methods of agriculture. The most water is found near the coast, which has two water tables: one just below the surface, and the other 30-40 feet down. Here bullocks and camels are used to draw water from wells; both irrigation and dry farming are practiced. Wells in the interior are up to 150 feet deep. Along the coast the fields are separated by high mud walls held together with prickly pear cacti planted on the top. These walls prevent the fertile, fertilized soil from washing away after a downpour. Hoe agriculture is more common in the small gardens of the Mediterranean coastal plains. More and more iron-tipped ploughs are being used, but it is still common to see a camel pulling a fire-hardened stick plough, and bullocks and donkeys treading on and threshing cereals.

What is really surprising is the amount of agriculture carried on under conditions as severe as those anywhere in the world. A well-planned, well-financed, balanced social and economic program will increase food production and social progress. Maybe the current oil exploration will find at least a partial answer to large scale development.

As previously stated, the interior tribal Arabs have little respect for their citified cousins, many of whom are natives of other North African countries. These urbanites usually wear western clothing except for headgear and most prefer the fez or tarboosh (a round skullcap, also popular in the Fezzan). The urban Arab is the hope of progressive Libya, and this class of professionals, students, government officials, businessmen, and merchants represent Libya to the outside world, culturally and commercially, much as the Sanūsī Order did before 1932. Most foreigners have no idea what exists on or behind the Jabal. The desert and its people are hidden in a veil of sand and heat. The *ghibli,* blowing in from the south, increases the inaccessibility.

A shortage of teachers, administrators, and bureaucrats forced the Libyan government to look outside for trained, competent personnel. Consequently, since independence, the number of Lebanese and Egyptian Arabs has greatly increased in the urban centers, especially Tripoli and Benghazi. The Tripolitanians are more favorably disposed to the Egyptians than are the Cyrenaicans. The adherents of King Idrīs I fail to see merit in ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir's republicanism, nor do the Libyans as a whole like the idea of a Pan-Arab state with Egypt as its center. The tribes probably would not accept such an idea and would revolt.

The urban bazaar situation, especially in Tripoli, took an interesting

turn during and after World War II. Before World War II, no real bargaining for luxury goods was possible simply because no luxury goods existed. Friendly occupying armies, however, brought an influx of souvenir buyers. Young Arabs, speaking Italian and English, took over this new-born trade and hired the older artisans, living deep in the heart of the walled, old city, to work for them. One leather goods merchant (aged 21 in 1956) said he had thirty different workmen producing for him alone. The merchants are mainly Arabs, but the Indians have a strong and increasing share.

In 1955 the government established price control and this further limited bargaining possibilities unless large purchases were made. The luxury souvenir shops are located on the edge of the old city, just inside the wall, easily accessible to tourists, servicemen and foreign residents. Few Westerners ever penetrate the narrow streets and multi-storied buildings of the old city. Traditional bargaining, therefore, has given way to the supply and demand of British, American and other Westerners who want to buy luxury items and souvenirs and will pay the price asked. In the weekly markets south of the urban centers bargaining is still a fine art, and it is sheer joy to watch two badawīn bargain for livestock.

A hangover from Italian days, the Uaddan Casino, still has many afficianados, and several nightclubs, replete with B-girls, flourish. Those Arabs who do not drink alcohol enjoy a local, very sweet cola drink called Kitty Cola, as they patronize sidewalk cafes and watch the crowd. Few women go outside their compounds without wearing the sack-like, coverall *barracan,* often hiding the best Parisian styles. For better or worse, the urban Libyan Arab is becoming semi-westernized.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH THE TRIBES

The Ottomans never controlled the tribes; they dealt with them through the Sanūsī Order. The Italians defeated the tribes, but never conquered them. Throughout the colonial period the Italians were forced to maintain forts and relatively isolated outposts along all main lines of communications. They even built a thick wall around most of European Tripoli, topping it with protruding fragments of broken glass to prevent scaling. Small arms loopholes peered out every few yards along the wall. Italian—or more often Eritrean colonials—manned the guard posts.

To illustrate the changes in tribal attitudes toward central governmental control it may be useful briefly to discuss the Arab Zintan tribe during the Italian period and the evolving relationships in the current period of independence. The Zintan tribe is seminomadic. In summer one section moves to their plateau camp at Ghariat al-Gharbiyyah near Wadi Zamzam, which has a good well and sparse grasses and shrubs for their camels, sheep, and goats. A few families remain behind at

Al Ghariat al-Sharqiyyah (the winter camp) to care for the date palms. Distance between the two camps is about twenty miles, but the elevation difference is about 800 feet. Well irrigation keeps the date palms green although the water table drops to about 120 feet or lower in the hottest month, July. The plateau group returns in September and the dates are harvested in October.

The Zintan tribe was one of the Tripolitanian tribes which fiercely resisted the Italian invaders. Many of its warriors won honors or death in the struggle. The main Italian communication and transport line from Tripoli through Garian and Mizda to Sebha ran through Zintan territory, so the Italians built a small fort (Forte Baccon) on the strategic high ground overlooking the palm tree garden, permitting a 360-degree field of fire. The Italians maintained a company (200-300 men) of colonial troops officered by three to four officers, and commanded by a Captain. The Captain's wife was permitted to accompany him. Frontal assaults against such well-armed and well-manned garrisons were suicide, yet such attacks came often and snipings oftener. Armed convoys brought supplies to Forte Baccon. Outpost boredom punctuated with periodic forays—compounded by heat—made life almost unbearable.

Le Clerc and his Free French Army, moving up from the Lake Chad region, accepted the surrender of Forte Baccon in 1943. World War II tank tracks are still visible on the desert floor. Minefields at several points along the Tripoli to Al Ghariah road menace truck transport. To cross minefields one simply follows the latest set of tire tracks. The old mines are being excavated by Arabs and sold to the Algerian nationalists. The untrained Arabs are often killed in this hazardous enterprise.

Today Forte Baccon is almost deserted. All wooden beams have been removed by the Zintan tribe and even the barbed wire around the fort hangs low and rusts disconsolately. Adjacent to the old fort the Libyan flag flies proudly. A corporal and nine men occupy the post. Their tour of duty is from three to six months and then they are relieved by another squad from Mizda, their permanent post. The police use the former Italian officers' quarters inside Forte Baccon as a latrine. Inside the police compound is a small, one-room rest house for visitors. The chief of the Qabīlah Zintan is a frequent visitor to the police post, which has become a popular men's get-together point, the crossroads store in rural America. Forte Baccon has one inhabitant. Just inside its formerly impregnable walls, facing the oasis, is the tomb of a marabūṭ (holy man). He had fallen leading an attack on the fort in the 1930's. Now in death he is victorious, he has breached the walls. The Italians are gone and the fort is his.

The situation here described is typical all over Libya. In spite of old tribal feuds, most elements of the population are co-operating with the central government's representatives. After all, they are Libyans

and not Italians. Thus the Libyan tribal situation is about what it was when the Ottoman Turks arrived. The tribes acted independently, using the Sanūsī Order as intermediaries with the outside world. Now, however, the government of the United Kingdom of Libya has been substituted for the Sanūsī Order. The Sanūsī appear to be rising out of the sands again, but primarily as a religious order—as their founder had intended all along.

The segmentary opposition of the tribes is likely to remain important to the social, economic, and political aspects of Libyan life for some time to come, even though efforts of the United Nations and United States assistance programs are slowly improving farming and herding techniques. The commercial and agricultural bustle of the Mediterranean coastline is lost in the vast emptiness of the interior. Here we find the happy, unfettered, undeveloped (in the Western sense), and to some extent undevelopable desert and plateau tribes and oasis farmers. Greek, Roman, and Italian ruins herald at least a brief return to the purity of the days of the Banū Sulaim and Banū Hilāl.

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THE ABOLITION OF THE SHARʿĪ COURTS IN EGYPT II. AN ASSESSMENT

The previous article examined the recent law abolishing the Sharʿī and the communal courts in Egypt in terms of its substance and the reactions to it in Egypt and other Arab countries. We have referred briefly to its significance and concluded that it marked the end of the old Islamic pattern of Sharʿī State in Egypt. The present article attempts to set this conclusion in relief by analyzing the doctrinal foundations of the Sharʿī State, and the forces responsible for the process of its disintegration.

The doctrine of the Sharʿī State emerged from the ruins of the Caliphal State or Caliphate, and was inspired by the aim of salvaging from these ruins the essential principles of the Islamic State which would be applicable to the new historical circumstances. Consequently, before we examine the doctrine of the Sharʿī State, we shall have to review briefly the principles underlying the Caliphate and the evolution they underwent in the course of history.

The classical doctrine of the Caliphate meant an extremely tightly knit system at the core of which was the Law and the Caliph.[1] But the concept of Law in Islam is entirely different from that of the West, whether ancient or modern. For the ancients as for the modern westerners, Law is the norm of right sanctioned by the people, directly or by means of its representative organs; it carries its authority by virtue of the will of man and by virtue of his moral nature. The concept that the Muslim has of the Law places God in its focal point: God is the Supreme Head of the Muslim community and the Law is nothing but His will; it is the norm given by Allah the Legislator to the world and according to this Law He will judge it. Obedience to this Law is for the believers a social duty and a precept of the faith as well; by the same token, its violation constitutes not only an infraction of the judicial order but also a religious sin. In principle, the Law is clear and all-encompassing. In its application to particular instances, use may be made of reasoning by analogy, which is then sanctioned by the Ijmāʿ, consensus, of the whole community, or of the ʿulamāʾ. Such consensus has the assurance of Divine Grace that it can never be wrong.

The Caliph was the representative of the Law; consequently, his function was also dual—that is, both religious and social. It was summarized by Muslim jurists in this formula: to protect the religion and

[1] For an extremely well documented summary of the Islamic concept of Law and the Caliphate, see Santillana, *Istituzione di diritto musulmano*, Vol. I (Rome, 1926). For the classical doctrine of the Caliphate, see ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, (Istanbul, 1928) Vol. I pp. 270-285. A simplified translation of relevant passages by H. A. R. Gibb appeared in Khadduri and Liebesny, eds., *Law in the Middle East*, Vol. I (Washington, 1955) pp. 7-11.

govern the world. All authority derived from him by delegation and all acts of government as well as all contracts were valid only through him or his delegate. On the other hand, the Caliph himself was subject to the Law; his acts in general were valid only if he had been appointed in accordance with the Law, and, when in office, each of his acts was invalid if it violated it.

Confronting the Caliph was the equal mass of the *Ummah*, or community united by the single bond of religion. The bond between ruler and ruled was one of contract, the *bayᶜah* freely concluded between each Caliph and the *Ummah*, or its representatives, by the terms of which the *ummah* committed itself to absolute obedience to the ruler while the latter committed himself to govern in accordance with the Law. Should the Caliph prove to be wicked and evil-doing or should he violate the Law, the contract lost its validity and the *ummah* might "turn away from him and give allegiance to another." [2]

It is absolutely essential to keep in mind that the contract did not in itself establish the Caliphate, either as an office or as a form of state. Social Contract notions are completely out of place here. The institution and the state of the Caliphate existed only by virtue of the Divine Will expressed in the Law, and from that Will exclusively the Caliph derived his authority. The *bayᶜah* was an attestation on the part of the Caliph to govern in accordance with the Law that had been issued by the Only Legislator and a commitment on the part of the people to obey him as long as he did so.

The fatal flaw of this system was the lack of any mechanism of adjustment short of revolution. What is more, revolution was not, by the logic of the system, an ultimate means of relief to which the people could resort, but an immediate necessity in order to avoid living in sin and forfeiting salvation. For if the Caliph was evil-doing or if he had not been appointed in accordance with the Law, his authority was nullified; and in that case all acts, contracts, and deeds, which were always undertaken by virtue of that authority, became invalid. In the strict logic of the Law, the *ummah* risked being repeatedly placed before the awful dilemma that had given rise to the sectarian Khawārij who had subjected the community to gruesome civil wars for two centuries and had been condemned and outlawed by the bulk of the *ummah* and the jurists. That is why the early constitutional theorists contented themselves with the vague, optional, and, therefore, inconsistent, device that the *ummah* "may turn away from the Caliph, etc...." But even this measure was not destined to last.

At the beginning of the 9th century A.D., the Caliphate began to decline rapidly. By the 10th century the authority of the Caliph hardly extended beyond the precincts of Baghdad, and the Caliph himself was at the mercy of his foreign mercenaries. In the latter half of that

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[2] Ibid., Al-Bahgdādi.

century, there was a rival Sunnī Caliphate in Spain, a Shīᶜah Caliphate in Egypt and part of Syria, and the Baghdad Caliphs had fallen under the power of the Shīᶜah Buwayhid princes. Caliphs were seated and unseated at the whim of these princes, and a few were blinded, reduced to beggary and even murdered. Illegitimate appointments thus became the rule, while the theoretical powers and qualifications of the Caliph became a dead letter. Maintenance of the mere option of withholding obedience and turning to a new Caliph threatened to encourage factionalism and exacerbate the violence of the times and was consequently dropped by the jurists without much ado.

But if it was possible to enjoin obedience even to an evil-doing Caliph on the expedient ground that his deposition by force might cause a greater evil to the civil order, the question of the validating of acts and contracts which pertained to the religious side of the Caliph's functions and were dependent on legitimate appointment, remained to be settled. This task was tackled by Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). He observed that "government in these days is a consequence solely of military power..." and went on to say that "whosoever he may be to whom the holder of a military power professes his allegiance, that person is the Caliph; and whosoever exercises independent authority, while he shows allegiance to the Caliph by mentioning his name in the khuṭbah and on the coinage, he is a sultan, whose orders and judgements are valid in the several parts of the earth." [3] His argument in support of this view reflects what he considered to be the essence of the Caliphate, and was expressed as follows:

> "The concessions that we make here are not voluntary, but necessity makes permissible that which is forbidden... This being so, if someone does not agree to that and thinks that the *imāmah* is dead in our times because it lacks the necessary requisites... we would ask him: which is better; to declare that all qāḍīs are revoked, that all authority is invalid, that marriages cannot be contracted, to declare null the acts of authority everywhere and to allow that all the world is living in sin; or to recognize that the *imāmah* exists in fact and that the dealings and acts of administration are valid, given the existing facts and the necessities of the actual moment?..." [4]

It is obvious that the main purpose of the Caliphate for Al-Ghazālī, what he calls "the capital," is to promote the salvation of the believers by applying the Sacred Law and to maintain civil order.

After the extinction of the Caliphate of Baghdad, Muslim political doctrine diverged for some time in two main currents. One stream of thought pursued Al-Ghazālī's assertion that "government in these days is a consequence of power" to a conclusion which he did not intend, by seeking to make legal norm of this observation of fact. This view was represented by Ibn Jamāᶜa, chief qāḍī of Egypt from 1291 to 1294 and from 1309 to 1327:

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[3] Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā ᶜUlūm al-Dīn*, (Cairo, 1933), Vol. II p. 124.
[4] Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iᶜtiqād*, (Cairo, 1320 H.), p. 107.

> "If the office of the Imam[5] is vacant at the time, and one who is not fitted for it aspires to it and compels people by his might and his armies (to accept him) without (receiving) an oath of allegiance and without nomination by his predecessor, his office is contractually assumed and obedience is to be rendered to him, in order that the unity of the Muslims may be preserved. That he should be barbarous and evil-doing in no way invalidates this, in the most authoritative view..."[6]

Ibn Jamāᶜa then went on to say that if a more powerful person overcame this Imām by his might and armies then he, in turn, became Imām, and so on. Another view along the same line had already been developed in the 11th century, inspired by the political traditions of the Sassanid Persian empire. It found an eminent spokesman in the person of Niẓām al-Mulk[7], wazīr of the Seljuq Sultan Malik Shāh (d. 1092). According to this view, sovereign power is of Divine institution and obedience to the ruler is a religious duty because temporal power is the foundation of the social order and its support in the face of the greed and violence of men; the ruler has no intrinsic obligation towards religion. But if he is wise, he will promote it and defend it against heresies because its application and unity are the best guarantees of a stable social order. The author ignored the Caliphate even though it still existed at the time in a nominal and precarious fashion. Hence its final disappearance, rather than affecting this view, made it even more applicable to the new political and military realities. However, neither this nor Ibn Jamāᶜa's view gained acceptance by the bulk of the Muslim community, because both failed to take account of the place of the Sharīᶜah in their system. Ibn Jamāᶜa's view would have thus made obligatory the recognition by all Muslims of the Caliphate established by the Mamluks in Egypt while Niẓām al-Mulk's theory would have compelled *de jure* recognition even of the Mongolian rule over substantial parts of Islam.

The other current of thought endeavored to salvage the "capital" of Al-Ghazālī—the ideal of the Islamic State—by assuring to the Sharīᶜah a predominant position in the new order while taking into account the political-military realities. This current is represented by two lines of thought that differed more in approach than in the concrete results. Ibn Khaldūn(d. 1406), taking a philosophical approach, divided all states into three categories: the state of tyranny, the state of reason, and the state of religion; the last is characterized above all by being governed under the general supervision of God's Law, which characteristic is in truth the essence of the Caliphate. Stated in his own words:

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[5] The terms *Imām* and Caliph, and *Imamah* and Caliphate are used interchangeably except when otherwise indicated.

[6] Badr-al-Dīn ibn Jamāᶜa, *Taḥrīr al-Aḥkām fī Tadbīr Ahl al-Islām*, ap. Islamica, Bd. VI, p. 357. Relevant passages quoted by Gibb in Khadduri and Liebesny, eds., op. cit.

[7] Nizām al-Mulk, *Siyasat Name*, ed. and tr. Ch. Schefer, (Paris, 1891-1893).

"The state, therefore, whose law is based on violence and coercion and gives full play to the irascible nature is tyranny and injustice and in the eyes of the Law is blameworthy, a judgment in which political wisdom also concurs. Furthermore, that state whose law is based upon rational statecraft and its principles, but lacks the supervision of the Revealed Law, is likewise blameworthy, since it is the result of speculation without the light of God; for the Lawgiver knows best the interests of men in all that relates to the other world, which is concealed from them. The principles of rational government aim solely at apparent and worldly interests, whereas the object of the Lawgiver is men's salvation in the hereafter. It is imperative, therefore, by the very nature of Revealed Laws, to bring the whole people to conform themselves to their ordinances in all matters of this world and the next. And this rule is the rule of the Lawgivers, that is to say, the Prophets, and their successors, that is to say, the Caliphs, and this the true meaning of the Caliphate..." [8]

A century earlier, the philosopher Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274), who lived at the other end of the Muslim world, had reached identical conclusions by reformulating Al-Fārābī's Muslim version of Plato's Republic. [9]

The other line of thought in the same general current adopted the historical-legal approach and is best represented by Ibn Taymiyyah, a contemporary of Ibn Jamāᶜa. Relying on some 10th century orthodox theories, Ibn Taymiyyah maintained that the institution of the Caliphate was not a legal necessity. The historical Caliphate was a form prescribed by circumstances; it was concerned with religion only, and, in any case, it ceased to exist after the first four Caliphs. All the subsequent rulers of Islam have been secular princes. The Imāmah which Ibn Taymiyyah distinguishes from the Caliphate, is a system that prevails when the secular ruler concludes a concordat with the people by virtue of which he commits himself to govern in close collaboration with the 'ulamā' in accordance with the precepts of the Sharīᶜah, and to foster their application in general, in exchange for the willing obedience of the people. [10] Thus, the important difference in the conception of Islamic history and in terminology notwithstanding, Ibn Taymiyyah suggested the same practical solution to the problem facing the Muslims as Ibn Khaldūn and Al-Ṭūsī.

The second current of thought (Ibn Khaldūn. Ibn Taymiyyah) was the one to achieve the Ijmāᶜ of the ummah and it became the canonical doctrine of the Islamic State. In its final formulation, however, it borrowed an element from the theory of Niẓām al-Mulk. Thus Al-Dawwānī (d. 1503), writing on the eve of Selim's conquest of Egypt, summed up the already accepted doctrine by starting from the premise that sovereignty (sulṭān) is a gift divinely bestowed upon a selected person. Government may be either righteous or unrighteous. The righteous

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[8] Ibn Khaldūn, *Al-Muqaddimah*, Book 3, Ch. 25.

[9] Cf. Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Akhlāq-i-Naṣiri*, 1883 ed., pp. 410-411.

[10] In H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques d'Ibn Taymiya* (Cairo, 1939), pp. 278-317.

government, which regards its subjects as children and friends and labors for their temporal and spiritual welfare by governing justly and applying the Sharīᶜah is the Imāmah and is entitled to the style and prerogatives of the Caliphate.[11] It is by virtue of this theory, not the "classical doctrine," from which, as we have seen, it differs considerably, that the title of Caliph was applied to some of the Ottoman sultans. In later times, the identity of the title served, sometimes deliberately, sometimes unintentionally, to confuse the two doctrines; consequently, for the sake of clarity we have referred to the later one by its main characteristic and called it the Sharᶜī State.

From the Ottoman occupation to the present day, the Sharᶜī State in Egypt underwent three phases: from the time of the conquest until Muḥammad ᶜAlī, Egypt remained *de jure* as well as *de facto* a Sharᶜī State. From Muḥammad ᶜAlī until the declaration of independence in 1922, Egypt's status continued to be the same *de jure,* but in fact, great social, economic and political changes had taken place, which were bound to undermine her status as a Sharᶜī State. The final breakdown took place in the third phase, between 1922 and the present day.

It may seem strange at first sight that the British occupation and the declaration of the Protectorate have not been taken as significant events in the Islamic constitutional evolution of Egypt. Actually, while these events contributed a great deal indirectly to the eventual breakdown of the Sharᶜī State, they did not affect Egypt's status as such in a direct manner. For the British concerned themselves mainly with matters of military and civil administration that had almost never been under the effective jurisdiction of the Sharīᶜah. In borderline questions, such as education, the British, for reasons of their own, intervened very little to spread western education and have done much to strengthen the traditional kuttāb system. The fact that they arrogated to themselves the right to appoint the sultan in 1914 did not affect Egypt's Islamic judicial status since the theory of the Sharᶜī State does not insist on a particular procedure of appointment, as we have seen. The decisive condition is that the ruler promote the Sharīᶜah in its traditional spheres of operation; and the British presence or appointment of the sultan did not affect this condition.

What the occupation may have done, however, was to sharpen the lines of division between the spheres of Sharīᶜah and Siyāsah. This division tended to insulate the religious institutions from the currents of change that were sweeping the country and thus to stifle the incentive for reform within them. It contributed to widening the gap that had begun to manifest itself between the mentalities and ways of life of the men engaged in running the institutions within the two spheres and tended to cause attention to focus on the Sharᶜī institutions as the

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[11] Al-Dawwānī, *Akhlāq-i-Jalālī,* tr. W. F. Thompson under the title *Practical Philosophy of the Muhammadan People,* (London, 1930), Ch. 3.

marks that distinguish the Sharᶜī State to the detriment of the spirit behind them. Finally, it influenced heavily the evolution towards a constitutional government on the western style which, in the event, meant an evolution away from the Sharᶜī State form.

The Khedive Ismāᶜīl did not infringe directly on the Sharᶜī status of Egypt despite his ambition to make Egypt "a part of Europe." However, his reign did most to bring about a new class, enamoured of the forms of western civilization, that was destined to destroy the Sharᶜī State. The adoption of several western codes, the reform of the Sharᶜī courts along the lines of western courts, and the semi-official codification of Sharᶜī law prepared the ground for the ultimate annexation of the Sharᶜī to the civil courts.

It was Muḥammad ᶜAlī who had first turned Egypt's eyes westward. The west had meant to him mainly technology and power, but he could not open the door for these and keep other ideas out. Thus, for instance, Ismāᶜīl acquired his passion for things European while on a study mission in France; and it was also in France that Sharīf Pasha acquired the notions of constitutional government which he tried to apply in Egypt on the eve of the British occupation.

Muḥammad ᶜAlī also undertook at least two measures that were to prove of great indirect consequence for the Sharᶜī State: he established the rule of the prince appointing the Shaikh al-Azhar and he drafted the kuttāb system in the service of his power schemes. By the first act he abolished the long standing position of independence of Al-Azhar and weakened its power to resist innovations, especially when these had the blessings of the prince. By the latter act he substituted for a system that provided the ABC for salvation, a system that offered the ABC for employment, and thus began on a large scale the trend to replace moral ends with utilitarian aims in public institutions. All subsequent reforms did much to improve the facilities and organization of the kuttāb system, but failed to undo this damage.

But of all the changes that took place in the 19th and early 20th century, by far the most important from the point of view of the future of the Sharᶜī State was the converging of economic, social and political factors to bring about a new class of western educated professionals and intellectuals proclaiming the gospel of nationalism. Intrinsically not all nationalism is necessarily opposed to the Sharᶜī State. Indeed, among the earliest nationalist leaders in Egypt there were men like Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ᶜAbduh who had combined their nationalistic claims with a program for revitalizing the Sharīᶜah and its institutions. However, the form of nationalism that was historically adopted in Egypt was of the European vintage. It sought to encompass everything for the service of the interest and glory of the nation-state. This sort of nationalism, which had become universal dogma in the second half of the 19th century is in profound contradiction with the principle of the Sharᶜī State.

The aim of the Sharᶜī State, it will be recalled, is to secure the conditions necessary for the salvation of its subjects and to assure their earthly well-being. To achieve this object, the ruler has an infallible guide in the Sharᶜīah which is God's own design. In contrast, the principle of nationalism proclaims the state to be above everything. Its ultimate goal is the survival and glory of the nation-state; and its immediate aims are determined by notions of utility and by considerations of the ultimate goal. To achieve these ends, the state relies on human reason and will, whether of one, of many, or of all its members. Reason and will provide the only necessary justification or sanction for its actions.

The contradiction between nationalism and the Sharᶜī State was reflected in the first major act of the nationalists after the declaration of independence. The Constitution of 1923 asserted ominously that "all powers emanate from the nation and are exercised in the manner established in the present Constitution" (Titre III art. 23). It went on to say that the Legislative Power is exercised by the King and Parliament, without mentioning any restriction on it. It declared that "freedom of conscience is absolute" (Art 12) disregarding the Sharīᶜah's prohibition of *riddah,* conversion of a Muslim, under penalty of death. It prescribed for the king an oath which committed him "...by God Almighty to observe the Constitution and *the Laws of the Egyptian people*" (Art. 60) and for the representatives of the people an oath of allegiance to the King and the Constitution, thus founding government on a new *bayᶜah* that took no special account of the Sharīᶜah and its place in the state. While the Constitution still declared that "Islam is the religion of the State..." (Art. 149), it took care to state explicitly that this did not involve subordinating the Legislator to the authority of Muslim law and institutions: "the Law regulates the manner in which the King exercises his powers in accordance with the present Constitution in all that which pertains to the religious establishments, the religious chiefs, the waqfs... and, in general, all matters concerning the cults admitted in the country..." (Art. 153). The Constitution thus affected a legal revolution which reversed the traditional relationship between the sovereign and the Sharīᶜah. Instead of his being under it, it was placed under him, along with the general affairs of the state.

The immediate reflection of the new situation in actual life was not at all so revolutionary. For one thing, the Constitution provided an escape clause which obviated the need for the immediate exercise of the prerogatives which the Legislator had assumed. The next clause in the article lastly quoted stated that "...in the absence of a legislative provision, these powers (the power of the king in religious affairs) shall continue to be exercised in accordance with the current rules and customs." (Art. 153). For reasons which do not concern us here, no legislative provision was made. Thus a certain continuity in the life

of the religious institutions prevailed which gave the impression that the Sharᶜī State continued to exist. Moreover, when the Legislator sought to introduce "reforms" in the Sharᶜī laws he proceeded cautiously, using the terminology and the method of fiqh casuistically rather than applying the knife or making altogether new laws. This confirmed the impression that the Sharīᶜah still imposed itself on the Legislator, when in reality he was violating some of its main principles.

We shall not enter into all the details of the numerous reforms [12] that were introduced from 1923 until the abolition of the Sharᶜī courts. From the point of view of political theory, we should, however, emphasize two major points:

First, all the laws dealing with Sharᶜī subjects were formulated by secular legal experts and parliamentary committtees and were issued in the form of laws, like all laws, sanctioned only by the authority of the sovereign power. This plays havoc with any traditional notion of Ijtihād and Ijmāᶜ, which are the only Sharᶜī methods of introducing reforms. The Legislator recognized that, but tried to defend himself by claiming that no true Ijmāᶜ really existed after the scattering of the Prophet's companions from Medina. But this is very drastic and disruptive reasoning. For once the authority of Ijmāᶜ is undermined, the authority of most texts of the Qurᵓān and the Hadīth is also undermined, and there remains no authority to support a particular interpretation of a verse or the authenticity of a tradition.

Secondly, the most important reforms were undertaken on the basis of the right of the sovereign, in Sharᶜī law, to limit the jurisdiction of the courts in respect to time, place, and subject matter, and his right to direct the application of certain views rather than others in the name of *maṣlaḥah,* public interest. Leaving aside the abuses in the application of these principles, it is clear that, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Sharīᶜah, no sovereign can use this right to withhold Sharᶜī law from his subjects. Yet the device was resorted to by the Legislator. Furthermore, the sovereign to whom the Sharīᶜah grants these rights is, in the first place, a sovereign who is himself under the Sharīᶜah and is its chief servant, so that his restrictions are, presumably, in the interest of the ideal of the Sharīᶜah, not a sovereign who claims to be his own absolute master and is guided by the Benthamite calculus of pain and pleasure in his conception of *maṣlaḥah.*

It seems clear then, that what the present Régime did in abolishing the Sharᶜī courts was only to apply in a more bold and outright way the principles of sovereignty which had been proclaimed by the Constitution of 1923 and which had been applied hesitantly and underhandedly by the preceding régimes. However, by taking its stand unequivocally on the ground of the most absolute conception of national

[12] Cf. series of articles by J. N. D. Anderson on "Recent Developments in Sharīᶜah Law" in *Muslim World,* xl: October, 1950, to xlii: October 1952; particularly the first and second articles in xl: October 1950 and xli: January 1951.

sovereignty and by pulling down the most vital symbols of the Sharᶜī State it not only destroyed the illusion that this state still existed, but also abolished all prospect of its regeneration.

The truly remarkable thing in all these developments is the insignificant resistance that the ᶜulamāᵓ offered to the secularizers. Not that these stalwart guardians of the faith were lax or to that extent powerless. For despite the submission of the chief ᶜulamāᵓ to the prince, from the days of Muḥammad ᶜAlī, they still had on their side the vast majority of the people who were opposed to the secularizers by instinct and inertia. They had proved their zeal when they stood up against what they considered an attack on orthodoxy in Ṭaha Ḥusain's book on pre-Islamic Poetry and in the case of ᶜAlī ᶜAbd al-Rāziq's book: *Islam and the Principles of Government.* They had stood effectively also against even the mild reformist plans of Shaikh Muḥammad ᶜAbduh.

The explanation of this phenomenon must be ascribed to a very large extent to a tragic failure on the part of the ᶜulamāᵓ to understand the significance and import of what was taking place; itself perhaps a consequence of their mistaken concept of their mission.

It is almost certain that the ᶜulamāᵓ failed to understand the significance of the transition from the dynastic to the national state. They probably equated the dynastic sovereign with the sovereign of the national state not realizing that, while the claims of the former could be reconciled with those of the Sharīᶜah, the claims of the latter were, by definition, all-inclusive, temporal, self-willed, and intolerant of any competing authority. One factor that conspired to cloud the issues for the ᶜulamāᵓ was that the constitution makers and the legislators made use of terms familiar in Muslim writings, but gave them entirely new meanings. Did the ᶜulamāᵓ know that the terms *siyādah, mulk, ummah, qānūn, iᶜtiqād,* were used respectively for sovereignty, sovereign rights, nation, legislated law, and conscience in the senses in which they are understood in western jurisprudence? Did the Legislator's deliberation and his use of Sharᶜī terms and a semblance of the method of fiqh blind them as regards the prerogatives he had assumed in law vis-à-vis the Sharīᶜah? Their behavior suggests the answer. While the Legislator went on making law after law on the basis of principles so inconsistent with the spirit of the Sharᶜī State, the ᶜulamāᵓ, without questioning the premises, concentrated their opposition on this or that specific clause of a law and succeeded most of the time merely in delaying the law and compelling the Legislator to use more ingenuity in his next attempt.[13] A fresh definition of the

[13] Such, to mention one instance, was the case with a few articles in a draft-law of 1926 invalidating the triple divorce pronounced at once and formulae of divorce intended as threats. Opposition of the ᶜulamāᵓ succeeded in forcing the shelving of the project for a time, but the draft-law was reformulated and enacted into law, including the controversial articles, in 1929.

relationship between the Sharīᶜah and the national state that would seek to preserve the ideals of the Sharᶜī State and adapt their application to the new circumstances was never attempted by the ᶜulamāᵓ. It might have been expected that the publication of Shaikh ᶜAlī ᶜAbd al-Rāziq's book would have provoked at least a fresh consideration of the relationship between Sharīᶜa and state. Instead, the ᶜulamāᵓ only reasserted the outworn theories of the Caliphate, disregarding completely the problem of their applicability to present conditions, and insisted that Shaikh ᶜAlī ᶜAbd al-Rāziq be punished, even when this insistence led to a ministerial crisis. The ᶜulamāᵓ achieved what they probably considered their mission: ᶜAbd al-Rāziq was punished and his example discouraged any fresh thought on the subject. The orthodox formal *theory* of the Islamic state was preserved. But the *Islamic state itself* continued to decline until its termination in September 1954.

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THE HIGHER LEARNING IN IRAQ

The Iraqis are very seriously concerned with the problem of higher education. Industrialization, the various engineering projects, the public health schemes and other plans designed to raise the standard of living require a large army of technical and administrative personnel, teachers and medical specialists. Colleges, technical institutes and professional schools are needed for the training of such people. The large plans of the Development Board will come to naught if they are not accompanied by adequate expansion of higher educational facilities.

The subject of higher education in Iraq has received scant attention from Western students. There are short perfunctory chapters on education in the economic reports; there is a good account of education in Iraq in Matthews and Akrawi's *Education in the Arab Countries of the Middle East,* there are articles by ᶜAkrāwī, Jamālī and others and there are the annual reports of the Ministry of Education which are issued in Arabic. There are, finally, the Monroe report and the Südhof report on technical education; the first was written in 1932, the second in 1934. They are hopelessly out of date but are of considerable historic interest. [1]

The most recent account of higher education in Iraq is that contained in a report issued in 1953 by a British Commission headed by Professor H. A. R. Gibb. [2] The mandate of the Commission was to study the feasibility of the University project. It contains an assessment and critique of the various Colleges and Higher Institutes as well as recommendations for their improvement. It strongly urged the immediate establishment of a University.

One of the last pieces of business of the 1956 Spring Session of the Iraqi Parliament was the passage of a Law for the establishment of the University of Baghdad. (Bill. 60. June 6th, 1956). Its provisions are most generous. Government grants will be liberal; the buildings will be erected on land donated by the State. A University City in a southern suburb of Baghdad is envisaged; all Government establishments-hospitals, social welfare centres, libraries, laboratories, etc. will be made available to the University for purposes of study and research. The first President of the University is to be named by the Minister of Education. This nomination will be approved or rejected by the Council of Ministers. Subsequent Presidents will be elected by the Academic Senate; their choice also will have to be ratified be the Council of Ministers. It would appear that, in the regulation of its internal

[1] Matthews and Akrawi, *Education in the Arab Countries of the Middle East,* Washington, 1949, pp. 121-127; Ministry of Education of Iraq. *Al Taqīr al-Sanawī ᶜan Sair al-Maᶜārif* (Annual Reports on the Development of Education) Baghdad, 1922-to date; Monroe, *Report of the Educational Enquiry Commission,* Baghdad, 1932; Südhof, *A Report on Technical Education in Iraq,* Baghdad, 1934.

[2] Gibb et al., *Report to the Royal Iraqi Government by a Commission of British University Professors,* Baghdad, 1953.

affairs, the University will be fairly free of political influences. However, the allocation of grants, as well as the form of the presidency of the University will involve some measure of ministerial control. A Constituent Assembly—composed of the President and seven other members—is to guide the establishment into being and to decide which of the Higher Institutes will be acceptable as Schools and Faculties of the University.

Unsettled conditions in the Near East, however, and internal difficulties in Iraq may be responsible for failure thus far to actuate the plan approved in June, 1956. There is, accordingly, no *functioning* State University in Iraq. But there is an impressive group of Colleges ('Higher Institutes') under the control of various Ministries, and in which in 1956-57, there were 5,185 students enrolled. [3] There are no Higher Institutes in any Iraqi city other than Baghdad. [4]

It should be noted that higher education is largely subsidized. The students pay ridiculously low fees. In many schools they are educated entirely at Government expense; they are accommodated in dormitories and are given allowances for board and incidentals. None of the Higher Institutes is very old. Apart from the theological academies, the present system of Colleges is in the main a post-Mandate development.

Under the Turkish régime, education seems to have been a rather haphazard affair. There were Turkish secondary schools in Baghdad and Mosul. Arab schools were of the traditional mosque-school type. Promising graduates of the Turkish schools were sent to Constantinople for professional training. Thus most of the older lawyers and physicians in Iraq are Turkish-educated. The only College which antedates the British Mandate apart from the Theological Seminaries is the Law College founded in the early years of the present century.

It may be well to summarise the main educational resources of Iraq briefly.

STATE-SUPPORTED COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS

There are, at present, seventeen State-subsidized 'Higher Institutes' under the control of various Ministries. The College of Agriculture and the School of Veterinary Medicine are controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture; the Royal College of Medicine and its affiliated Schools of Dentistry, Nursing and Pharmacy are responsible to the Ministry of Health.

The Ministry of Education controls the following establishments: the Law College, the Engineering College, the Higher Teachers' Training

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[3] I am most grateful to the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, D.C. for educational statistics for the academic year 1956-57.

[4] There are Primary Teachers' Training Colleges in other parts of Iraq; however, they are not degree-granting institutions.

There was an announcement in April, 1956, of projected Medical Schools and Faculties of Arts & Science for Basra and Mosul. I imagine that it will be some time before these schools are in operation.

College (Dār al-Muᶜallimīn al-ᶜĀliyah), the Institute of Fine Arts, the College of Commerce and Economics, the Queen ᶜĀliyah College for Women and the College of Arts and Science. All these are degree-granting institutions: the degree of M. B., B. S. (Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery) is awarded to graduates of the Royal College of Medicine; all other schools give the *Licence* degree to their graduates. It is to be presumed that all these establishments will be corporate Colleges of the new University.

Standards vary greatly; there is, however, an honest attempt to conform to Western practice. Gibb and his associates were especially critical in their assessment of the work of the Law College and of that of the College of Commerce and Economics. The Law College—traditionally popular as the incubator of Ministers and functionaries—was scandalously overcrowded at the time of Gibb's visit. The College of Commerce was also overcrowded and was in the throes of reorganization. The situation has improved substantially in both colleges.

The various Ministries and the Development Board cooperate in the sponsorship of a most important auxiliary to the work of the 'Higher Institutes.' A vital element in the intellectual life of Iraq, it is known as the Mission Programme. Under it large sums of money are allocated for the provision of scholarships whereby capable Iraqis are sent abroad for undergraduate and graduate training in a wide variety of subjects. The Humanities, Pure Science, Engineering, Agriculture, Medicine, etc. have been studied by Iraqis in a great number of countries: the United States, Great Britain, France, Egypt, Germany, the Lebanon, etc. Close to 1,250,000 dinars are spent annually on the Mission Programme. Over 1,000 students are now studying abroad at Government expense. They are liberally subsidized in order to ensure that they devote full time to their studies. Upon their return, they are assigned to work in the service of the Ministry that sponsored them. In general, they are expected to serve one year for every year spent abroad at Government expense. The Mission scheme has proved itself to be useful and productive. Through it, a whole generation of university teachers, medical specialists, engineers and executive Civil Service personnel has been trained.

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES

1—Sharīᶜah College

The College is located in the northern section of Baghdad—in the ᶜAdhamiya quarter, adjacent to the Imām al-ᶜAdham Mosque. The Imam al ᶜAdham is, of course, the celebrated jurist Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuᶜmān ibn Thābit whose ornate tomb is located in the Mosque.

The Sharīᶜah College is the chief training-centre of Ḥanafī ᶜUlamāᵓ for the whole of Iraq.

Teaching is given along traditional lines: the students are taught

Quranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence (*Fiqh*), Arabic Literature, History, Mathematics, Philosophy, etc.

The majority of the teachers presumably have been trained in the College itself or in Al Azhar in Cairo. A recent staff appointment is a graduate of the Sorbonne, a man well-trained in methods of research and familiar with European languages and scholarship.

The course lasts six years and leads to a Master's degree (ᶜalīmiy-yah) in Religion and Allied Subjects.

The College is administered by the Department of Awqāf. Enrolment (1956-57); 193 men.

2—The Theological Academies of the Shīᶜah.

Small schools are attached to the Mosque of Kādhimain in suburban Baghdad and to that of Karbalāᵓ, the site of the martyrdom of Ḥusain.

The major Theological Academy is at Najaf—in the precincts of the Mosque of ᶜAlī. The author was extremely well received by several of the mujtahidīn here in 1956 and had ample opportunity to question them on matters of curriculum, methods, etc.

The students come from every country in which the Jaᶜfaris are represented. There are large numbers of Indians, Persians and Afghans in the schools and of Central Asian students. It is extremely unlikely that they come from the U.S.S.R. More probably they orginate from Northern Persia, Afghanistan, Northern India and Pakistan. The Najafis refer to them as "Tibetans."

Methods of teaching are traditional; a certificate of proficiency is given to the capable student by the man under whom he studies. This certificate is recognized by the corporation of mujtahidīn or interpreters of the Faith.

It should be stressed that this "graduation" is not equivalent to entry into the corporation of mujtahidīn. However, I think that it may be presumed to be a definite step in that direction. Qāḍis of the Ithnāᵓ ᶜAshariyyah are normally chosen from the ranks of such graduates. Information indicates that there are 10,000 students in Najaf but this seems scarcely credible. However, the city literally pullulates with men in turbans and caftans—whether they are all students is difficult to say. Some have been students in the Holy city for an unconscionable length of time. One Indian student told the writer he had been there for thirty years. The School is supported by revenues from the pious foundations.

MINORITY THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS

The Jews train their *hachams* or rabbis in *midrashim,* Oriental equivalents of the Ashkenazi *yeshivoth.* These religious academies are attached to certain synagogues in the larger cities.

The Christian communities which are not indigenous to Iraq—such as the Armenians, Maronites, Melchites and Orthodox—train their

clergy in Beirut or in other Near Eastern centres. The indigenous Christians—the Nestorians, the Chaldeans, Jacobites and East Syrians maintain theological academies. They are generally attached to one of the Northern monasteries: Mar Behnam, Rabban Hormuzd and others.

The Dominicans have an Oriental Seminary in Mosul where they train clergy for the East Syrians and Chaldeans.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED IN HIGHER EDUCATIONS [5]

Two years ago, a Charter for the foundation of a 'Higher Insitute' was issued by the Iraqi Government to the Fathers of the New England Province of the Society of Jesus. The American Jesuits have been working in Iraq since 1931.

The new Jesuit establishment, Al-Hikma University, opened its doors in September, 1956 with Departments of Business Administration and Physics and Engineering Sciences. Both courses last four years; degrees of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration and in Engineering Physics will be awarded to graduates. [6]

Supplementing the work of the 'Higher Institutes' are the activities of a number of establishments: libraries, [7] museums, foreign embassies, foundations, etc.

Most of the college libraries are adequate. The State-supported libraries of the Directorate of Antiquities, of the Iraqi Academy and of the Department of Awqāf are extremely good and have large collections of manuscripts. There are libraries attached to the larger mosques: ᶜAbd al-Qādir Al-Jilānī, ᶜAdhamiyyah, the Mashad ᶜAlī at Najaf, etc.

Iraqi museums are exceptionally good. The Directorate of Antiquities maintains an excellent Museum of Archaeology in Baghdad and smaller museums in Mosul, Samarra, Babylon, etc. It has been engaged in the work of excavation in various parts of the country and has restored a number of Islamic sites in Baghdad, Mosul, Kufa and Samarra. [8] The Directorate publishes a scholarly journal, *Sumer*, twice a year. Its pamphlets and other occasional publications are equally good.

A number of foreign embassies sponsor cultural and educational programs. Those of the American, British, French and Turkish Governments are the most ambitious. The United Nations is actively engaged in a variety of educational, scientific and public health pro-

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[5] Mention should be made here of the College founded in Baghdad—some ten years ago—by Dr. C. K. Staudt of the American Reformed Mission. Economic difficulties forced the establishment to close a few years after its foundation.

[6] *Bulletin of University Studies in Business Administration and Physics and Engineering Sciences* Al-Hikma University, Baghdad, 1956.

[7] Cf. Dagher, *Bibliotheques du Proche -et du Moyen Orient,* Paris, 1951, pp. 39seq.

[8] Cf. *A Historical Guide to the Ancient Sites in Iraq* issued by the Directorate of Antiquities, Baghdad, 1953.

jects. The World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNESCO have personnel working in Iraq.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN ACTION: THE COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCE.

This College occupies a most important position in the Iraqi educational system since a Faculty of Arts and Pure Science is the cardinal element in the proposed University structure. It will be examined here in detail.

The College was founded in 1949. Its initial years were extremely difficult. Indeed, the period of hard times is far from over—although the fight for survival appears to have been won.

It is somewhat misleading to refer to the establishment as the College of Arts *and* Science. They are effectively two Colleges—loosely federated and situated in different parts of the City. Teachers from the two institutions rarely see one another and their students do not fraternize.

The bond between the two Colleges is the fact that both are administered by the same Dean. He presides over the deliberations of the autonomous Faculty Council of each institution. Each College has an Assistant Dean and they share the services of a Secretary, Registrar and Bursar. Aggregate enrolment (1956-57) was 696 students.

A—*The College of Science* (*Kulliyat al-ᶜUlūm*)

This College is located in the ᶜAdhamiyyah quarter of the City—in a new building which seems adequate to its present requirements. The laboratories are well-equipped and the library is fairly good. Students may enrol in any one of these Departments: Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics, Botany, Zoology. There is a Department of Geology in the process of organization. The Faculty appear to be competent; there is a strong foreign contingent among the staff-members: British, American, Canadian, German as well as Palestinian and Egyptian Arabs. The students are of relatively high calibre. Their command of English is superior to that of the students in the Arts College. Instruction is largely in English—English text-books are in general use.

B—*The College of Arts* (*Kulliyat al-Adab*)

It is with this section of the Faculty that the writer is most familiar, having spent two years on its staff as Professor of Philosophy. The buildings in which the College was housed until lately were possibly the worst of any School in the system. The main building, in the Bāb al-Muᶜaẓẓam quarter, was an abandoned Primary School, with an annex, some two miles from the main centre consisting of an eleven room cottage. Both buildings were quite inadequate in every respect. Fortunately, the Bab al-Muᶜaẓẓam building is to be demolished to make way for a new street. The College is now relocated and its new equip-

ment and furnishings are a great improvement. There is also a good library, competently managed by a full-time librarian.

The College is administered by the Dean, assisted by a Vice-Dean and a Faculty Council composed of the Heads of the various Departments. The Faculty Council is at once a legislative and executive body. They are supposed to recommend curriculum changes and to see to their implementation and are responsible for all aspects of academic discipline: admission, expulsion, promotion, graduation, etc.

The College contains these Departments: Arabic, Archaeology, Economics, English, Geography, History and Sociology. Until four years ago, Philosophy was an autonomous Department; it is now an adjunct of the Department of Sociology. Psychology and Anthropology, new subjects in the lists, are also included under Sociology. Foreign languages are taught under the aegis of three Departments: Persian and Turkish in the Department of Arabic; French in the English Department and German in the Archaeology Department. The few courses offered in Political Science are taught in the Department of Economics. Neither of the remaining Departments exhibits hybrid characteristics.

Students elect to study in any one of the Departments or Sections. All courses require four years for completion. Successful candidates are graduated as Licentiates in Arts.[9]

British academic practice is supposed to be normative in the organization of the College. Ideally, each Department should be headed by a Professor—assisted by a number of Readers and Lecturers. This plan is followed in some Departments, but is by no means the rule; the Sociology Department, for example, has three full Professors, while the Geography Department is directed by an Assistant Professor. In 1955-56, there were forty-five full-time teachers on the staff of the College of Arts. The College wisely dispenses with the services of the horde of part-time instructors who haunt most of the other Colleges and debase standards. Of the forty-five, twenty-two were foreigners—eleven Britons, five Egyptians and one national of each of the following countries: Austria, Canada, France, Lebanon, Turkey and the United States. Eight of the staff-members (six foreigners and two Iraqis) were full Professors; ten (all Iraqis) were Assistant Professors; the remainder were classified as Lecturers, Assistant Lecturers and Demonstrators.

The foreign staff, as indicated above, is largely British. This denotes continued fidelity to a practice initiated during the early years of the Mandate when English advisors played an important role in the Ministry of Education and numbers of British teachers were brought

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[9] Gibb estimated that Licentiates of the College would require two further years of study in a British University in order to qualify for the British B.A. Cf. Gibb et al. *Report to the Royal Iraqi Government by a Commission of British University Professors,* Baghdad, 1953, p. 17.

into Iraq.[10] The country has been subjected to two main foreign influences: that of Turkey and that of the United Kingdom. Turkish influence is now negligible and British influence is giving way to an amalgam that may best be described as Anglo-American. American influence is growing by leaps and bounds due, no doubt, to the growth of American investment in the Near East, to the popularity of the Hollywood film and American picture-magazine and to the amazing success which the many fine American consumer-goods (from Coca Cola to Frigidaires and Cadillacs) have had with those of the Iraqi public sufficiently well-off to purchase them.

In the College of Arts, however, the dominant influence is still British. In 1955-56, Englishmen directed the Departments of Economics, English and Sociology. An Egyptian is Head of the Department of Archaeology. Most of the British teachers are recruited by means of advertisements in English newspapers. Interviews at the Iraqi Embassy in London are designed to eliminate unsuitable candidates. Teachers from other countries are recruited via advertisements in professional journals and through the good offices of Foundations and other international organizations.

Iraq has been fairly fortunate in the matter of foreign teachers. Those in the College of Arts and Science, as well as those in other Colleges, are for the most part, hard-working, honest and reasonably well-qualified. There are, of course, the odd time-server, the odd incompetent, the odd sycophant who live in perpetual terror of being shipped back home. However, the majority of the men and women at the College are good if somewhat uninspired teachers. The programs of study planned by some of the foreign Department Heads seem rather pretentious and unrealistic and the actual yield falls far short of the production goals set.

The most serious criticism that may be voiced against the foreigners is that they make little or no effort to understand or to come to terms with Iraq or the Iraqis. They live in enclaves as impervious to Arab influence as Surbiton or Scarsdale. Many have been working in the country for a period of five or six years and are still ignorant of the rudiments of Islam; their knowledge of Arabic is barely sufficient to order a cup of tea or coffee.

Very few of the foreign teachers display any interest in Islamic Studies or Near Eastern History and Archaeology whereby they might enrich and improve their protracted sojourn in a country where living conditions are somewhat difficult, whose climate is trying and where rewarding social and academic contacts are difficult to make. The great catalyst of the mass exodus from their native countries is, of course,

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[10] There was a British Director-General at the Ministry until 1926; there were official British advisors during the years 1926-30 and 1942-47. Cf. Longrigg, *'Iraq — 1900-1950*, Oxford, 1953, pp. 110, 165, 306.

money. Salaries paid to foreigners are princely by European standards and very good by those of North America.

Apart from the matter of salary, the Ministry of Education does little to render the lot of its foreign employees a happy one. All letters, proclamations and communications are issued in Arabic. This is highly disconcerting to newly-arrived teachers who cannot even read their own names in Arabic script. Visits to the Ministry are equally painful. The transaction of business is further complicated by an unbelievably involved office-routine. The Iraqi academic staff appear to be better qualified academically than their foreign colleagues; fifteen Iraqis were possessors of Doctorate degrees, compared with six of the foreigners.

Petty intrigues play an unduly large part in the academic life of Iraq. The local staff stand in considerable awe and fear of the Ministry of Education—with what justification is difficult to assess. Certainly, political considerations play a role in Faculty affairs. However, this is not too surprising in a Government establishment.

Salaries, in view of the rising cost of living, are far from munificent. In the session 1955-56, they ranged from twenty-one to fifty-five dinars per month.[11] Legislation enacted in June, 1956, provides for substantial rises in Civil Service salaries.[12] This is surely a most judicious move—calculated to furnish incentive for initiative and hard work. To supplement their income, too many younger teachers give extra lectures in other schools. This saps their efficiency as teachers and researchers.

Teaching methods are highly unimaginative; most of the teachers dictate reams of notes to their students—who proceed to memorize them and to reproduce them mechanically at examination-time. Discussion is rarely used as a pedagogical technique. The majority of the Iraqi teachers are idealistic and are honestly convinced that they have an important role to play in the country's development. However, dull routine, a multitude of petty annoyances and overwork have blunted their enthusiasm. Most of the teachers engage in little active research. Some of them write. One of the more successful and popular teachers is the author of a series of controversial and provocative books.

The student-body is recruited from every liwā' (district) of Iraq on the basis of results obtained in the Secondary School examinations and according to a scheme of proportional representation based on provincial population figures. The students the writer taught in Iraq were splendid young men and women, eager to learn, earnest and hard-working. However, too many of them are inadequately prepared to undertake work of an advanced character. Such a state of affairs is

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[11] *Salary Schedule,* issued by the College of Arts, May, 1956. To these base-salaries were added cost-of-living bonuses of ca. 20-25 %.

[12] Civil Law No. 59, passed June 4, 1956 provides for general rises of 33 1/3 % for all Civil Service employees. Lower salaried employees were given rises of up to 70 % of their salaries.

due, undoubtedly, to the type of instruction that they received in the Secondary Schools. Though very few direct observations on the work of these institutions were possible, experience with the students of the College of Arts strongly suggests that any proposed amelioration of the Higher Institutes must be preceded by a thorough-going revision of the work of the preparatory system.

This is not the whole story. To this lack of formal training must be added the sad facts of the circumstances under which they passed their childhood and adolescence. In the lives of most of them, poverty is an ever-present reality dulling and depressing. The parents of many of my students were illiterate peasants. They grew up in homes where books were of no use and too expensive to buy. Accordingly, most of them acquired no taste for reading and no familiarity with books and so lacked an essential, intelligent apprenticeship for academic life. But in spite of these well-nigh insuperable difficulties, a surprising number of the students bear comparison with the best students in western universities. Such men and women should be sent on Missions immediately to capitalize on their youth, intelligence and enthusiasm. For the inferior student, the fact that all the foreign teachers lecture in English presents great difficulties. Some special accommodation should be made for their benefit.

The College of Arts needs to be reformed. The Faculty Council is officious rather than efficient and seems unable to devise any plan to ensure continuity in the direction of some Departments. Foreign Heads are frequently changed. Even in the more stable Departments there is too much improvisation. A partial excuse for this faltering is that the Administration is subjected to strong pressures and the College the object of much carping criticism. It has even been queried whether the existence of a College of Arts is justified at this stage of Iraq's development.

Now, it is all too easy, at this juncture, to condemn the Iraqis as unimaginative dolts, too insensitive to perceive that the Humanities constitute the core of any University curriculum and that scholarly work in History and Philosophy is as important to the country's future as the training of technicians, engineers and medical specialists. The need for technical personnel is truly far more pressing than are the country's requirements in the field of the Humanities. However, this does not mean that a Liberal Arts College has no role to play in Iraq—however poorly defined that role may be at the present time. Here lies the crux of the problem: the College of Arts is unsure of itself. Its very identity in lost in a welter of 'practical' considerations and its function in the academic life of the country is conceived in an exasperatingly vague fashion. Very few Iraqi educators have an adequate notion of what constitutes scholarship in the Humanities and how the scholarly tradition may be dispensed in a Faculty of Arts.

Edward ᶜAtīyah's view that "*...humanism, that passionate interest in*

man and his great adventure, is not a marked feature of the Arab tradition" [13] is severe but substantially accurate. However, the 'adab' or literary tradition is still reasonably healthy in Iraq. Literate Iraqis are indefatigable versifiers and poetry is still cultivated as one of the arts. There are even schools of realistic poets who scorn the classic metres of Al-Ruṣāfī and Al-Zahāwī and are addicted instead to Impressionism, Expressionism, Surrealism and other fads. Contemporary Iraqi literature also boasts a number of good novelists and short-story writers such as Dhū-al-Nūn Ayyūb and the late Aḥmad al-Sayyid.

However, scientific literary criticism is practically non-existent; the need for study and discipline in such matters is not keenly felt. Again, there are too many amateur historians. History is largely anecdotal; little recourse is had to textual criticism, evaluation of sources and other scholarly techniques and methods. Philosophy has not been seriously studied in Iraq since the time of Al-Ghazāla in the 12th century (d. 1111). This vital aspect of Arab culture has been allowed to lie fallow, due—in great part—to obsolete religious objections. A critical study of Religion simply does not exist. The History of Religion and Comparative Religion—potentially fruitful sources of insight in the Humanities and Social Sciences—are scarcely cultivated. Religion, as an object of study, is despised by the young effendi. He is all too eager to devote his energies to what he conceives to be more practical subjects. There is, therefore, an effective damming of sources which, in the West, aliment and promote the study of the Humanities.

The College's search for an identity of some sort is exacerbated by the fact that many critics consider it to be an eminently expendable luxury. They point to the fact that its graduates have great difficulty in finding remunerative employment. Most of the alumni, sooner or later, find their way into the Civil Service as Secondary School teachers or as supernumerary clerks. The employment situation is bound to improve with the increase in commercial activity which will result from the industrialization of the country.

The pathetic desire of the College authorities to prove the usefulness of and need for a Faculty of Arts leads to an undue stress of the more practical subjects such as Economics. There is little or no conception of education as 'liberal', i.e., as something that may produce a better human being. Too many concessions already have been made to the 'practical' school. In the current reorganization of the Department of Sociology it is to be hoped that a clearer definition of aims and objectives will emerge. The Department of History stresses Arab and Islamic History—very few courses are given in European History. This is short-sighted.

No one can deny that a knowledge of Islamic History is of prime importance to Iraqi students. However, the world these students are

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[13] *An Arab Tells His Story,* London, 1946, p. 146.

called upon to face is compounded of a multiplicity of factors, many of which are importations from the West. The students take remarkably well to the cheapest and worst elements of Western civilization. Surely it is important that they come to have some appreciation of the real character of the civilization whose appurtenances and artifacts are being adopted so freely by all Oriental countries. Ideally, such appreciation should be cultivated in the College of Arts—the place where the history, religion and philosophy of other civilizations should be studied and expounded.

It is imperative that we, in the West, understand the Arabs. However, it is equally necessary that they come to understand the West. Accurate knowledge of European history, real knowledge of Western institutions, religion and philosophy are sure sources for such understanding. The West has been through the experience of industrialization; its economic and commercial activities are intelligently organized and its legal, political and cultural institutions have—in the main—proved to be sufficiently flexible to survive the process.

Contemporary Iraq is in the throes of westernization and industrialization. This has already given rise to a multitude of problems and bids fair to test the resiliency of the traditional way of life and to strain canonized cultural patterns to the breaking-point. Much can be learned, by the Iraqis, through the study of European and American history and from an intelligent analysis of Western mistakes and successes along the road to industrialization. If the continuity of Iraqi culture is not to be ruptured, if her way of life is to be something more than a grotesque simulacrum of that of the West, it would appear that a small contingent of interpreters and conservators is as necessary to the well-being of the country as the vast army of technicians and engineers. This small contingent will normally be stationed in the Faculty of Arts.

A Faculty of Arts is not an academic emporium where various disciplines are taught in haphazard fashion and without proper integration. It should be the arbiter of the work of all Faculties and Departments, submitting the conclusions of historians, sociologists, littérateurs and scientists to analysis and evaluation. Without this essentially philosophical insight, its work is meaningless and without purpose. This may be asking too much of the College of Arts at the present time; however, it should be established as an ideal toward which all efforts are to be directed.

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Revelation and Reason in Islam. By Arthur J. Arberry. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1957, (George, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London), pp. 122. $ 3.00.

In *Revelation and Reason in Islam* Profesor Arberry has essayed the almost impossible, to chart the course of the controversy over Reason and Revelation, or Reason and Faith, through and by means of the successive debates which took place in Islam between theologians, philosophers, theosophists and mystics, upon doctrinal questions such as Free-will versus Predestination, the Nature and Attributes of God, especially His Word, or Speech, the Eternal Qur'ān, the Future Life and finally the Nature of Man, which is, it must be confessed, seldom discussed explicitly to any extent, but the widely different conceptions of which, held by the various protagonists, largely determine their religious thought.

In the orderly exposition of these debates, however, the reader often loses touch with the problem at issue, the relation of reason to revelation in Islam. Sometimes, indeed, he is at a loss to pin down the relevancy of the subject of debate to that problem. This is especially true of the very interesting and quite lengthy discussion of the various conceptions of the Future Life in Chapter II, which show, indeed, that the philosophers of Islam plumped generally for their own pet pleasure and desire, an eternal life of spiritual happiness in the contemplation of intelligible things and the One, or First Cause. But it does not suggest that their conception of the hereafter was just as irrational in its way as that of the Paradise of purified earthly joys, which they contemptuously concede to the theologians, preachers and the common herd of men. For the philosophers' eternal state implies a non—or supra—rational reason, what the 3rd century Christian mystic, Evagrius Ponticus (d.c. 400), and his Syrian epigones, the Nestorian and Monophysite monks, named pure, or naked, mind, achieved by a progressive detachment from all passion and sense-impressions in order to rejoin divine immateriality, and rejects all ratiocinative activity in order to free the pure mind which is itself intuitive. "The mind," says Evagrius, "is free of all impressions and materiality when it contemplates God" (C. I 46). "Blessed is the mind which at the time of prayer becomes immaterial and naked of all" (De Or. 119).

Pure, or naked, mind is defined by Evagrius as one "which has been perfected by the vision of itself (or its essence, pure intellectuality) and is thought worthy of attaining contemplation of the Holy Trinity" (C. III 6). "When the mind is judged worthy of the contemplation of the Holy Trinity, then by grace it is also named God, since it has arrived at the similitude of its Creator" (C. V 81), which is its primordial state (C. III 17), prior to "movement" (i.e., the Fall, the degradation of souls by sin (M. ix, p. 159), and the indivisible unity of Christ with his rationa creature in the Trinity, which unites all in a unity without duality (M. xi, 34, p. 161). Mind is the image of God, the "place" of God (C. V 39) and God by Grace, and has only to see

itself to see God (C. VII 4, 50, 53). For it is transformed by knowledge of God to the nature of God according to the principle of assimilation by knowledge.

Muslim philosophers, such as Al-Fārābī and Avicenna, reconciled revelation with reason by simply eliminating revelation, identifying it with reason, as did also the mystics, and probably in their own curious way the Ismāʿīlīs. But the reason, with which they assimilated revelation, was not the natural reason, but an enlightened, intuitive reason in touch with the Active Intellect, the Evagrian pure, or naked, mind stamped with the image of Christ; and Revelation, the verities revealed in God's Word, the Qurʾān, was not for them, as for the orthodox theologians, the irrational basis of the Faith in principle and motive beyond and inaccessible to reason by the very fact that "it proceeded from the sheer, arbitrary will of God," but the knowledge drawn from it was not even subject, like theirs, to verification by common experience, or general agreement.

Rhazes seems to have rejected revelation altogether (Ch. II, p. 39); but Averroes made a final attempt to solve the dilemma. In his *Faṣl al-Maqāl* he writes (p. 22, 13-15): "The aim of the Law (the Qurʾān) is only to teach the true knowledge and correct practice. The true knowledge is the knowledge of God Most High, and of all existing things as they really are, and especially the law concerning these, and knowledge of future blessedness and torment." Again (p. 23, 8-p. 24, 5) he says that instruction is of two kinds, by the methods of assent, which are three in number, the demonstrative, the dialectical and the rhetorical, and the methods of conception, which are two in number, the thing itself, or its image. But all men are not by nature such as can grasp demonstrative, or even dialectical arguments, because of the difficulty in learning demonstrative arguments and the time it takes to study them. Therefore, since the aim of the Law is to teach all, it must include all the methods of assent and of conception, but since its primary aim is to care for the many without neglecting to arouse the élite, the methods mostly used in it are those common to the many.

There is one Truth, but several proofs. Averroes held with Aristotle that only demonstrative proofs furnish necessary, absolute truth, and that dialectical and rhetorical proofs yield only probability. The philosopher alone, therefore, can grasp the verities of the Qurʾān essentially, and revelation is ultimately rational, as is indeed God Himself No wonder that Ibn Taimiyya sought to silence "the sweet reason of Averroes' patient voice" (p. 69), or that Al-Ghazālī opposed the philosophers' "exclusive reliance on reason" (p. 63).

The exposition of Ismāʿīlī doctrines in Chapter II, with its analysis of Nāṣir-i-Khusrau's *Harmony of Greek Philosophy and Ismāʿīlian Theosophy* and several extracts from it, and Chapter IV, with its account of the life of Al-Bisṭāmī and the text of some of his quite extensive colloquies with God, its short review of Al-Ghazālī's conversion and mystical position and its observation on the idea of the pre-eternal essence of Muḥammad, are scintillating, if brief, sketches of two aspects of Islam's religious life. However they add little, if

anything, to the proper subject of the book. Ismāʿīlism was, as Professor Arberry remarks, "a prostitution of human reason in the name of infallible authority" (and also of revelation). If the perfect mystic is beyond good and evil, his thought is also beyond reason and revelation. The course of Muslim mysticism seems, on the whole, to have been a progressive assimilation of the mystical doctrines of Evagrius Ponticus as developed in Nestorian and Monophysite monasticism; and the Idea of Muḥammad, identified with the Idea of Ideas, might well have been the final phase of Islam's appropriation to itself of Evagrian thought. "The Messiah is that one in whom is the whole of the Unity; and he it is who receives the submission of the rational natures" (C. III 2), "He who is in the image of the Invisible God is the teacher of knowledge concerning Him to every rational nature that is in his image" (C. II 23).

NOTE: "C" = Century. See *Evagrius Ponticus,* W. Frankenberg.
"De Or" = *De Oratione,* ed. a transl. I. Hausherr.
Faṣl al-Maqāl, ed. and transl. by Leon Gauthier.

Harvard University WILLIAM THOMSON

Ṭaha Ḥūsayn: His Place in the Egyptian Literary Renaissance. By Pierre Cachia, Luzac and Co, London, 1956. 8vo. pp. ix, 260.

During the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties there was no better known or more controversial figure in the Egyptian academic world than the blind scholar and man of letters, Dr. Ṭaha Ḥusain. He had been a Professor in the old frenchified Université Égyptienne, and when this was incorporated into the newly constituted State University in 1925 he had a Chair in the Faculty of Arts, of which later he was for a time Dean. He was active in politics, and for a period was Minister of Education. His fame, however, was as a popular writer and lecturer. In these nineteen-fifties the Ewart Hall in Cairo will still be packed to capacity when a lecture by Dr. Ṭaha Ḥusain is announced. It is not only that he is an ardent champion of Egyptian nationalism, or that he is a fearless advocate of reform, notorious for his outspoken modernism and his criticism of antiquated beliefs and customs. These things, of course, mean that any lecture of his is liable to be exciting, but beyond that there is a personal charm and a quite extraordinary skill in handling the Arabic language. He has broken completely with the oldfashioned style of linguistic ornamentation, with its much appreciated piling up of obscurities, a style to which Arabic lends itself rather easily, and has developed a style which is simple and lucid but at the same time makes the most of the rich resources of the language.

Ṭaha Ḥusain represents an interesting combination of Eastern and Western culture. In his early youth he had a traditional Muslim education, including some years at the ancient Muslim University, Al-Azhar, but added to that a French education, partly in Egypt and partly in France, his Doctorate being from a French University. He has been strongly influenced by the ancient Greek culture, which he has striven to reintroduce to the Arab world by way of translations. One of the charges laid against him by the Muslim religious

authorities who accused him of heresy was that he emphasized too much the borrowings of early Islam from Hellenic culture. In Egypt he has been bitterly attacked for his views, and one of his books can be procured only in a revised form, the original edition having been suppressed by authority as offensive to Islamic orthodoxy. On the other hand he has been acclaimed as the wisest of the modern Egyptian reformers.

It was the appearance of English and French translations of the early part of his autobiographical work *Al-Ayyām* (The Days), which aroused particular interest in him outside Egypt, and in recent years the enquiry has often been heard as to why so little about him was available to Western readers. That interest makes this present book, a revision of a Doctoral Dissertation at the University of Edinburgh, sure of a good reception. The author was a student in Cairo, is familiar with Arabic and the Egyptian scene, and has had personal contact with Dr Ṭaha Ḥusain. He wisely introduces his subject by an account of the literary renaissance in Egypt which leads up to these present-day writers, briefly but adequately recounts the story of Dr Ṭaha Ḥusain's life, with some attempt at judging his character, and then discusses his numerous writings as illustrative of his significance as a reformer and as a man of letters. Finally he attempts a critique of his literary craftsmanship. Much of this is rather immature but it does make available to readers unacquainted with Arabic a readable account of what Ṭaha Ḥusain has attempted to do in his writings, and allows them to see something of his significance in the life of present-day Egypt.

Columbia University, New York ARTHUR JEFFERY

The White Fathers. By Glenn D. Kittler. Harper & Brothers New York, 1957. pp. 299 plus xv, map. $ 5.00.

It is always something of a revelation to discover the extent of the work that others are doing. Protestants as well as Catholics should be aware of a missionary movement which has six hundred stations in Africa, together with schools, clinics, hospitals and farms. Cardinal Lavigerie, the founder of the White Fathers, was by any reckoning a great man. He was ahead of his time, both in his theory of Christian missions and in his views on colonisation. He had the personality to inspire others with his vision and the resolution to carry it through. He demanded of his missionaries an utter and life-long devotion, a complete self-identification with the Arabs insofar as their faith would allow and a hundred years of selfless charity without expecting conversions, in order to pierce the Arab heart and remove the anti-Christian prejudice from the Muslim mind.

This is a very readable book, in places perhaps too colloquial in style, and if occasionally there is a tendency towards exaggerated statement, this is but a slight blemish in a sincere piece of work. Since it is written from a frankly Catholic point of view, the reader will not expect lengthy or highly favourable references to Protestant missions. The writer is very severe towards Alexander Mackay, and a less than generous reference is made to Livingstone. More unfortunate

is the implication that the great struggle to eliminate the slave trade was carried through entirely by Catholics. Credit should be given to the powerful contribution of evangelical Christians in England. With all this, however, the book should prove interesting and thought-provoking to all who are concerned with Christianity's approach to Islam, and to Africa generally.

Algiers, North Africa LAURENCE R. STEDEFORD

Ancient and Oriental Music (The New Oxford History of Music—Vol. I), Edited by Egon Wellesz, Oxford University Press, London, 1957, pp. xxiii, 530. Bibliography, index, illustrations. $ 9.50.

Many welcome changes have taken place in the general view of the history of music and comparative musicology within the past few years. A "history of music", even the one which Oxford published earlier, concerned itself with the history of the art music of the West, beginning in Greece and continuing through the modern phases of Western composition and musical practice. The new emphases are described in the Introduction to the Volume under question, as follows: (p. xvii)

"During the two decades that separate the publication of the Introductory Volume and the planning of the NEW OXFORD HISTORY OF MUSIC musicological research has made great progress in the field covered by the present volume. Phonograph and gramophone have made it possible to study the music of remote and primitive peoples. The methods of transcribing the music have improved. Comparative musicology, that new branch of musical research, regarded in its beginnings some fifty years ago as a side-line, has enlarged its scope and developed its methods. Orientalists have taken an ever-increasing interest in writings about music and passages in historical works referring to it. Students of comparative liturgiology have given the initiative to an investigation of the relationship between Jewish and Christian chant, and their work has led to the examination of the passages on music in the Holy Scriptures in a new light. The present volume takes into account this widening of the field of musicological studies, which has created a new outlook."

The new science of ethno-musicology has brought about something of a revolution in the whole approach to music—a revolution of which some of the conventional and orthodox schools of music are not yet aware. The delight with which this reviewer read this volume of the New Oxford History was almost beyond bound. The work is a symposium by experts, each of whom feels it necessary to make a case for this type of study before approaching his particular field. Primitive Music is discussed under many headings by Marius Schneider, Professor of Comparative Musicology, University of Cologne. The Music of Far Eastern Asia, including China, Japan, Southeast Asia, and a surprisingly wide group of other Asiatic countries is handled by Laurence Picken, Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. Arnold Bake, a Dutch musicologist who is now Reader in Sanskrit, University of London, has a magnificent chapter on the Music of India. Other areas under discussion are Music in the Bible, in Post-Biblical Judaism, in ancient Greece and in Rome. The chapters which would interest

the readers of this periodical, beyond perhaps the other areas, are those written by Henry George Farmer, well-known as an interpreter of the music of the Arabs. He writes three of the chapters; one on Ancient Mesopotamia, another on Ancient Egypt and a third very valuable contribution on the Music of Islam.

The characteristic approach by each one of these authors is the function of music in a civilization. One scarcely knows where the anthropological aspects of music run into the musical aspects of anthropology. In the civilizations under discussion there is a much greater integration of the life of the people with their every expression, and the most intimate emotional reading of the meaning of cultures is to be found in the spontaneity of its musical expression.

Your reviewer feels competent to criticize only the chapter on Indian Music which is really, except for passing references to musical synthesis in the north of India, a record of Hindu music. In passing, it may be of interest to note that some of the violence done to Indian music, particularly in the importation of instruments, is attributed to the ill-informed activities of the Western Christian missonary. But so well does Mr. Bake deal with the present dilemma of Indian music, and so much of what he has to say is equally applicable to the music of other cultures, that it may not be out of place to quote from his paragraphs on *Modern Developments*: (pp. 225-227)

"Indian music is passing through a critical period. The impact of the West has shaken its foundations more drastically than foreign influences have ever done before. Mistaken attempts to foist the finished Western system of harmony on to the perfect modal system of Indian monophony have been made for the last hundred years, not only by missionaries but also by enthusiastic Indian admirers of European culture. In this process the delicate structure of Indian music is crushed out of existence. Lately the music of the films, and jazz with its coarse appeal, have not beckoned in vain.

In this unfortunate development the radio plays an important part, but it also gives the champions of the severe classical style an opportunity to reach the ears of a great many more people than would have had the opportunity to hear this music in olden days. The medieval attitude of a master teaching only a few chosen pupils and not divulging his best to the uninitiated is still strong. Music for the masses is a very recent trend, and music teaching now tends to move away from the intimate teacher-pupil connexion towards class-teaching in schools and colleges.

This is a very strongly supported movement strengthened also by the growth of nationalistic feeling. But new developments, breaking away from the traditional system, are not lacking. The very perfection of that system precluded further development, and adventurous spirits have had to look for new avenues for their creative impulses. They have but rarely understood that the new developments must have their roots in Indian music itself to be viable, yet there are indications that that understanding is dawning. After a period of Western influence, Rabindranath Tagore turned to the folk-melodies of Bengal for inspiration, and all over India isolated poets and musicians are drawing their strength from the music of the people,

often with very felicitous results. For Indian folk-music, which ranges from the primitive two-note sing-song of the Chencus of the jungles of Hyderabad to the stirring war-ballads of the bards of Rajputana and the mystical longing of the princess-saint Mirabai, is an expression of the whole life of the people, with their joys and sorrows."

The discussion of the Music of Islam by Dr. Farmer includes necessarily much of a history of Islamic civilization. This history is discussed with particular emphasis on the part that music has played in the development of the Islamic people and, indeed, of Islam itself, or at least those aspects of Islam in which music is considered an aid or an approach to religion. A knowledge of Islamic musical theory is a necessary possession of those who would understand not only the music of Islam, but much of the culture of Islam itself. The influence of Islamic music on the music of the West, during the days when the artistic culture of the Arab penetrated Europe, is a fascinating study for the student of comparative musicology, and particularly for the student of the history of music in Spain. Dr. Farmer concludes his section on Islamic Music by saying that during the 700 years of Islamic influence on European culture "it was this glow that helped to light the way for Europe's progress in music." (p. 477).

It remains only to be said that much of the meaning, as well as the history, of music as it involves people and peoples, is only now coming to light with the building up of materials for the broader study of music than was possible before the tape recorder and anthropological field work in music. Through a study of music approached from this point of view, not only are the peoples of the world better understood, but there is the possibility of intercultural contributions to enrich the musics of the whole world.

The bibliographies are of very great help for those who would go further in any one of these fields. One of the greatest values of this volume is not yet available. It is projected that a recording be pressed, illustrating each volume of *The New History of Music.* The recordings, illustrative of this first volume, will be on records of 78 rpm under the title *The History of Music in Sound,* Vol. I. This volume will include 18 sides, and should be quite as valuable as the text of the Oxford history itself.

Hartford, Connecticut. MALCOLM S. PITT

Early Sites of Christianity. By Peter Bamm, Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1957, pp. 256, map, illustrations, $ 4.50 Translated from the German by Stanley Godman.

Greece, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Egypt are presented through the eyes of a thoughtful traveler interested in life as it is lived, in nostalgic sentiments of the past, in history, legend and beauty. For one who has traveled in these areas, the book refreshes a thousand lingering sentiments; any one about to make a journey, it invites not only to look at what the author saw, but to adopt his method of friendly curiosity about manners and customs strange to the West. Also, to one who has journeyed through books of history, this offers a pleasant that-reminds-me style of recalling persons, places and dates. Excellent illustrations increase the reader's pleasure.

The purpose of the book is cultivated enjoyment, and for that purpose it should be used. The missionary, whose purpose is living religious faith, must read cautiously, for here theology and history are traditional and sentimental rather than vital (cf. pp. 13 ff, 185, 230; the error on p. 217 on the time of the Ottoman taking of Jerusalem, 1617 for 1517, must be accidental). Society is described with great beauty as to its emotional heritage but not in its revolutionary modernity in the midst of which the missionary must live.

Wherever one sits to read Peter Bamm's book, he will soon imagine himself in a deck-chair upon a little Mediterranean steamer, gently moving along the beautiful shores where gray monasteries mark the virile epic of ancient Christians now gently remembered by aged monks who have escaped from the even more terrifying epic of the 20th century.

Hartford, Connecticut MOSES BAILEY

Heritage of the Desert: The Arabs and the Middle East. By Harry B. Ellis, Ronald Press Company, New York, 1956, pp. 311, bibliography and index, $ 5.00.

Here is another of those books about the Middle East, which current history so often renders out-of-date before the author autographs copies for his friends! In this case the events connected with "Aswan" and "Suez" are responsible, not certainly Mr. Ellis who in the summer of 1956 never expected the disasters of the autumn. For any Near-Easterner, native of foreign, there is nothing new in this book which perhaps suffers from repetition. But the element of personal experience which enters into most chapters serves to confirm judgments reached on other grounds. This personal touch is emphasised and enriched by equally personal photographs. Full-weight is given to the serious problems raised over the last fifty years by the different invasions of the West into the area (or should it be "arena") of the Eastern Mediterranean—political or economic or (and it might have been stressed more) missionary. On the last, the final word has not been said. Those who know the situations obtaining in the various countries will be grateful for Chapter 12—*Arabian Nights 1956*—for it is by no means general for residents or visitors in other countries to share the author's experiences. It would have been good to write these pages against the background of the opening pages of the Editor's *The Call of the Minaret* or the recent discussion by Bethmann of "Decisive Years in Palestine." Now and again in references to the past there are sentences which provoke more criticism than the chapters devoted to current history. It is at least doubtful whether the Hebrews were "Monotheists" in 1300 B.C., or lower on the same page (5) whether it was not the Islamic Empire rather than Arab, as such, which was the "standard-bearer" of learning in mediaeval times.

We question, too, whether, as is the impression given, it was "the fires of Arab nationalism, expressed in terrorism and revolt, that forced the gradual relinquishment of the mandates." Any resident in the area through ten or more years would know that this was not the whole story. On page 15 the tragedy of Palestinian refugeedom is

merely mentioned among other reasons for understanding an area "which looms as the next testing ground between the Soviets and the West." This tragedy is a main factor in the thought and conversation of ordinary people through the area mentioned and on beyond. There is so much that is worthwhile in this book, written popularly and with a desire to have readers understand the situations, that on more than one occasion the reviewer has put down the book with the lament that if only the author had known how to speak the language of the area with its different peoples, a book of this nature would be fourfold more valuable.

Red Hill, Surrey, England E. F. F. Bishop

The Arab Bloc in the United Nations. By Dr. G. Moussa Dib, Djambatan Ltd, International Educational Publishing House, Amsterdam, 1956, pp. 122, index, bibliography.

The author desires that all Arabs form one large "community" or bloc of nations bound by ties of religion, language, culture, common history, and common population. The Arab bloc has often voted together in the United Nations in matters directly pertaining to the Arab States and in matters affecting the Afro-Asians and Latin Americans, nations which are in need of economic help.

The achievement of political independence has been recent. Dislike and distrust of France and Great Britain have been fostered by certain elements within some Arab nations. Such distrust has even been transferred to the United States as a member of the Western bloc with France and Britain.

The Arab bloc, however, is not exclusively Muslim and there is divergence of interest among its members. Some have joined, most have denounced, the Baghdad Pact and (since this book was written) the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East. Each Arab state has voted as seemed best for its own national interest. Some side with the West in the cold war; others side with the East. Those that favor Russia call their policy "neutralism," lest the Arab populace disown or overthrow the leaders of such policy as abhorrent to their basic religion and economy. In short, the Arab nations seek to bargain to meet their economic needs free of strings to either the West or the East, and, if possible, from both simultaneously. They have voted in the United Nations as their national policy dictated. The record shows no unanimity among the Arab nations except in matters involving Israel.

The Arab, the Afro-Asian, and the Latin American nations lack developed resources, economic stability, and modern "scientific know-how" to develop resources, economy, and a higher standard of living. The Arab States have been asking and receiving arms, payment for which weakens their economy and lowers their standard of living. Ultimately aid by East and West through the United Nations, as the author points out, would remove the fear on the part of the have-not nations of aid "with strings attached."

Events have shown the divisive forces operating in the Arab bloc. The author shows that "[a growing number of Arab votes in the United Nations] has tended to bring the Arab States closer together

while scientific know-how [necessitating dependence on the Western Great Powers] has tended to drive them asunder." Particularly in his conclusion Dr. Dib emphasizes the dispersive forces. He finds the Baghdad Pact and ʿAbd al-Naṣir's arms deal with Czechoslovakia, both of 1955, symbols of diverging policies in the Arab world. He holds that the Iraqi Government, as a member of the Baghdad Pact, sacrificed basic Arabic principles—"negotiated with the Western Great Powers from weakness"; that Colonel Nasir "negotiated with the Big Powers from power—the solidarity of so many million Arabs. The outcome was that the Iraqi Government secured economic and military aid with strings attached; the second secured the same thing without strings." The detailed "case histories" of Arabic issues in the United Nations make Dr. Dib's study a very useful reference work. The monograph is admirably clear and concise.

Hunter College of the City of New York GRACE J. CALDER

The Seven Odes. The First Chapter in Arabic Literature. By Arthur J. Arberry. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1957 (George, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London), pp. 258. $ 5.75.

Professor Arberry's book has three parts and raises four or five problems, two of which are disposed of deftly and persuasively, the others just as deftly, if not with such authority. The first part (24 pp), the Prologue, examines the origin and transmission as an anthology of the seven so-called "Suspended Poems" of the Arabs. It traces briefly but adequately the literary history of the anthology from its assembly as such by Ḥammād al-Rāwiya (died, circa 774), whose life, style and character are neatly delineated, through the evidences for it in early Arabic literature, to the five commentaries, which were considered most authoritative. The last of these was the work of "perhaps the greatest of all commentators on old Arabic poetry," Al-Tabrīzī (d. 1109). It concerns itself mainly, naturally enough, with the fortune of the anthology in England, where that amazing Welshman, Sir William Jones, polyglot and poet, was the first to translate the anthology into any foreign tongue (1782), and where later the Blunts, emulating Fitzgerald and his "Glorious Quatrains of ʿUmar Khayyām," sought to achieve a translation of the seven odes that would be "a new flower of a strange and interesting kind added to the body of our English classics." But "the indifferent public hailed no new Omar, and the Blunts' translation has never been reprinted" (1903).

The second part (197 pp), the body of the book, presents Professor Arberry's translations of the seven "Suspended Poems", each introduced by an appropriate preface, in which he gives, in the first place, an account of the life, circumstances and character of the poet, enlivened occasionally with anecdotes, true or legendary, concerning him, and then records the Arab editors and commentators of his poetry and the English, French and German scholars of the 18th and 19th centuries, who have edited, annotated and translated it. He embellishes this record with thumb-nail sketches of some distinguished Muslim literati or with stories of the fate of a manuscript or a translation and offers finally for comparison several translations of selected verses of the ode by English, French and German Arabists. The whole represents

a happy union of urbane erudition with the journalistic instinct, or idiom, and a passion for personal detail and colour.

The third part (27 pp), the Epilogue, introduces the question of the authenticity of the seven odes by a quotation from a notorious book by the celebrated Egyptian scholar, Dr. Ṭaha Ḥusain, entitled, *On Pre-Islamic Literature*, which repeated, with some modifications, his attack on the authenticity of Pre-Islamic poetry in general (developed in a previously published and still more notorious book, *On Pre-Islamic Poetry*, which was withdrawn from sale by pressure of public opinion). Arberry proceeds to analyse the thesis of this assault by summarizing the arguments in support of it presented by Professor D. S. Margoliouth in his monograph, *The Origins of Arabic Poetry*. He concedes the cogency of the case set out by these two scholars, but points out the sophistry of some of the arguments and the fallacious nature of others and concludes finally "that the weight of evidence is heavily in favour of the Seven Odes being genuine products of the age to which Arab tradition has assigned them" (p. 253). Unfortunately he only finds time to mention the names of the scholars, both Arab and Western, who have rebutted this specious thesis, some of whom have by patient research and critical investigation traced the development of Arabic poetry, and some of its schools, from as early as the 5th century, demolishing the pretentious arguments of the thesis by historical fact and literary evidence and not by any dialectic.

The rest of the Epilogue is devoted mainly to a discussion of the quality of the Seven Odes. "Are they great poetry, as the Arabs would have us believe?" or "are they so flawed in general composition or in particular detail as to merit relegation to the status of the venerable but curious rather than the beautiful?" (p. 26). The answer to both of these rhetorical questions is, I think, no. The general composition of the odes is defective, their several parts having only a very tenuous connection, if any; and long ago that acute, if sternly moral, Ashᶜarite, Al-Bāqillānī, pointed out quite a few flaws of detail in the Ode of Imrū al-Qais, verses padded for the sake of metre or rhyme (nos. 7, 10, 11, 26), verses which he judged mediocre, weak, commonplace, meaningless, trite and silly (nos. 8, 9, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31), verses unrelated and confused in composition (nos. 24, 25), and finally verses which he stigmatized as cheap, vulgar, foul and obscene (nos. 14, 15, 19), in which "there is nothing to evoke approval or to be considered beautiful" and which "make [the poet] contemptible, silly and indecent."

Professor Blachère's "optical trouble of western criticism" (p. 245), induced by the meticulous lucubrations of learned Muslims, has affected that criticism both for good and evil. It has encouraged a becoming modesty; but it has also led western critics to resign their aesthetic, as well as their ethical, judgment. The men who forged and fixed the literary taste of the Arab world, and to whom these poems owe their celebrity, the grammarians of the 9th and 10th centuries, did not seek, as Professor von Grunebaum has pointed out, to develop an aesthetic. They did not investigate the nature of the beautiful, but only the nature of the literary art. Beauty in their eyes was just "something additional superimposed upon the canvas of ordinary

speech," "an ornament added at will to the treatment of a given motif"... "by the application of a certain number of technical devices." Originality was defined as "the improved rendition of traditional motifs" and literary progress as "the sequence of such improved renditions," leading to "a steady rise both of subtlety and of ornateness of presentation." As Professor Arberry himself puts it: "In Arabic poetry the business of the creative craftsman was to invent new patterns of thought and sound within the framework of his revered tradition." Here, however, "thought" needs to be carefully defined (p. 246).

Under the dead hand of this mechanistic idea of beauty and the "revered tradition" Arab literary creativeness withered and died, except in mystic circles, after the brief flowering of Arabic poetry in the so-called "age of reason" in the 9th and 10th centuries; and Arabic poetry was there and then moulded and set in style and scope, its forms "severely circumscribed by conventions," "its topics strictly limited," and Arab taste formed and fixed for centuries to come by the grammarians of that period, when the Seven Odes served, with the rest of pagan poetry (though especially so) as models of the laws of prosody and the art of rhetoric.

This technical appraisal of the odes has precluded, by the authority which it has wielded down through the ages, any proper judgment of their true status in the realm of poetry. They are not, on the whole, great poetry even if "supremely fine poems judged by Arab standards" (p. 254). They may exhibit dramatic intensity ever so often and epigrammatic terseness generally—these two Arab virtues—but not "to a degree approaching perfection" (p. 250). Catholicity they may also have (p. 251), for that is an attribute of all good poetry; but "full-blooded frankness" as a designation of what Al-Bāqillānī justly terms lewdness and obscenity seems a less than ingenuous 20th century substitute for Sir William Jones' 19th century euphemism "juvenile frolics."

On the other hand, these odes present many an apt and sometimes striking metaphor, or simile, and paint some fine and effective descriptions of nature and its moods, of horse and camel and their good points, and the joy of their strength and swiftness and action, of wild animals and their traits in their natural environment, of desert road and camp and inn, and of the chase and battle. They also instill many noble sentiments on the virtues of loyalty and generosity, justice and courage, on pride of race and of self and personal integrity, all of which can stir emotion even in translation, and which any lover of the country and its wild life, or student of the human situation, can grasp and enjoy without an intimate knowledge of the desert and its life. For these virtues are catholic.

Professor Arberry has translated these classical figures, descriptions and sentiments for the English-speaking world with great fidelity and a true sense of their inherent, idiomatic quality in simple, straightforward English speech, pure and undefiled by any mannerisms, archaic or romantic, shaped by a lucid and vigorous style and a fine feeling for the genuine rhythm of English speech (which an occasional transposition of words seems to violate) into a flowing translation of the

Arabic original, as genial as can well be imagined. He does not attempt to reproduce, or replace, the Arabic measures and rhymes which mostly captivate an Arab audience. Some measures are most stately and others are lively and stirring, and to find and fit the rhyming word at the end of each verse is a brilliant jeu d'esprit. The translator justly puts his trust in the cadence of his English rendering to convey as much as is possible of the sentiment inspired by the tone of the poems. But even so his translations are not tokens of great poetry. That, however is not Professor Arberry's fault.

Harvard University WILLIAM THOMSON

The Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs Against the Islamic World. By Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Hague, Mouton & Company, 1955, pp. xi, 352, biographical notes, maps, index.

The article in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (p. 549 f.) on the Ismāʿīliyyah by Cl. Huart summarizes what has been written about this sect in general Islamic history. The groundwork that was accomplished by ʿAbdullāh ibn Maymūn (d. A.D. 875), who was "filled with a fierce hatred of the Arabs and with a freethinker's contempt for Islam" (Nicholson, *Literary History of the Arabs,* p. 271), is set forth graphically in E. G. Browne's *Literary History of Persia* (Vol. I, p. 396 ff.). ʿAbdullāh, as Dr. Nicholson has mentioned, "conceived the idea of a vast secret society which should be all things to all men, and which, by playing on the strongest passions and tempting the inmost weaknesses of human nature, should unite malcontents of every description in a conspiracy to overthrow the existing *régime* He saw that the movement, in order to succeed, must be started on a religious basis, and he therefore identified himself with an obscure Shīʿite sect, the Ismāʿīlīs, who were so called because they regarded Muḥammad, son of Ismāʿīl, son of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, as the Seventh Imām." (Nicholson, *op. cit.,* pp. 271, 272).

During the four centuries from the time of ʿAbdullāh until the Mongol invasion "the Ismāʿīlītes (Fāṭimids, Carmathians, and Assassins) either ruled or ravaged a great part of the Muḥammadan Empire." (Nicholson, *op. cit.,* p. 272).

In Dr. Hodgson's book, *The Order of Assassins,* there is a chart facing page 160 that shows the "Genealogy of the Ismāʿīlī Imāms," and at page 88 there is another chart of "Chronological Landmarks" from 1072-1275. A map opposite page 16 points out the areas where the Fāṭimid power had been extended.

It was ʿUbayd Allāh (A.D. 909-934) who proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi, and who has been considered to have been the founder of the Fāṭimid dynasty of Caliphs. His real name was Saʿīd ibn Ḥusayn. He was a grandson of ʿAbdullāh ibn Maymūn, and it was his grandfather's widespread program of infiltration and opposition to ʿAbbāsid authority that had prepared the way for his success.

An article by W. Ivanow in the *Supplement* to the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (p. 98 ff.) adds valuable information, as the author specifies, about "the Ismāʿīlī system of philosophy and science, coordinated with the religion, and serving as a revelation of its inner contents."

The books with which readers are likely to be familiar are J. von

Hammer's *Geschichte der Assassinen,* Freya Stark's *Valleys of the Assassins,* and B. Bouthoul's *Grand Maître des Assassins.* These books give an interesting review of the activities of the Assassins as a minority sect living in the mountain fastnesses of northern Persia. They were hostile towards the Sunnī rulers and distrustful of the Persian Shīᶜites, who were Twelvers. In consistency with the teaching and practice of both ᶜAbdullāh and ᶜUbayd Allāh, they carried on a program of systematic intimidation and strategic assassination.

Dr. Hodgson observes that "a number of Muslim sects had used assassination as a technique. It is recorded of Muḥammed himself that on several occasions he exclaimed that one or another inaccessible enemy of his did not deserve to live; and was then gratified by one of his men's finding ways of destroying the enemy in question. The purist Khārijites in early times, who declared all other Muslims apostate and therefore subject to the death penalty, sometimes showed their fervor by killing any individual Muslim in their path" (p. 82).

The author prefers to designate the Ismāᶜīlīs who dwelt in fortified villages in the Saljūq domains, particularly in Alamūt, as Nizārīs. He discusses in detail their break with the Fāṭimids in Egypt over the question of succession in the imamate. "Historians of the period," as Dr. J. N. Hollister has indicated in his comprehensive work *The Shiᶜa of India,* "leave the impression that Ḥasan Ṣabbāḥ championed Nizār." In general the early Nizārīs may be described as the followers of Ḥasan Ṣabbāḥ (A.D. 1090-1124), whose energy and special teaching are mainly responsible for their distinctive characteristics. In the course of their development as a community their territory "was divided into four parts: a section of Qūhistān in eastern Irān, a large tract with many towns; Gird Kūh, in Qūmis, evidently a single fortress; Rudbār, with Alamūt, a small tract with many fortresses and villages; and the southern Jabal Bahra, in Syria, similar to Irān" (Hodgson, p. 115).

While the author states that his main purpose is "to trace the course of the Nizārī community as a whole, analyzing military, or doctrinal developments only as they bear upon the general development of the community," (p. 33) the present writer credits him primarily with a painstaking survey of his sources, which he has listed fully in his Biographical Notes. Unfortunately many of the Nizārī documents, texts and translations, are like an archaeologist's broken pieces of pottery, in that they often afford little more than hints or suggestions, on which the author has undertaken to make progress. Most readers would naturally prefer longer passages in translation from more rewarding authorities instead of so many fragmentary references that lead to the frequent use of "probably," "possibly," or "perhaps."

The Persian historians who wrote, as the author remarks, after the fall of the Nizārī state "with remarkable fidelity," were ᶜAṭa Malik-i-Juwaynī (wrote 1260) and Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb (wrote 1310). While these two writers concentrated on the center Alamūt, the author observes that they have furnished "a reasonably continuous record of the internal evolution in this sect, which allows us to make sense of the few items of the time preserved among latter-day Nizārīs" (p. 26).

In his Appendix II Dr. Hodgson has translated a section from Al-Shahrastānī's *Al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal* that describes more lucidly Ḥasan-

i-Ṣabbāḥ's doctrine about the necessity of a trustworthy *imām*. And in his Appendix I he has translated the seven chapters that are attributed to Ḥasan-i-Ṣabbāḥ and which suggest, he says, "a relatively uneducated author, popularizing the faith on his own crude level for the humbler members of the sect." One gets the impression that the author has been disappointed with the Nizārī texts as sources of information. To seek to find out what they have said for themselves was a commendable desire, and there was doubtless the hope that the translations and edited texts that have been supplied in recent years by W. Ivanow would yield more than they have. And of Mr. Ivanow's interpretations of Nizārī documents and history, the author comments that "while always alert to find the most considerate view, they sometimes seem strained, particularly at those points where myth or mysticism are involved." Furthermore, he ascribes to Mr. Ivanow "a tendency to a freeness in translation, either for the sake of modernizing the spirit of a work, or for the sake of eliminating the 'fashionable' mysticism so as to show the rational meaning that may underlie the wording'" '(p. 33).

We note that in his discussions about the imām, Ḥasan-i-Ṣabbāḥ employed four main propositions. The first was to refute the rationalistic dictum that human reason was the ultimate authority and adequate to give men "the desired absolute truth about God." Ḥasan's declaration was that either one needs a teacher to know God, or not. He insisted, moreover, that to maintain any one view means the acceptance of a teacher, an authority—if only oneself. The second proposition was against the Sunnī legists. In this case he declared that either the teacher must be authoritative, or else any teacher will do. This discussion would lead to the conclusion, he argued, that there must be a single arbiter, as the Shīᶜites always claimed. The third of these propositions was aimed at the other Shīᶜites, notably the Twelvers. Either the authority of the teacher must be demonstrated, or any teacher can be accepted as authoritative. And the final proposal, in accepting the Shīᶜite position, was that for the knowledge of God men must have one authoritative *imām*. In proof of this contention Ḥasan utilized a dialectical principle in determining the nature of knowledge, namely, "that opposites can only be known through each other." Consequently, "without the imām, reason leads to a blank wall. Without reason the imām rests unproven and so unknown" (p. 56). Therefore Ḥasan asserted that his Imām Mustanṣir was himself the *ḥujja*, or proof, of God. Therefore, as the only one claiming to be his own proof he must be accepted, for lack of any other claimant to fulfill this logical necessity.

At a time when Islamic writings and reasoned discussions were being considerably influenced by the methods of Greek philosophers and the scholastic theologians, the freer thinking Ismāᶜīlīs attracted scholars to come and live in their isolated and well protected fortresses. Among these were poets, astrologers, anti-nominian Ṣūfīs, commentators on the Qurᵓān and students of moral philosophy.

One notable development was an intellectual revolt against orthodox Islam, particularly against conformity to the Sharīᶜah. This revolt was fostered and promoted by Ḥasan II (d. A.D. 1166). According to the

author's summary, "Ḥasan apparently proclaimed that through the truth he was bringing (and for which Ḥasan-i-Ṣabbāḥ had prepared the way), all men could come to know God directly, immediately (as the Ṣūfīs did)... By bringing knowledge of the truth into its fullness, evidently, Ḥasan had actualized the Paradise that some individual Ismāʿīlīs had been able to approach in potentiality; and opened it to all men. Now men could see God directly, with their spiritual eyes, as was appropriate to Paradise; and at the same time those who still refused to accept the truth were condemned in their wilful ignorance for ever. This was the great Resurrection [*qiyāmah*] toward which all lesser searchings, all partial truths, all former prophecies had been tending. This was the culmination of the ages" (p. 155). Ḥasan II was popular and effective in his leadership. He was intolerant, however, towards those who did not comply with his new teachings. "Though spiritually all who did not accept his gospel were by that fact dead, yet physically they remained; and Rashīd al-Dīn [the historian] tells us that Ḥasan at least suggested the death penalty for those in his territories who continued to cling to the Sharīʿah. Just as in the days of Sharīʿah it was a capital crime to behave on a free spiritual basis—the imām had required one to impose *taqiyya* [dissimulation] on oneself —so now in the days of the spiritual *Qiyāmah* it should be capital to follow the old law" (p. 158).

The author considers that "despite the more bizarre aspects of the faith, fundamentally it was an attempt to express the same sort of spiritual adulthood as that of Christianity that also threw off the yoke of the Law. The time had come when artificial rules meant to curb the ignorant for his own good were no longer necessary, for the child had learned to manipulate his environment himself in full awareness of what was involved; he could allow his decisions to arise, not from a contrived code or an imposed ritual of reminder, but from the spirit of the situation. The sense of the divine presence should of itself govern his life. The Ismāʿīlī's themselves noted the similarity of many of their positions to the Christian in this respect" (pp. 175, 176).

"A comparison of the system of the *Qiyāmah* with that of the Gospel according to John will bring out considerable similarities, as well as overwhelming differences... The exhortation to turn to God so that one's very being, one's existence, will be through the imām, can be rendered with the parable of the vine. The rejection of the Sharīʿah at the *Qiyāmah* is inevitably paralleled by the Christian rejection of the Law ('Neither in this mountain, but in spirit and in truth'), a rejection which also has come only in the fullness of time ('the time is coming and now is'). Though in John the Resurrection has not yet arrived as such, yet some elements to be associated with it are there already: 'If I had not spoken to them, they had not sinned; but now they have sin.' Already at Jesus' word, his disciples are clean, and are to abide in him; and following his personal resurrection, they shall know the truth, and the truth shall make them free—the great message of any gospel of the presence of the Spirit" (pp. 176, 177).

The author continues: "The most remarkable difference between the two gospels is the lack in that of Alamūt of Passion and Love," and to

this remark the author adds the note: "Perhaps a Christian can be forgiven for adding that he fails to find the biographical 'life and power' in the hereditarily selected Ḥasan which he finds in Jesus, or in Francis, who was given a similar role by the Spirituals; Ḥasan seems to be more nearly an arbitrary symbol of a community experience" (p. 177).

The leader of the Syrian community of the Nizārīs, who was appointed by Ḥasan II in 1133, was Rashīd al-Dīn Sinān. He is remembered as the colorful "Old Man of the Mountain," celebrated in E. S. Guyard's *Un Grand Maître des Assassins,* or as Ivanow has stated, for "successfully defending his people from the continuous pressure of the orthodox Muḥammadan rulers, especially the famous Saladin, on the one hand, and against the Crusaders on the other... The stories connected with Sinān chiefly center around his organisation of *fidāʿīs,* which he used as an instrument for removing his political opponents by assassination" (Enc. of Islam, Vol. 3, Part 2, p. 1123).

Sinān promoted the interpretation given by Ḥasan II to the *Qiyāmah,* the resurrection experience, as a spiritual emancipation from the authority of the Sharīʿah. Dr. Hodgson mentions that he sent an envoy "to ask the King of Jerusalem for teachers to come and make them Christian; requiring only that their tribute to the Templars be given up. To the consternation of the King and his court, who had gladly accepted the proposition, the Templars murdered the envoy on his return, and the project came to nothing, though the King apologized profusely. Perhaps the Ismāʿīlīs had thought to become a special Christian order, like the Templars themselves" (p. 204).

Two generations after the time of Sinān, which the author describes as "generations of reaction, hope and disappointment," the great center of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, Alumūt, fell in the course of the devastating sweep of the Mongol invasion, and with that the author says "our story is over."

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the late Agha Khān, who was recognized as the head of the Ismāʿīlīs in India, who are there known by their "ethic name of Khojas," had for many years "continued to receive the allegiance of the greater part of the scattered Ismāʿīlīs of Syria, Irān and the Oxus, in their thousands." ... And the Indian community "has not only become an important section of Islam, but one of the most alert and active commercial communities of the world" (p. 278).

Terrace Gardens, Lakeland, Florida DWIGHT M. DONALDSON

A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Edited by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1957. xxii, pp. 684. Bibliography, Index. $ 5.00.

There has long been a need to gather the essential sources of Indian philosophy as nearly as possible at first hand. This book contains translations, usually the best of those available in English, of authoritative writings throughout the history of Indian thought. In this instance, Indian thought and Indian philosophy are, with the exception of the Buddhist and Jainist sections, Hindu. The selection has been well made and the bibliography is extensive and authoritative.

The collection includes selections from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-gītā in its entirety, selections from the Mahābhārata, The Laws of Manu and the Artha-śāstra of Kautilya. Following these works, to which all orthodox systems of philosophy point as sources, certain characteristic writings in the heterodox systems (Cārvāka, Jainism and Buddhism) are included. The six orthodox systems and their variations constitute a major section of the work, and the final chapters contain quotations from the works of the contemporaries, the late Sri Aurobindo and Dr. Radhakrishnan himself. A very valuable appendix follows, which allows one to locate in the original texts the sources of the English translations used, with a listing of the translations themselves.

This is the first time, to the knowledge of this reviewer, that so comprehensive a source book has been available. It simplifies the task of the teacher of the history of religions immeasurably. The work is worthy of an extended review, but the subject matter is outside the major interest of this periodical.

Hartford, Connecticut MALCOLM S. PITT

The Coming World Civilization. By William Ernest Hocking, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1956, pp. xiv, 210. $ 3.75.

Professor Hocking has concerned himself for many years with the relationships between philosophy, religion, law and culture. In this book he attempts to arrange some of his conclusions into a comprehensive pattern. His contribution is welcome in an age of specialization that does little to equip men to study life in its wholeness.

The book is divided into six studies, each of which is in a sense self-contained yet dependent on the others. In the first half of the book he deals with the problems peculiar to our age, while in the latter half he discusses the manner in which religion—in particular, Christianity—holds the key to the world civilization which must inevitably develop unless we destroy the possibility by a holocaust. His analysis of Christianity in the fourth study is especially deserving of attention.

Hocking maintains that the state cannot of itself give man the basis for a world civilization. This is impossible because its rôle is that of law rather than spirit. We have passed the time when the church could provide the framework as in the past, because science and philosophy have released men from the dogmatic structures of the past. This, however, has freed religion for its contemporary rôle: it has freed Christianity from the West, so that the East can accept Christianity's contributions without thereby becoming westernized. Just how this is likely to come about, and how the living religions can be inter-related without losing their particularity, Hocking develops in his final chapter. Some will find fault with his conclusions, but few will argue that he has not presented a reasoned, sensitive argument which has theological depth and insight.

Hartford, Connecticut WILLIAM BRADLEY

Islamic Society and the West Volume I: *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century,* Part II. By H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen. Oxford University Press, New York, 1957, pp. 261, Bibliography, index, $ 5.60.

With the publication of *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century,*

Part II, Professors Gibb and Bowen complete the prolegomena, as they term it, of their projected multi-volume cooperative study of the impact of the West on the Turkish and Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire. They present in this work an independent, preliminary investigation rather than an introduction to the volumes to follow, their purpose being to describe the milieu upon which modern influences from the West went to work.

What the authors give the reader is a detailed portrayal of a predominantly static state society. Ottoman administrative organization and its attendant social structure, which by 1520 had come to dominate the western Islamic world, ceased to evolve in any constructive sense by the end of the 16th century. For the next two centuries Ottoman institutions and administrative practices, and the Islamic institutions which formed an integral part of the Ottoman fabric, suffered a gradual corruption of their orginal intent, or at best crystallized into obsolete forms protected by tradition. Attempts to purify and revitalize the systems through the introduction of safeguards merely added to the already confusing abundance of governmental and religious offices. Professors Gibb and Bowen describe this proliferation in considerable detail, and it is only when they reach into the past for perspective to explain how this state of affairs came to be that one is able to see any semblance of a pattern to the whole, or gain a feeling for the organic relationship of institution to institution. It is fortunate that the authors have done this, for these passages, e.g., the brilliant chapter on "The Religious Institution", are what rescue the work from becoming little more than a guide to Ottoman offices and officials and their respective functions.

For the student of Ottoman administrative and social organization, *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century* is the reference point for an impressive body of information, painstakingly gathered or deduced from a host of abstruse and frequently conflicting sources. For the student of Islamic society in the Ottoman period, it offers, scattered through its pages, passages of refreshing insight and interpretation. As for the student of Western influence on the Islamic world, he will be confronted with a superabundance of detail and specialized terminology. What the book contributes for this group of readers is evidence of the degree to which Ottoman Islamic society in the 18th century was unprepared for the new world of ideas which was soon to flood in upon it. Ottoman intellectuals of the 18th century, except for a handful of individualists like the remarkable Katib Chelebi, were woefully unprepared to compete with or be nourished by the West. The Arab intellectual climate, although in some ways freer than the Ottoman, was equally inadequate to meet the demands soon to be put upon it. It is no wonder that the West, when inevitably it broke through the defensive shell of Islamic tradition, should have had so deep and disruptive an impact.

Chapter headings of Part II are as follows: Taxation and Finance; The Religious Institution; The 'Ulema; The Administration of Law; Education; Religious Endowments (Awkaf); The Dervishes; The Dhimmis.

Montclair,
New Jersey

HARVEY P. HALL

SHORTER NOTICES

A Book of Prayers and Readings. Zaria, Northern Region, Nigeria, 1957, pp. 63.

For long it has been a problem how to attain joint Muslim-Christian worship and prayer in schools and colleges where both faiths are represented and where it is desired to express a real dependence upon God but in language which does not make the participation of either group unreal or uncongenial. A sub committee of the Morals Standards Committee of the Northern Region of Nigeria addressed itself to this problem and this pioneer booklet of readings and prayers compiled from Christian and Muslim sources is the result. The foreword points out that it is not intended to displace the regular prayers of either community. Al Haji Aliyu, Makama of Bida and Minister of Education contributes a preface. The committee had two Muslim and two Christian members, the Chairman being Dr Constance Geary. Three clergy were co-opted to serve. The result of its labours is a useful little book which opens up new possibilities which could well be essayed elsewhere also.

Mahomet et la Tradition Islamique. By Emile Dermenghem, Editions du Seuil, 1957, pp. 192, 100 illustrations, 350 frs.

A finely produced summary of the early origins of Islam. The author is already well-known for his biography of the Prophet. A remarkable feature of this work is the black and white reproductions of Muslim Calligraphy, architecture, art and design. These alone make it an attractive investment. The text is introductory and follows familiar lines. The book is the first in a new series of "Maitres Spirituels."

The Arabian Prophet. By Dr. Ata Mohy-ud-Din. Ferozsons, Lahore, Pakistan, 1955, pp. 405. Rs. 5.

This book, written by a Pakistani Muslim who has illustrated his points with profuse quotations mainly from western writers, is an attempt to help Muslims of westernised outlook to come to a new understanding of their Islamic heritage.

In the three main sections the life, ministry and message of Muḥammad are described in a way that helps to explain the very great impact that Islam has had, and continues to have, on the world. The author has given a clear picture of the social and economic administration set up and carried on in the 7th century to which he refers as the only example of the true Islamic way of life, in contrast with what goes on in the so-named Muslim states today.

Although he makes his point that the creation of a truly Islamic state in the modern world depends on the members of the state being true Muslims, Dr. Mohy-ud-Din gives no indication as to how the patriarchal way of life he describes, so seemingly dependent on the leadership, example and personal direction of the Prophet himself, can be adapted to the complex society of today.

Seeds of the Desert; the Legacy of Charles de Foucauld. By R. Voillaume, Burns and Oates, London, 1955, pp. 368.

Charles de Foucauld found a very inadequate biographer. This translation of *Au Coeur des Masses,* by the present Prior General of the

Little Brothers of Jesus, gives a far more authentic sense of the greatness and glory of the founder of the Order than Anne Fremantle's 'Life' succeeded in doing. It consists of meditations, on the meaning of Charles de Foucauld's concept of sanctity in identification, addressed to the Little Brothers. There are rich quotations from his writings, letters and diaries. The Prior General's long, sometimes repetitive, but always arresting, reflections are fused with the fire of their great exemplar. The result is a truly moving classic of the spiritual life and the Christian Mission. "Your role is to belong solely and totally to Jesus so as to enable Him to be present to your follow men." "Never let yourselves close up inside out of a faint heart or a weary mind".

Working Together—III. West Pakistan. By John Carden. London, The Highway Press, 1956. pp. 39.

The spearheads of the movement toward Christian unity today are often to be found in the lands of Asia. The churches of Pakistan are no exception. They have recently formed an All Pakistan Christian Council, a federation of East and West Pakistan groups including nearly all the Protestant Christians of the country. They have developed new unity in medical work, higher education, vocational education, and even in theological education, in spite of the theological and liturgical differences which continue to beset them. At present most of the major churches are engaged in negotiations for organic union, though the United Presbyterians, who constitute nearly half the Protestant Christian population of the area, remain aloof because they feel that the proposed union lacks a sufficiently explicit doctrinal statement, they doubt the proposals for unification of the ministry under bishops.

This significant story of growing unity is told briefly but carefully by John Carden in the third of the series on "Working Together" published by the Church Missionary Society. Not only is the contemporary development well covered, but also its antecedents right back to the early evidences of cooperativeness among the missionaries who first entered Lahore in 1849. Seldom are the facts of such development in a country like Pakistan brought together, and even a small contribution like the present one is to be warmly welcomed.

Revolt on the Nile. By Colonel Anwar El Sadat. New York: The John Day Company, 1957. pp. 159, $ 3.00.

The author, one of the members of "Free Officers," a clandestine revolutionary society organized by Jamāl ᶜAbd-al Nāṣir in 1939, tells the story of the revolution in Egypt from that date until 1952.

Disclosing the dual objective of this society (to destroy feudalism represented by the monarchy and to cast out British colonialism) he proceeds to describe frankly the series of intrigues with the Nazis during the Second World War, with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose aims were similar but whose methods differed, leading up to the final forced abdication of King Farouk, the placing of General Neguib in a position of leadership, and the withdrawal of the British forces to the Suez Canal area.

The book is virtually a laudatory account by a close friend of the part played by the President and his "Free Officers" in their

determined effort to bring to realization the right of the people. In telling it the author does not fail to portray ᶜAbd-al-Nāṣir as the practical, level-headed, calculating, cautious inspirer and leader of the revolution. It would be interesting to have the author's account of developments from 1952 to the present. Whatever the reader's sentiments, sympathies, or reactions, the disclosures of one so intimately involved in the revolution are of value.

Violent Truce. By Commander E. H. Hutchinson, USNR. The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1956. pp. 199, plus xxvi, illustrations, maps.

The author, a Military Observer assigned to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Palestine, from November 1951 until October 1954, and for two years of this period head of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission composed of Jordanians, Israelis and military observers from six neutral countries, relates some of the border incidents as he observed them. In his presentation he attempts to be strictly objective and impartial. Coming from the pen of an American, it should leave its impression especially on compatriots who are sensitive to the gravity of a situation with which they cannot but be concerned.

Resurgent Religions. By Bishop S. Kulundran, Lutterworth Press, 1957, pp. 32, 2/—.

A brief survey by a Bishop of the Church of South India of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam in their 20th century forms. The section on Islam is marred by several unfortunate errors both of print and content, which do not inspire confidence in the other judgements. There are some useful summaries and suggestions for the student. Under the aegis of the World Council of Churches and the first in a new series, this booklet should have been more careful and a Bibliography would have helped.

Cuadernos Africanos y Orientales, publication of the Institute of Political Studies, Plaza de la Marina Española, 8, Madrid. No. 35, 3rd quarter 1956, pp. 172.

Of special interest to readers of "The Muslim World" in this Journal is an article entitled "Spanish Thought about Morocco" in which the writer, J. M. C. Torres, considers Africa to be a natural and logical complement of Europe. Spain, by virtue of its geographical proximity and historical political relatedness, is in a position to understand best and to interpret the Muslim world. Another article discusses the frontiers of Algeria and still another the meaning of present political trends in South Arabia.

The section on World Events includes notes on the international situation, the Arab world, South Africa, economic and social affairs, with special reference to the Suez problem. Thereupon follow several book reviews and valuable periodical references on Muslim, Middle East and African affairs.

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

The International Islamic Colloquium. We are grateful to Dr. Bayard Dodge of Cairo for the following general account of the setting and scene at this significant gathering held in Lahore, Pakistan, at the turn of the year. It introduces a discussion by him of the significance of the Colloquium which it is planned to publish in July, possibly with evaluations from other participants.

During September, 1953, a Colloquium on Islamic Culture was held in America under the auspices of Princeton University and the Library of Congress. The conference was attended by forty Muslim delegates and an equal number of Anglo-Saxons, but the funds were too limited to make it possible to bring scholars from Europe. Although this first conference was an experiment, it was successful enough to create a demand for a second colloquium. The University of the Punjab very generously met this demand by organizing a large and well financed conference at Lahore. It was called the "International Islamic Colloquium", "Al-Nadwah al-ᶜĀlamiyyah li 'l-Islāmiyyāt".

The University of the Punjab, which served as host of the conference, was found in 1882. Last year there were 12,011 full time and 4,119 part time students, 2,019 of whom were women and 1,691 graduate students. Some of these students were in the affiliated colleges. Although the University occupies some handsome buildings in a pleasant part of the city, its grounds are much too limited to allow for expansion. Accordingly, a very extensive new campus is to be developed in the suburbs.

The Vice-Chancellor of the University, Dr. M. Afzal Husain, gave a great deal of time to the organization of the Colloquium. He was ably assisted by Dr. Muhammad Shafi, the Director, Professor Alaud Din Siddiqi, Head of the Department of Islamic Studies, and Mr. M. Bashir, the Registrar, as well as by a number of executive secretaries.

The inaugural meeting was held in the great hall of the University on the afternoon of December 29, 1957, and was addressed by Major General Iskander Mirza, President of Pakistan. Fifteen hundred guests were present, in addition to the delegates. The Vice-Chancellor also gave an address and many of the delegates brought greetings from their countries. After the assembly there was a garden party at the University.

The next day was devoted to festivities. In the morning the delegates were invited to attend impressive ceremonies for the laying of the first stone of the new University campus in the suburbs of Lahore. After a number of honorary degrees had been conferred on distinguished citizens of Pakistan, a large number of professional and post-graduate degrees were awarded to men and women students of the University. The Qurᵓān was recited and President Ewing of Forman Christian College led in prayer. In the afternoon the delegates were taken to the great audience hall of the Mughal palace fort, where the President of the Republic delivered an address from the royal balcony. The purpose of the ceremony was to open an exhibition of Muslim Art and Culture, which was installed in the beautiful Jahangir Quadrangle of the Fort.

After the ceremony there was a reception at Government House, given by Akhtar Husain, Governor of West Pakistan and Chancellor of the University of the Punjab.

While these ceremonies were taking place, all of the delegates to the Colloquium arrived, except a group from Russia, detained by winter storms and late in reaching Lahore. The secretarial staff of the Colloquium met the planes, arranged for the scholars to be accomodated in comfortable hotels, provided for transport and showed such thoughtfulness that all were most appreciative of their kindness.

The number of delegates was as follows: —Afghanistan-4, Canada-1, Ceylon-2, Communist China-5, Egypt-12, France-2, Germany-4, Holland-3, India-4, Indonesia-5, Iran-11, Iraq-7, Italy-1, Jordan-1, Kenya-1, Libya-5, Morocco-3, Norway-1, Pakistan-53, Palestine-1, Philippines-2, Saudi Arabia-2, Spain-1, South Africa-1, Sudan-2, Sweden-1, Syria-7, Thailand-2, Tunis-4, Turkey-3, Unesco-1, United Kingdom-5, U.S.A.-9, U.S.S.R.-4, Total-169.

The Government of Pakistan made it possible to bring this large group of scholars together, because it not only provided hotel accomodations, but also paid for the travel of the delegates to Lahore and return. Many of the Muslim delegates were very learned and influential leaders of their own communities, while some of the greatest living Orientalists were among the delegates from Europe and America. The only woman delegate was from the University of London. (She acted as chairman of one of the sessions.) A number of other delegates were accompanied by their wives, one Pakistani woman read a communication, and many ladies were in the audience as visitors.

The business sessions of the Colloquium began on the morning of December 31, 1957. There were eight days of formal meetings and except for a special program on Friday morning, January 3rd, there were sessions both morning and afternoon. As Sunday is observed as a day of rest in Pakistan, January 5th was devoted to recreation.

The sessions were held in the University Hall, which is a huge oblong room with a lofty ceiling. The flags of the countries from which the delegates came were hung around the walls. The two official languages of the conference were English and Arabic; at each session there were two chairman who could control the discussions in these two languages. As copies of the papers printed in both languages were distributed to the delegates, it was not necessary to waste time over translating, except when there was informal discussion. The two deans of the faculties of Letters of 'Ain Shams and Alexandria Universities impressed everyone by their skill in translating.

The long table for the presiding officers formed one side of an open square. To the right and left there were rows of tables for the delegates, who were seated alphabetically according to the names of their countries. On the fourth side there were seats for at least a hundred visitors. Behind these visitors were screens, which closed off the end of the room where tea was served both morning and afternoon. Each country was asked to name a leader for its group of delegates. These leaders sat in the front rows, with the names of their countries and individual microphones in front of them.

The Qur'ān was chanted at the beginning of each session. It was impressive to hear scholars from a variety of nations, as in turn they intoned passages from the Book which bound them all together. All of the mornings and part of the afternoons were devoted to the reading of formal papers. As most of the papers were too long, it was amusing to watch the presiding officers, as they tried to prevent the delegates from running overtime. Many delegates interrupted to raise objections to points which seemed to be unorthodox, and on several occasions there were explosive demonstrations against distasteful remarks. On the whole, however, the sessions were of a formal nature, as the audience was too large to make informal discussion practicable.

An effort was made to avoid political references. In fact one of the American delegates withdrew his paper, because it gave the impression of entering into political discussion, in a way which was not intended. A scholar from India raised objections when the Kashmir dispute was mentioned and another delegate explained that because of bad translation his remarks about Western civilization were not as uncomplimentary as they seemed to be. The Chinese and Russian Communist delegates included a certain amount of political material in their papers and also raised strong objections to a statement, which was made by a scholar of Austrian origin. On the whole, however, the conference was remarkably free from political material and was mainly devoted to subjects of a religious and cultural character.

It is difficult to give a true picture of the great hall, filled with men from thirty-four countries, many of whom were clad in Oriental garments with a great variety of turbans, national caps, white headcloths, and flowing robes. The women who came as visitors wore their beautiful saris, with veils over their shoulders. Mediaeval and modern, Eastern and Western, ecclesiastical and secular, were blended together.

Although many of the delegates came from lands struggling for independence and nationalism, there was a general consciousness of the importance of international cooperation.

This spirit of comradeship and good will was strengthened by personal contacts at meals and tea time, on bus trips and during receptions and excursions. On Friday, after the Muslim delegates had met together at the Islamic College, there was a pleasant luncheon on the lawn of the Institute of Islamic Studies. On Saturday afternoon there was a tea at the new Ismail Aiwan-i-Science, which has been donated by an industrial family of Lyallpur to encourage research in the social and natural sciences. It will contribute to the program of the Pakistan Association for the Advancement of Science.

On Sunday there was an out-of-door lunch in the great outer court of the famous tomb of the Emperor Jahangir. This was followed by a tea, which was given by the people of Lahore in the Shalimar. This park was laid out by the Mughal emperors and, inspite of the ravages of time, it is still one of the most beautiful gardens of the world. Pakistan Highlanders with their leopard skin cloaks and bagpipes marched around the pretty tanks and through the marble kiosks, while a multitude of fountains played in the air and watered the masses of flowers and exotic shade trees. On Sunday evening there was a dinner in the great hall of the University.

A number of the social events were cancelled because of the unexpected death of Shaikh Muḥammad ᶜAbd-Allāh Draz, who was a professor of Al-Jāmiᶜ al-Azhar and a member of the Supreme Council of the ᶜUlamāᵓ at Cairo. There was a short funeral service before the body was flown to Cairo for burial.

On the last day of the Colloquium a committee presented a number of resolutions, which were formally adopted. The principal decisions were: (i) that further meetings of a similar nature should be planned for and held at suitable intervals in the future; (ii) that the invitation extended by the Ministry of Education of Egypt, for holding the next Colloquium at Cairo, be gratefully accepted; (iii) that Dr. M. Afzal Husain of Lahore and Dr. Abdul Wahhāb Azzām of Egypt be asked to offer their services to plan for the next Colloquium.

Dr. Philip K. Hitti of Princeton was appointed to express the formal thanks of the delegates to the University of the Punjab and other scholars added their personal thanks. The final session ended with the chanting of the Qurᵓān by Al-Hajj Sattiov Ismail Mahdum, Deputy President of the Ecclesiastical Association of Muslims in Middle Asia and Kazakhstan and Rector of the "Mir Arab" Madrassah in Bukhāra. He wore a great white turban and a robe brilliant with blue, yellow, white and green stripes.

The conference ended with a dinner given by the Government of Pakistan at the Oberoi Falettis Hotel. As the sessions came to a close, the delegates felt sincere gratitude for the kind hospitality shown to them, at the same time that they realized what a tremendous contribution the Colloquium had made both to an understanding of Islam and to international good will. It is hoped to publish in the July issue an analytical article dealing with the themes and findings of the Colloquium.

Thoughts on the Artificial Satellite. The launching of the first artificial satellite by the Russians in 1957 did not fail to elicit comment from Arab writers. A writer for the Mecca daily *Al-Bilād al-Saᶜūdiyyah* in October said that in his opinion man's successes in launching the moon does not mean that man will now rule space. The success of this experiment, he admits, is a great scientific achievement but modern scientific discoveries "will not change the world's universal conditions." Scientific progress will be limited by the laws of nature which God has allowed the mind of man to discover. In the Qurᵓān God has said, "And of knowledge ye have been vouchsafed but little." (xvii. 85).

Another writer in the same paper said: "The appearance of the artificial moon will no doubt restore the state of international balance between the Western and Eastern blocs." He expressed the hope that this will stop the armament race and deplored the huge expenditures for arms and military bases during the recent years. He concluded his commentary by saying that because of the recent launching of the earth satellite "the world is swinging between complete destruction and a new life of everlasting peace."

Appeal for Social Reform. A writer in an August 25 Riyāḍ weekly expressed his mind about the use of wealth thus: "Wealthy men: Duty calls; will you respond? Why do you not use your wealth in fostering the national economy? What you are doing is amassing money without

benefiting either yourself or your country. I wish someone would start a soap factory, a leather tannery, a soft drinks factory, a textile factory or a blast furnace for scrap metal. Why do you not wake up? Economically speaking your minds are fossilized and none of you knows the meaning of development, commercially or socially. If you embark on industrial and economic projects, you will not only help your country but also derive great profits. This is only a word to you, the wealthy men. I hope you will benefit from it."

Another writer in the same weekly calls for a reform in the postal system, especially for the sale of postage stamps. He wrote: "People are crowded in front of the post office window. Why is this so? For several reasons: The public habitually sends letters by registered mail for fear they may get lost. Furthermore, the numerous stamps for each letter can only be affixed by the postal clerk. The writer proposes that in order to correct this situation, the following be done: the number of stamps required for each letter be reduced; that stamps be sold in many shops so that they may be available to all and that each person may affix his own stamps; that public confidence be created in the proper functioning of the Post Office and that the public be reassured about the safety of the mails, whether registered or not; that many post office boxes be established in suitable places in the city and messengers be employed to empty these boxes regularly..."

These observations are reported not to arouse an idle curiosity but to note to what extent progress, well-being and harmony depend on efficiency and orderliness in everyday affairs. Indeed it may be implied from the above excerpts that harmonious relationships and a sense of well-being may be enjoyed only as the qualities of honesty, integrity, altruism and mutual confidence characterize society, whether on a municipal, national or world scale.

Higher education. The project formerly announced of the creation of a Saʿūdī University in Riyāḍ has finally been realized. On Nov. 6, 1957, the University was formally inaugurated in the presence of H.M. King Saʿūd, members of the royal family, government ministers and other dignitaries. Addresses were made by the Minister of Education and the Governor of Riyāḍ. Dr. ʿAbd al-Wahhab ʿAzzam, former Egyptian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and now President of the Saʿūdī University, delivered an address on behalf of the University staff. Initially the University is composed of a College of Arts and a College of Science. The former will include divisions for Arabic language and literature, Islamic languages and literature, general history, Islamic history and civilization, geography, European languages an literature. The College of Science will provide instruction in physics, chemistry, mathematics, botany, zoology, geology and astronomy. The period of instruction in these two Colleges will be four years. It is announced that a College of Commerce and a College of Law will be added. The latter will teach the Islamic Sharīʿah.

The new Assiut University in Upper Egypt was opened on October 7th, 1957. In the beginning it is composed of a College of Science and a College of Engineering. It is reported that in the former two hundred students are enrolled, including twelve girls, and in the latter 320 students including sixteen girls.

On Sept. 20, 1957, a medical college was opened by Prime Minister Suhrawardy at Chittagong in East Pakistan. Attached to the medical college is a 120-bed hospital.

Camels and Cadillacs. A commentator for a Meccan daily has deplored the lack of a poet to immortalize the Cadillac. He wrote:

"If you are to choose between two gifts, what would you choose, a camel or a Cadillac? Naturally you will choose the Cadillac, for the days of the camel are gone. The camel, however, has been made immortal in Arabic literature, and in the past, the camel was the best of all gifts. The 57-model Cadillac of today, on the other hand, is a piece of modern art. Have you noticed the difference between the comfortable and soft seats of a Cadillac and the arched back of a camel? And the air-conditioning, and the radio, etc. No matter what I say about the Cadillac, I will be unable to give it as good a description as Arab poets of old gave the camel. Isn't there any poet today who can immortalize the Cadillac with at least one poem or at least a few lines of poetry? If I were a poet I would not hesitate to do that for a moment. The poor Cadillac; it has not yet entered the field of literature, and no poet has yet made mention of it. It is possible, however, that if one of our poets does himself one day own a Cadillac, it will enter the field of literature and may then rival the camel."

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By Sue Molleson Foster

I. GENERAL

Essai de bibliographie sur la vie et l'œuvre d'Ibn Haldun. H. Pérès. *Studi Orientali in Onore di G. L. Della Vida.* Roma, 1956. pp. 304-329.

The Horace Havemeyer bequest of Islamic art. Maurice S. Dimand. *Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Art,* New York. May, 1957. pp. 208-212. Describes an outstanding collection of Syrian and Persian pottery.

Near Eastern Studies in Italy. Ettore Rossi. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. February, 1957. pp. 57-60. A survey of the various institutions engaged in the work — among them the Universities of Rome and Naples.

L'œuvre scientifique syrienne de M. Charles Virolleaud. *Syria,* Paris. Vol. 33, 1956. pp. 8-12. The article is included in "Hommages à M. Ch. Virolleaud," which is prefaced by an extensive bibliography of his works.

Les origines de la mosquée et l'architecture religieuse des Omeiyades. Élie Lambert. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 6. pp. 5-18.

The Parthian Gōsān and Iranian minstrel tradition. Mary Boyce. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* London. 1957, part 1-2. pp. 10-45. A thoroughly documented study.

Références. A. van Leeuwen. *IBLA,* Tunis. 1956, part 3. pp. 333-347. A classified periodical survey.

Le rinceau dans l'évolution de l'art sudarabe. Jacqueline Pirenne. *Syria,* Paris. 1957, part 1-2. pp. 97-127. A profusely illustra-

ted history of the graceful decoration from the 4th century B.C. in Syria tracing its penetration South over the ancient trade routes.

Robert College: Turkish gateway to the future. Franc Shor. *The National Geographic Magazine,* Washington, D.C. September, 1957. pp. 399-437. Describes steady progress through the years, after a difficult beginning in 1863-64, under the guidance of Dr. Cyrus Hamlin aided financially by Christopher Rhinelander Robart.

II. HISTORY OF ISLAM

Aspects nouveaux du problème Thamoudéen. Jacques Ryckmans. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 5. pp. 1-17.

Les gouverneurs de la Province Romaine d'Arabie de 193 à 305. H. Gilflaum. *Syria,* Paris. 1957, part 1-2. pp. 128-144. A chronological list with some biographical information.

Islam in Holland. S. M. Tufail. *The Islamic Review,* Woking. August, 1957. pp. 37-38. There is considerable activity, especially in Amsterdam where there is a beautiful mosque.

Observations sur la nature et les causes de la Conquête Arabe. G.-H. Bousquet. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 6. pp. 37-52.

Quis custodiet custodes: some reflections on the Persian theory of government. Ann K. S. Lambton *Studia Islamica,* Paris, 1956, part 5, pp. 125-148; 1956, part 6, pp. 125-146.

Some social and political aspects of Islam in Indonesia. Justus M. van der Kroef. *The Islamic Review,* Woking. July, 1957. pp. 33-39. While strictly orthodox Islam, wholly based on the Qurʾān, Fiqh, and Muslim tradition does not exist, the diverse Indonesian Islamic movements are vital assets to the young nation.

III. QURʾĀN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

Biographical material from the Diwān al-Hikmah. D. M. Dunlop. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* London. 1957, part 1-2. pp. 82-89. Discusses material to be found in a British Museum manuscript, an abridgement of the "Cabinet of Wisdom" by Abū Sulaimān Muḥammad ibn Tāḥir al-Sijāzī dealing with Greek and Islamic philosophers.

Le culte de Muʿāwiya au IIIe siècle de l'Hégire. Charles Pellat. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 6. pp. 53-66.

The dating of the Qurʾān. W. Montgomery Watt. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* London. 1957, part 1-2. pp. 46-56. A review of Richard Bell's theories.

L'extase de Plotin et le Fanāʾ de Ghazalī. Farid Jabre. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 6. pp. 101-124.

False prophets and others. A. S. Tritton. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,* London. 1957, part 1-2. pp. 1-9. Describes the rise and careers of men such as Hāmīm in North Africa, Abū Sālih of Ḥilla, Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥājj Jamāl al-Majdhūb of Aleppo, and many others.

L'humanisme dans la pensée Arabe. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 6. pp. 67-100.

Les noms et les statuts: le problème de la foix et des œuvres en Islam. L. Gardet. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 5. pp. 61-124.

On some recent translations of the Qur'ān. A. Bausani. *Numen,* Leiden. January, 1957. pp. 75-82. Considers the work done by Arberry, M. M. Moreno, R. Bell, Montgomery Watt, and C. Widengren; the author's own work, "Il Corano"; and two Aḥmadiyyah translations.

La prière coranique en Islâm. Yoakim Moubarac. *Église Vivante,* Paris. Novembre-Décembre, 1956. pp. 411-423. An exposition, with many beautiful extracts, of canonical and free prayer, as well as the prayers of mysticism.

Religious influences on medieval Arabic philosophy. L. Kopf. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 5. pp. 33-59.

Simples remarques négatives sur le vocabulaire du Coran. Robert Brunschvig. *Studia Islamica,* Paris. 1956, part 5. pp. 19-32.

IV. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

La femme musulmane en U.S.S.R. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. *Esprit,* Paris. Juillet-Août, 1957. pp. 46-65. Gives high praise to Russia for her amazing success in modernizing the condition of her Islamic peoples in less than forty years — especially the emancipation and progress among the women.

Fertility of the urban and rural population in Egypt. Girgis Abdo Marzouk. *L'Égypte Contemporain,* Le Caire. Janvier, 1957. pp. 27-34. The author reports a definite trend towards smaller families especially in urban areas.

Forest management in Iran. Henry S. Kernan. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Spring, 1957. pp. 199-202. Until 1943 Iran practised no conservation, having been endowed with magnificent forests and simply taking them for granted. Now the Forest Service is putting through an active constructive programme with Point Four aid.

V. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Appeasing the Arabs. *King-Hall News-Letter,* London. July 31, 1957. pp. 857-860. Discusses the news of the removal of the Shell and British Petroleum Company from Israel because of the activity of the Arab Boycott Committee and recalls the tragic results from the appeasement of Italy in the Abyssinian crisis of 1936.

Arab neutralism and Bandung. Georgiana G. Stevens. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Spring, 1957. pp. 139-152. The author believes that "what seems to be evolving is a more guarded and real neutrality in the classic, non-political sense of the word, in place of the ambiguities of 'neutralism' " in the Arab world.

Auf Weiszen und Blauen Nil. Erika, Graefin Reventlow. *Christ und Welt,* Berlin. September 26, 1957. p. 18. Tells of the newly independent Sudan.

Four clues to the Mideast. James Morris. *New York Times Magazine,* New York. December 8, 1957. pp. 9; 98-99. Considers the

oil and strategic interests of the Free World and Russia; the appeal of radicalism to the down-trodden masses; the Arab detestation of Israel; and Arab longing for some form of racial unity.

THE GREATEST OIL KING OF THEM ALL. Richard Austin Smith. *Fortune,* New York. March, 1957. pp. 152-156. Describes the history and prospects of Shaikh ᶜAbdullāh al-Subah of Kuwait.

HOW THE BOY KING FOOLED THE PLOTTERS. Joseph Alsop. *The Saturday Evening Post,* Philadelphia. November 23, 1957. pp. 31; 147-150. Praise for the youthful king of Jordan.

THE LESSON OF SYRIA. *King-Hall News-Letter,* London. August 28, 1957. pp. 889-892. Suggestions for more intelligent handling of Middle East problems.

NEW BLOCS FOR OLD IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Ray Allen. *Commentary,* New York. August, 1957. pp. 132-138. Surveys the alignment of Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen versus Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya strengthened by the partial sympathy of Saudi Arabia.

NEW CURRENTS IN OLD DAMASCUS. Osgood Caruthers. *New York Times Magazine,* New York. September 8, 1957. pp. 21; 120-121. With the withdrawal of French and British influence from the area, the United States has become the disliked Western Power while Eastern Europeans in all professions are cordially welcomed.

VI. NORTH AFRICA

CULTURE ARABE ET CULTURE OCCIDENTALE DANS LA TUNISIE D'AUJOURD'HUI. M. Lelong. *IBLA,* Tunis. 1956, part 3. pp. 313-331. An analysis of answers by prominent Tunisians to a questionnaire put out by Al-Fikr.

LE MAROC À LA CONQUÊTE DE LUI-MÊME. Jean Lacouture. *Ésprit.* Paris. Juin, 1957. pp. 968-981. An eloquent plea for patience and help for the young country—so dependent on French support in its yet untried sovereignty.

NEW TUNISIA. *The Islamic Review,* Woking. July, 1957. pp. 22-27. The revision of the judicial system, the abolition of polygamy, and the submission of divorce to the decision of a tribunal are all significant achievements for Tunisia's first year of independence.

NOTES FROM MOROCCO. Cecily Mackworth. *The Twentieth Century,* London. September, 1957. pp. 204-215. Informal sketches of life in Rabat, Aghouatime, Marrakech, and Tiznit—all tremendously changed since the time of the French, but still charming and all suffering from lack of tourists.

RÉFLEXIONS SUR LE DRAME ALGÉRIEN. Gustave Monod. *Foi et Vie,* Paris. Mai-Juin, 1957. pp. 191-194. Summarises various documents and articles on the shocking occurrences in Algeria, laments the blows given to Christianity in the eyes of Islam, and urges a policy of pacification towards the rebels and not one of reprisal.

SAUD VS. NASSER. Osgood Caruthers. *New York Times Magazine,* New York. November 10, 1957. pp. 24; 88-90. A study in contrasts.

TUNISIE. Marc Heurgon. *Esprit,* Paris. Juin, 1957. pp. 951-967. Surveys a year of Tunisian independence and shows how much France might be doing to help in technological and cultural lines.